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Two Basic Points in Georgian-German Relations

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I Introduction

The relations between Georgia and Germany refer to the actual and progressively ongoing process. These relations have quite significant tradition in the last century. According to the information of the German Embassy in Georgia\textsuperscript{1} “close and trustful relations between Germany and Georgia have the tradition of nearly 200 years”\textsuperscript{2}. Therefore the experience earned through the different historical points of German-Georgian relations can be used from nowadays as well as from the future perspective. Accordingly, the analyze of the important points in these relations and explaining certain circumstances of them should be worth of interest. Therefore the aim of our research is to clarify the certain points in the history of Georgian-German relations with the proper theoretical framework.

Although the relations between Germany and Georgia count nearly two centuries, we have to draw the line according to the characteristics of these relations. Under the term “relation” we basically mean political relations in our research\textsuperscript{3}. In this respect, for example, the translation of Shota Rustaveli’s “Night in the Panther’s Skin” made by Arthur Leist in XIX century does not comply with the concept of ‘relations’ in its political terms as we refer to it in this research. The political relations between these two countries had not started until the First World War. The reason of this was the fact that Georgia had been part of the Russian Empire all over the XIX century and could only have cultural relations with the states like Germany. However, the outbreak of the First World War in the beginning of the next century gave the impulses to Georgian interest groups to fight for the independence (not autonomy but independence) – the objective which was no longer that far from reality.

Our research is dedicated to the two basic points of the history of German-Georgian relations. The first point is the relations connected to the declaration of independence by Georgia in 26 May 1918. The second one refers to the restoration of independence in 9 April 1991 based on the independence act of 26 May. These two dates had been the

\textsuperscript{1} http://www.tiflis.diplo.de/Vertretung/tiflis/de/02/BilateraleBeziehungen.html
\textsuperscript{2} All of the translations (from Georgian, German and Russian sources) are made by author.
\textsuperscript{3} See p.10.
crucial points in the history of Georgia of the previous century. However, they had been the basic turning points in the history of German-Georgian relations as well. In the first case the basic motivation for starting the relations between Georgia and Germany was the issue of Georgian independence. In the second case the relations between Germany and Georgia has started after (but not immediately after) the declaration of independence as well.

However, there is a significant difference between these two periods of Georgian-German relations. First of all, the symmetry of developing relations goes differently. In the first case the relations had started several years before the declaration of independence, which was the direct result of these relations, and finished shortly (several months) after declaring independence. In the second case the relations have started some time after the restoration of independence, the relations which still go on during the last couple of decades. Another difference, which has the basic importance for our research, is the fundamentally different attitude from the German side towards the first and second cases of declaring independence of Georgia. The research tries to clarify the reasons for such difference and explain it with the proper theoretical concept.

The first actual part of our research\(^4\) refers to the declaration of independence on 26 May 1918 as the first basic point in German-Georgian relations. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part is dedicated to the preliminary period of the independence declaration. In this period the relations with German Foreign office had been initiated by the group of Georgian emigrants forming the Georgian Independence Committee. As a result of their activities Germany became interested and involved into ‘Georgian issue’. The second part examines the actual event of the independence declaration; namely the circumstances under which the Act of Independence was declared and the decisive role of Germany in this event. The third part discusses the period after 26 May 1918 which did not last longer than the autumn of the same year. That part clarifies the role of Germany as the guarantor and protector of Georgian independence as well as the reasons for unexpected end of these relations.

The following chapter is dedicated to the restoration of Georgian independence in 9 April 1991 as the second basic point. As mentioned above, this period seems to be similar to

\(^4\) Chapter III.
the first case, but in terms of German-Georgian relations it is substantially different from the first case at the same time. As there is not much to narrate about Georgian-German relations of the independence restoration period, that chapter has the different structure. The first part discusses the actual situation in Georgia in the years 1989-91, which was the period of preparation for the restoration of independence and the declaration of this finally in 1991. The second part examines the situation in Germany during the same period, which was full of dramatic events for Germany as well. The third part sums up the situation in terms of Georgian-German relations of that time and clarifies the reason why that period had been so different from the first case.

Our research follows the inductive reasoning of making general theoretical explanations after the examination of concrete cases. Accordingly, the next chapter is dedicated to the explanation of the abovementioned cases from the framework of political realism – theory which happened to have most explanatory power in these concrete cases. The first part of this chapter provides the explanation of the cases discussed before through the perspective of political realism. However, there are certain aspects of the cases which can not be explained from the political realism perspective. The second part attempts to find the proper explanation for these certain aspects. The final part summarizes the general theoretical explanations made so far about both of the cases in the previous parts.

The following chapter after the introduction contains the preliminary guidelines and general methodological explanations for the reader of the research. The aim of this chapter is to guide the reader across the different parts of the research. It provides the basic descriptions of the research topic and the field which it belongs. It also defines the research question and the hypothesis based on this question with the proper backgrounds, including the independent variables and dependent variable in this hypothesis. That chapter provides the explanation of methodology used in the research as well as the basic explanations referring to the case-study. Finally it provides the definition of the basic terms used in the thesis. Therefore the reader guided by this chapter will be familiar with the basic concepts and directions of the research.

\[5\] Chapter II.
II Preliminary Guidelines and Methodological Explanations

The relations between Germany and Georgia reportedly count the history of nearly two centuries\(^6\). However, the political relations between these countries had not been conducted until the beginning of the previous century. The reason for starting these relations was Georgian aspiration towards independence, which became achievable according to the new reality influenced by the First World War. The role of Germany in the declaration of Georgian independence by the act of 26 May 1918, as well as in the preparatory period and as a guarantor and protector of this independence, had been very significant. However, the attitude of Germany towards the very similar case of the restoration of independence in 1991 had been significantly different. While examining these two cases in the comparative way our research attempts to find the explanations for the abovementioned difference in the relevant theoretical framework. As the Georgian-German relation is the currently ongoing process, the experience of the past cases can be useful from nowadays perspective, as well as for the future.

The research belongs to the area of European Studies. According to the common definition of this field, European Studies include the social and political science curriculum containing the variety of disciplines including European history and the relations of European states with the neighboring countries of the European Union. This view is shared with Institute of European Studies at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University as well\(^7\). Accordingly, the topic of our research is completely in compliance with the field of the European Studies. The topic focuses on the relations between Germany and Georgia, which can be considered as the topic of the European history. The second part of the research is focused on the relations between these countries in 90s of the previous century, which is the topic for the recent history of the European Union. While the relations with Georgia has been chosen as the issue of research, it draws the attention on the relations between European and neighboring states, which is also the topic included in the field of the European Studies.

\(^6\) http://www.tiflis.diplo.de/Vertretung/tiflis/de/02/BilateraleBeziehungen.html
\(^7\) http://www.ies.tsu.ge/index.php?act=maes
The research question our thesis attempts to answer is the following: what can be the determining factor (or factors) for the substantial change of attitude from one country (Germany) towards the similar issue (independence) developing in another country (Georgia) in two different periods of time (1918 and 1991). The country, the attitude of which had been changed substantially towards one issue in the different time periods is Germany. Another country, towards which the attitude had been changed is Georgia. More precisely, the issue of concern and the object of attitude is the independence issue. The different time periods refer to 26 May 1918 with its short backgrounds and further developments during the following month in the first case and 9 April 1991 with the similar understanding of the preparatory and following periods in the second case.

According to the research question stated above, the hypothesis based on this question should be the following: the abovementioned substantial change in the attitude from one country towards the issue of independence of another country can be determined by the national interests of both of these countries. Accordingly, while these national interests coincide the relations between the countries go on and as long as these interests do not coincide with each other any longer, the relations do not develop any further. Concretely, the case of German-Georgian relations has been taken in order to apply the hypothesis with this concrete case. The elements of this hypothesis have been already defined in the previous paragraph of the research question and do not need further explanations, as they maintain the same meanings in the hypothesis as well.

The abovementioned hypothesis contains the dependent and independent variable. In terms of this hypothesis the independent variables are the national interests. They are in plural, while they belong to the two different countries and two different time periods. The dependent variable refers to the interrelation between these countries and is singular. Expressed in the mathematical representation they should have the following form:

\[ ax + bx = y \]

where a and b refers to the different countries, x implies the independent national interest and y refers to the dependent relations between the countries. We also have to mention that national interests can not be completely independent from the theoretical
perspective. However, the factors determining national interests can not be independent as well. Accordingly, if we follow these causal links, it might continue infinitely. Therefore we have drawn the ending line after the national interests while choosing them as independent variables for our hypothesis.

In terms of methodology we have chosen the way of inductive reasoning, implying the move from concrete observation to the generalization and theoretical explanation⁸. Namely we have chosen the method of beginning from the concrete case examples and observations, developing the tentative hypothesis while examining the cases and finally ending up with the general theoretical explanations of the cases discussed before (so-called ‘bottom-up’ method, instead of deductive ‘top-down’). Accordingly, the research starts with the concrete observations on the case study, tentatively elaborates with the theoretical explanations on this path and finally ends up with the general theoretical explanations of the concrete cases. In terms of research of the cases, the qualitative method of comparative case-study is preferred.

In terms of case study, the case of Georgian-German relations has been chosen as the case. It might seem as the single case at the first sight. However, it contains two separated sub-cases. The first case contains the relations between Germany and Georgia during the First World War period, basically around May 1918. The second case refers to the relations between the same countries during the collapse of the Soviet Union, basically around April 1991. As we can see, these sub-cases significantly differ from each other. Therefore the case-study fluctuates between being single and double. The best possible explanation of our case-study should be the statement that it is a single case divided into two separate sub-cases.

In our research the variety of terms are used, the explanation of which would be helpful for the reader in order to give the proper meaning to each of these terms while reading in the different contexts. We have to mention that we do not have any aim to provide the original or commonly shared definition of these terms. The aim of defining them is only to guide the reader. Therefore the definitions of these terms are valid and refer to this concrete thesis and it might differ from the commonly shared understanding of these terms.

⁸ http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php
For the reasons of our research, the following terms have to be defined as follows (alphabetical order):

Country – the territory and population of the nation or state.

The First World War – the war centered in Europe started on 28 July 1914 and finished on 11 November 1918.

Georgia – the territory and population of Georgian nation represented by the interest groups before declaring independence in 26 May 1918 and restoring independence in 9 April 1991, and represented by their legitimate governments since the declaration and restoration of independence.

Georgian Independence Committee – (also referred as the Georgian Committee) group of Georgian emigrants in Europe collaborating with German Foreign Office in order to achieve the independence of Georgia.

Georgian National Liberation Movement – the movement of late 1980s led by dissidents Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava aiming the restoration of independence of Georgia.

Germany – in the first case the German Empire with its status before the revolution in autumn 1918 leading to the establishment of Weimar Republic; in the second case only the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) before reunification and the reunified Germany with its current status since 3 October 1990.

Interest Group – voluntarily united group of persons seeking to influence the public policy in order to achieve their common objectives.

National Interest – the certain interest of the state or country expressed by its government or interest groups.

Perestroika – changes in the policy of the Soviet Union aiming to restructure the Soviet political and economic system, started in March 1985 and finished with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

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9 Deutsches Reich.
Political Realism – theory of International Relations which gives priority to national interest and security over the moral principles and ideology basically expressed in the works of Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau.

Political Relations – interactions between the governments or interest groups of the countries about the affairs of internal or external policies of these countries with the objective of achieving and establishing favorable relationship with each other.

Relations – refer to the political relations between the country governments or interest groups.

According to the development of reasoning discussed above, our research starts with the observations on the concrete cases. While discussing these cases the explanatory theories are elaborated tentatively in a simultaneous way with the discussions. The final part of the research sums up the theoretical explanations of the cases discussed before. Basically the theoretical explanation is made under the framework of the theory of political realism. More precisely, it refers to the classical realistic viewpoints expressed in the works by Thucydides, Machiavelli and, basically, the Six Principles of political realism defined by Hans Morgenthau. Together with these classical viewpoints some neorealist concepts have been used as well. More details of the theoretical explanations will be provided in the final part of our thesis.
III The Declaration of Independence

The declaration of independence in 26 May 1918 is the very important date in the history of Georgia. After 117 years of loosing independence and being part of Russian empire, this declaration gave birth to Georgian Independent Republic. Unfortunately the independent state existed in very short time period – less than three years. However, the 26 May declaration remained as a basement for the restoration of independence during the 70 years of soviet ruling and in 9 April 1991 the restoration of independence was based on the public legal and constitutional heritage of 26 May declaration.

It is the commonly known fact and commonly shared view, that the declaration of independence in 1918 was strongly supported by Germany and without this support the independence could hardly be achieved, if ever. It shows that the relations between Germany and Georgian part were very special by 1918. However, these relations did not last longer and by the end of the same year things had been changed. The following chapter discusses Germany’s role in the declaration of independence in 1918 and German-Georgian relations by that certain period of time. It also attempts to provide backgrounds and explanations of these relations.

1 Preliminary Period

The intense Georgian-German relations had started several years before the question of independence came into political reality. As the First World War broke out and Germany formally declared war with Russia in 1 August 1914\(^\text{10}\), shortly afterwards the young absolvent of the University of Geneva Leo Kereselidze contacted to the German council in Geneva Baron Gisbert von Romberg and asked him for help in „revolutionizing Georgia and whole Caucasus“\(^\text{11}\). The abovementioned action would be in the framework of “revolutionizing policy”, while the uprising of peripheries against empires and colonies against metropolises was considered as one of the efficient tools for defeating the

\(^{10}\) [http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/julycrisis.htm](http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/julycrisis.htm)

\(^{11}\) ბაქრაძე გვ. 34.
enemies by Germany\textsuperscript{12}. The offer made German part interested, as the realization of this plan could be helpful in the eastern front, and was accepted. Shortly afterwards the Georgian Independence Committee was established in September 1914\textsuperscript{13}, with Georg Machabelli, Michael Tsereteli and Peter Surguladze as the leaders together with Kereselidze.\textsuperscript{14}

What makes these relations interesting from the perspective of political realism is that both of the parts did not have any preliminary plan for the future collaboration. Their cooperation was the coincidence of interests by chance\textsuperscript{15} without any preparations before. The dynamically developing reality of the newly started World War made the German Foreign Affairs Agency and the group of Georgian emigrants involved in this cooperation based on the mutual interests. Despite of several disappointments in realizing the initial plans, this cooperation had been going on during nearly 4 years, until 1918 when Georgian independence was declared.

As the reality of war was the basic ground for these cooperation, the objectives of it was directed to the military matters. The policy of „revolutionizing“ contained the need of soldiers able to act in Georgia and, generally, in Caucasus and the military equipment needful for such actions. Accordingly, the idea of Georgian Legion came into being, as well as their provision with armament\textsuperscript{16}. This legion should be composed by Georgian former prisoners of war (as the part of Russian empire, Georgia was participated in the war on the Russian side) convinced to act on the German side. „We do not want to treat you as our enemies, rather, we consider you as our guests“\textsuperscript{17} said the newspaper „Caucasus\textsuperscript{18}“ spread among Georgian prisoners as the leaflets. The agitation was conducted by the members of Georgian Committee and the aim of this propaganda was to win the former soldiers over, in order to make them acting on German side, or, at least, to instill the sense of sympathy towards Germany.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{12} ბაქრაძე გვ. 31.
\bibitem{13} Strachan p. 718
\bibitem{14} Bihl s.32
\bibitem{15} ბაქრაძე გვ. 283.
\bibitem{16} Strachan p. 718
\bibitem{17} ბაქრაძე გვ. 91.
\bibitem{18} “კავკასია” – Georgian name of the newspaper
\end{thebibliography}
In the beginning the movement appeared to be successful, while the significant number of Georgian war prisoners made up their minds to join the Georgian legion. The number of the soldiers in this legion were fluctuating and changing very often. The practical use of this legion remained the problem as initially it was created in order to be the centre of revolt in Georgia and Caucasus, but that kind of uprisings did not take place and the couple of expeditions by submarines to the Georgian western border did not succeed. Many of the preliminary plans, such as collecting 500,000 Caucasians for „revolutionising“, or providing 50,000 rifles seemed to be quite fantastic even in the beginning and, accordingly, never came true. However, the propagandistic activities supported to intensify the German-Georgian relations in the semi-military and non-military affairs as well.

The Order of Queen Tamar, established since 1916, was the example of such semi-military activities often grown to another sort of relations. This order was provided by Georgian Independence Committee and granted to prominent figures who had performed significant service for Georgia, including military, as well as civil merit. According to Wipert von Blücher, this order „eclipsed all of the German military decorations with its magnificence and size“. This order was granted to several German prominent military and public figures, including Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, General von Lossow and several others.

The need for anti-Russian propaganda among Georgian war prisoners led to the idea of publishing Georgian newspaper in German and Georgian, the organizer of which was the Georgian Committee. Initially the name of this newspaper was „Caucasus“, which transformed into „Georgian Newspaper“ in 1916. Together with pro-German agitation, this newspaper provided the propaganda of the idea of independent Georgia Europe-wide, which already from military to political affairs. As the publication of the newspaper was coordinated by Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient - the foreign institution oriented on

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19 ბაქრაძე გვ. 235.  
20 Strachan p. 718  
21 Der Orden der Königin Tamar  
22 ბაქრაძე გვ. 163.  
23 გამსახურდი გვ. 252.  
24 „ქართული გაზეთი“ in Georgian  
25 News Agency about the East
the eastern countries\textsuperscript{26}, the relations entered into cultural fields as well. Therefore the newspaper made progress in terms of approaching Georgian issue into German concern. Young Georgian student Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, famous Georgian writer and public figure later on, also worked in this newspaper as an assistant-publisher.

The fate of Konstantine Gamsakhurdia shows that working in Georgian Independence Committee could be highly risky. Nearly twenty years later, after returning back into Georgia, Gamsakhurdia was arrested in 1926 with the charge of espionage, one of the basic argument of which was his participation in the activities of Georgian Committee 20 years ago, basically publishing the „Georgian Newspaper“. With this charge he was convicted without trial and sentenced with 10 years in the concentration camp to the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea\textsuperscript{27}. This fact indicates the high risk for Georgians working in the Committee, because of which the leader of the Committee Michael Tsereteheli stated in 1915 „the members of Georgian Committee are dispaired. Russians know everything about us step by step. We have families and properties in Georgia. We involved in this movement with the strong belief that Germany would support us by armament“\textsuperscript{28}.

Georgian Committee really received such guarantees with military support, together with supporting the declaration of independence by Georgia. Although the military part of Georgian-German plan did not succeed, the intense relations between the Committee and German Foreign Affairs Agency\textsuperscript{29} create the basis for successful Georgian-German relations in the future. The mostly important was that Georgian Committee caused the interest towards the idea of Georgian independence from German side. Moreover, the idea of independent Georgia entered the European level and, accordingly, became the issue for the international concern. The example of such internationalization is the third conference of the Union of Nations\textsuperscript{30} in Lausanne in June 1916, where Michael Tsereteli represented the Georgian part and delivered an impressive speech about the independence of Georgia. Interestingly enough, the only one protesting against

\textsuperscript{26} Schwanitz, war by revolution
\textsuperscript{27} სიგუა გვ. 113.
\textsuperscript{28} ბაქრაძე გვ. 139.
\textsuperscript{29} Auswärtiges Amt
\textsuperscript{30} Union des nationalités
Tseretheli’s speech was another Georgian participant of this conference from the Social-Democratic party.\footnote{ბაქრაძე გვ. 128.}

Another interesting fact is that Georgian Independent Committee was not well-known in Georgia. Maybe the slow delivery of information, especially during the war period, was the reason for being not informed and, sometimes, misinformed. According to the memoirs of Zurab Avalishvili - Georgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1918; he “was introduced with the group of Georgian emigrants staying in Germany since the beginning of war and expecting the liberation of Georgia from by some circumstances of war. Some considered them being crazy... But their activities and their propaganda prepared lot of things for the future”\footnote{ავალიშვილი გვ. 106.}. By that time the Committee was less active and the leaders declared the liquidation of the Committee couple of months later.\footnote{21 July 1918}

The activities conducted by Georgian Independence Committee certainly prepared lot of things for the following successful relations between Germany and newly independent Georgia. First of all it prepared the situation for declaring independence by Georgia and its special relations with Germany. On the other hand, Germany was also depended on the Georgian Committee to the extent of realizing their policy in Georgia and, generally, in Caucasus (Kaukasus-Politik),\footnote{Bihl s. 232.} while Georgian Committee played quite significant role in conducting the abovementioned policy.

We also have to mention, that Georgian Independence Committee was the first significant organization, which did not satisfy with the idea of Georgian autonomy and struggled for the independence instead (even the name of the Committee indicated its objective). Moreover, the Committee connected Georgia to not only Germany, but Europe, in general. “The activities of Georgian Committee was the first significant attempt of integrating Georgia into Europe without being depended on Russia. It was the first occasion, when such an attempt was not unilateral and the will of only Georgian part”\footnote{ბაქრაძე გვ. 285.}. Indeed, the coincidence of German and Georgian national interests in the very beginning of the First World War led to the intense and fruitful collaboration between the
two parties, which, in itself, became the basement for the future Georgian-German relations and determined the special role of Germany in the declaration of independence by Georgia in 1918.

The role of Georgian Independence Committee was decisive in the preparatory period. Afterwards, when Germany already became interested enough with the ‘Georgian issue’, it directly contacted with the international representatives of Georgian government (before declaring independence they represented Transcaucasian Provisional Government) and the Committee stayed out of the following developments. This was the following stage of German-Georgian relations, in which Georgian Committee was not involved (however, Committee’s activity conducted before determined this stage). Therefore we will discuss this stage of German-Georgian relations in the following chapter.

2 Independence as ‘the only way out’

The revolution in Russia in 1917 (or, better to say, revolutions in February and October) accelerated the processes towards seclusion of the whole Caucasian region from the Russian empire. As the Russian-Turkish front was beside Georgian border at the black sea, Georgia became involved actually in the dramatic events going on in 1917. After the February Revolution in 1917 the situation in Russian-Turkish front started to change in favour of Turkey. Some sources consider it as “Caucasus was about to return in the era of southern Islamic dominance”\textsuperscript{36}. The Turkish threat was very obvious, as they had entered into Georgian territories, including Batumi and Akhaltsikhe, and started to claim their possession on this territory. As Turkey was Germany’s ally, Germany could be considered as the only one able to detain Turkey’s increasing ambitions. “The only way was to use Germany as a ‘bridle’ for Turkey, but in order to do it, the independent Georgia had to appear on the stage, as well as the agreement with Germany and German support was needful”\textsuperscript{37}.

\textsuperscript{36} Зубов, Политическое будущее Кавказа.
\textsuperscript{37} ავალიშვილი გვ. 80.
Surprisingly enough, the idea of declaring independence became the subject for the contradictory debates between the political parties in Georgia. On one hand, “aspiration towards independence became obvious since the very beginning of the Russian revolution. It could not be otherwise. The unification with Russia had been conducted in abnormal conditions and it was not harmless”\(^{38}\). On the other hand, Georgian Social-Democratic party, which was considered to be “the most powerful party in Caucasus\(^ {39}\)” had another opinion. “This party (Social-Democratic) had always belonged to the Russian Social-Democratic Party. In Georgia they always struggled with the supporters of Georgian autonomy, in order to maintain ‘Centralism’\(^ {40}\).”

Such kind of attitude towards independence, or, as Social-Democrats used to say, “Nationality issue” seems quite curious. The party of Georgian Social-Democrats was considered to be the strongest party in Georgia and even in Caucasus, as mentioned above. Therefore it had to express the interests of their supporters in Georgia, referred as “national interests”\(^ {41}\) in the theory of political realism. On the other hand, the attitude of Georgian Social-Democrats towards the “Nationality issue” is strange enough not to be able to explain from the theoretical perspective of political realism. The situation became even more curious with the party having such an attitude came into government of Georgian Democratic Republic and remained until the end in February 1921. The basic idea of class struggle “prevented Georgian government from being national movement”\(^ {42}\).

The strange policy of “faithfulness towards Russian democracy” was expressed in the resolution taken by Georgian National Assembly in 19 November 1917, the project of which belonged to Noe Zhordania – the future head of Georgian government. The resolution stated: “1) Georgian nation maintains the orientation towards Russia, as well as it had during the last hundred years. 2) Georgian democracy, since the very beginning of its political existence, belongs itself with the Russian democracy and together with it aims to realize its own political, economical and national aspirations”\(^ {43}\).

\(^{38}\) ავალიშვილი გვ. 21.  
\(^{39}\) ბაქრაძე გვ. 211.  
\(^{40}\) ავალიშვილი გვ. 24.  
\(^{41}\) Morgenthau, Principle 2.  
\(^{42}\) ავალიშვილი გვ. 35.  
\(^{43}\) ბაქრაძე გვ. 211.
This strange policy of loyalty lasted even after dissolving the last hope of democracy – Russian Constituent Assembly in January 1918 by the sailor Jelezniakov with the simple argument: “the guard corps is tired! Get out!”

While Georgian Social-Democrats were consolidating their loyalty towards Russian democracy, the threat from Turkish invasions became more and more dangerous, occupying more and more Georgian territories around the black sea. In Russia the revolution has grown into civil war from which Turkey had benefited and strengthened its position in the front. Through Brest-Litovsk peace treaty in 3 March 1918 Germany tried to maintain its strengthened positions in the eastern front as well as to maintain balance. Several countries in Eastern Europe gained independence, while Georgia, together with its leading politicians loyal to Russian democracy, was left beside the liberation process at this stage.

However, Brest-Litovst peace treaty was not able to restrain the overgrowing territorial ambitions of Turkey. The role of Germany, as the only restraining power of Turkey, became more and more clear. The future position of Georgia had been consulted with German part, which should be the guarantor of Georgian independence and territorial integrity. In 22 May 1918 Akaki Chkhenkeli - deputy head and a foreign minister in the government of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, notofied general von Lossow, that Georgia is ready to declare independence and is asking for protection to Germany. Since then the events were accelerated and developed in several days.

In May 24 Chkhenkeli wrote to General Giorgi Kvinitadze: „the further postponement of declaring independence will lead to irreparable results. The only possible way left to us is the following: against the Turkish invasions we have to oppose independent Georgia, the supporter of which will be Germany. Their representative to the Georgian government will be Graf von Schulenburg.” The fact that German diplomats were not mere altruists and supported Georgia for not sentimental feelings but concrete benefit

44 Voline, After October.
45 [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/bl34.asp#treatytext](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/bl34.asp#treatytext)
46 Bihl s.58.
47 აღწერილობა გვ. 85
can be seen from Schulenburg’s letter to von Lossow from Tbilisi, “if we would be able to maintain Georgia, we will get the rest of the Caucasus sooner or later”\(^{48}\).

In the evening of May 26 Transcaucasian Republic received Turkish ultimatum, but it was already late. The Transcaucasian Republic did not exist any longer, as Georgia had already secceded from it. The act of independence had already been made at 17:10, which stated: „1) From now on Georgian people possess sovvereign rights and Georgia is the independent state 2) Political form of the independent Georgia is the Democratic Republic”\(^{49}\).

Not surprisingly, the curtseys towards „Russian Democracy“ are easily mentionable even in the act of independence, as it had been prepared by the Social-Democratic powers. Namely the statements, that “the course of great Russian revolution created such kind of domestic order inside Russia, that the military front was fully dissolved and Russian army left Transcaucasia. Left to the mercy of its own ability, Georgia, together with the whole Transcaucasia led their affairs on their own and created the relevant institutions, but the foreign forces dissolved the union of Transcaucasian nations and the political unity of Transcaucasia. The current situation makes Georgia to create its own state organization, in order to save itself from the conquest and build the solid basement for the independent development”\(^{50}\). These excerpts from the independence act creates an impression, that the author of it tries to justify himself against somebody, with the argument that independence was ‘the only way out’. Having in mind the loyalty of Georgian Social-Democrats towards the Russian Social-Democratic party, such tendency is no longer surprising.

In 28 May Armenia and Azerbaijan also declared independence and the Transcaucasian Federation officially dissolved. In the same day the provisional agreement was formed between Germany and newly independent Georgia\(^{51}\). According to this agreement Germany recognized Georgian government de facto and established surveillance above

\(^{48}\) ბაქრაძე გვ. 267.
\(^{50}\) The Act of Independence, 26 May 1918.
\(^{51}\) Bihl s.62.
Georgian railway. Two additional agreements had been formed as well. The first one concerned the economic issue, namely the possibility for Georgia to take state loan from Germany instead of giving the exclusive right of exploitation of Georgian fossil to Germany, the ways and procedures of exploitation were strictly regulated. Another additional agreement gave the certain rights to German colonists living in Georgia since the first half of XIX century.

In the same day General von Lossow took the obligation, that “Germany would declare its readiness to support Georgian government in conducting negotiations with Russian government about the secession from the Russian empire and, as the result of this secession, recognize Georgia as the free and independent state. Germany should also support Georgia in protecting its borders and relations with the neighbouring states” (Turkey is implied in the neighbouring states the relations with which should be supported by Germany).

With this agreement Georgia overcame the threat of being occupied by Turkey. This threat was not only against Georgia, but against Armenia far more dangerously. Through the way of declaring independent and forming the agreement with Germany two days later Georgia get rid from this danger. As we have seen, Germany was the only one who had power on Turkey and control the overgrowing ambitions of its ally. Germany took and performed this role, which meant giving the certain guarantees for the newly independent state. “Germany became the godfather of Georgian independence – at that moment only Germany was able to undertake this role, only through the German support this issue gained the international significance”.

However, German support was not unconditional and mere expression of good will. As a result of the abovementioned agreement Germany took the exclusive right of exploitation above the Georgian fossil. Such raw materials were very useful for the German economy and industry after the 4 years of being involved in the world war. Germany also gained the control over railway on the Georgian territory, which was also

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52 გაუწყებკათშ გვ 92.
53 ბიჰს.62.
54 გაუწყებკათშ გვ 96.
55 ბიჰს.61.
56 გაუწყებკათშ გვ 95.
important in the beginning of the previous century, when railway was the very significant sort of the land transport, especially during the war and in the Caucasus region near Black Sea, which had the strategic importance in the eastern front by that time.

On the other hand, Georgian side also benefited a lot from these agreements. First of all, Georgia get rid from the Turkish threat, which the significant danger for the country suffered by Islamic invasions during the centuries. Besides that, Georgia restored its statehood, which was lost 117 years ago since the unification with Russia in 1801. Germany undertook the obligation of guarantying the security of the newly independent state, protecting its borders and supporting in establishing the relations with neighbours – mainly Turkey and Russia. The economic support – German state loan should also be granted to Georgia (instead of the monopoly on Georgian fossil). Recognizing Georgia as an independent state would grant solid international significance to the newly independent state. Comparing to the perspective of being occupied by Turkey, or returning to Russia significantly destroyed with revolutions and civil wars in itself, German protectorate together with independence had to be considered as an ideal solution.

According to the arguments stated above, we can see the declaration of independence in 26 May 1918 as the positive outcome of the coincidence between German and Georgian national interests. The period of preparation basically conducted by the Georgian Independence Committee was expressed in the concrete result – 26 May declaration of independence, which was, and still remains, as a peak in German-Georgian relations.

3 After Independence

26 May 1918 Act of Independence, as the first and very significant result of German-Georgian cooperation and the agreements between the two countries two days later had create the basis for further development of relations between Georgia as already an independent state and Germany as the initiator and guarantor of its independence. The already achieved results should be the basement for further even higher level of

57 Bihl s.63.
relations, for which both of the parties had been preparing. Unfortunately, the relations did not go further, due to the variety of reasons discussed below. It lasted only for slightly more than a month, while in July the situation had changed all of a sudden. It is hard to make suppositions and presumptions of what way would these relations develop, but the beginning provided a lot of reasons for optimism.

What also makes these relations interesting even from nowadays perspective is that they were (and, for the future, should be) dependent on the mutual compromise. Germany treated Georgia on the equal basis, which was not usual sort of treatment from the leading military, economic and political power towards the newly independent country like Georgia. Such kind of treatment was expressed in the attitude towards Georgian Foreign Minister Chkhenkeli and Deputy Minister Avalishvili as they visited Berlin immediately after the declaration of independence, in order to arrange further relations with their guarantor and protector. However, this was not the case with the relations of German Foreign Office towards Georgian Independence Committee, while the Committee was considered as just the group of emigrants not legitimated from their country. With regards to the Georgian government the relations were going on the proper diplomatic manner. Although the states did not have similar powers, but both of them were independent states and relations had to be determined by this fact.

Such kind of attitude towards Georgian diplomats was expressed during their visit in Berlin, when they had the possibility to protect their national interests and make German side coming to the compromise. For example, in the beginning of this visit German side offered protectorate to Georgia, on which Deputy Minister Avalishvili responded “we are not afraid of protectorate, but it somehow reminds as English-Indian relations and this is not nice”. German side found the position reasonable and did not force to accept direct protectorate. Whatever unusual it might seem that the newly independent country, hardly survived from Turkish invasion slightly before and conquered by Soviet Russia shortly after, had refused German direct protectorate, this fact shows that Georgian representatives were absolutely able to protect their national interests while negotiating with Germany. Another example for such attitude is the issue of neutrality. 26 May Act of

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58 ბაქრაძე გვ. 283.
59 ავალიშვილი გვ. 111.
Independence stated that “during the international warfare Georgia remains as the eternally neutral state”\(^{60}\). According to the memoirs of Noe Zhordania – head of the Georgian government in 1918-21 years: “we have decided to choose the way of full neutrality”\(^{61}\). Whether it was realistic or not, to build Switzerland-kind-of neutral state in the middle of Caucasus which historically has been considered as a battlefield, neutrality was the principle chosen by Georgian government and German part did not even offer to Georgian delegation to participate in the war by German side.\(^{62}\) We can see once again that Georgian part was able to protect its principles and did so, even against Germany, which had to and was considered as an ideal partner.

Georgians were not the only ones protecting their principles. During that visit Germans also undertook the principal position towards more formalistic issue, which was the legal appropriateness of recognizing Georgia as an independent state. The argumentation of the legal department in German Foreign Office\(^{63}\) was the following: “nowadays Russia is having more peaceful relations with us and we can not recognize the independence of its part, while we did not do this during the formation of Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. We can not struggle with Russia nowadays, when we have to summon the best of our strength on the French front. Besides that, recognizing the independence of the country which is part of another country is legally irrelevant”\(^{64}\). To be more precise, this position was expressed by the head of the legal department and did not express the position of the whole German Foreign Office, which also had the interest to accelerate the process of independence recognition. However, both of the sides had to wait, till this ‘legal problem’ was solved.

In order to overcome this formalism and make the recognition ‘legally compatible’ Georgian delegates connected to Franz von Liszt – famous German specialist of international law\(^{65}\). Contrary to the argument that Georgia as the part of another country could not be recognized independent, Liszt wrote the research about Georgia’s

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\(^{60}\) Art. 3, The Act of Independence, 26 May 1918.
\(^{61}\) ჟორდანია გვ. 91.
\(^{62}\) ავალიშვილი გვ. 105.
\(^{63}\) Auswärtiges Amt
\(^{64}\) ავალიშვილი გვ. 107.
\(^{65}\) http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Franz+Von+Liszt
recognition - Die Völkerrechtliche Stellung der Republik Georgien. Publication of this book was very important event, as it made the issue of Georgian independent as the subject of international sciences, namely the Public International Law. According to this book, by that time (August 1918) Georgia was “original, completely independent and, accordingly, sovereign state and, being as such, has international legal right to claim for being recognized by another state”. After examining the historical and international legal backgrounds the author concluded that there was no legal obstacle for Georgia to be recognized as an independent state by Germany. Although Liszt gave significant favour to Georgian delegates, the question risen in this book by the agreement between Germany and Russia.

German-Russian agreement of 27 August 1918 brought very important development in the issue of recognizing Georgian independence. Through the Article 13 of this agreement Russia gave consent to Germany for recognizing Georgia as an independent state. It did not mean that Russia would also recognize the independence of Georgia. However, the agreement was very significant step forward, as Russia agreed German recognition of Georgian independence, which was already an achievement. Such provision was helpful not only in German-Georgian relations, as Germany would have no further obstacles to recognize Georgia as an independent state. It regulated Georgian-Russian relations to the certain extent, while it made Russia to agree on the recognition of Georgian independence by Germany.

The agreement made an important signal that Georgia was leaving the old style of conducting international relations and entered to the new era. The old style implied arranging international relations through Russia, the part of which Georgia had been before 26 May. “The most important thing was the fact that Georgia and, accordingly, Caucasus entered into European politics and history. The provincial-Russian era of our existence had been over”. Since that time Georgia entered into the arena of international politics and became the subject of international interest. Although German-

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66 International Legal Position of the Republic of Georgia
67 Liszt, Teil 1.
68 Zustimmung
69 Bihl s.107.
70 ავალიშვილი გვ. 145.
Georgian relations came to the end shortly afterwards, the role of Germany in bringing Georgia into the stage of international politics is very significant.

In summer of 1918 German-Georgian relations were in progress and gave ground for optimism to the initiators of this relation. However, the time of change was already approaching for Germany and, accordingly, for the whole Europe. The Autumn of 1918 also meant figuratively that the Autumn period has come in German-Georgian relations as well, while the November revolution was approaching. The German revolution started in autumn 1918 ended up with the creation of Weimar Republic in 1919 brought tremendous changes to Germany, including its international policy. Since then Germany was no longer able to continue its Caucasian policy in the previous manner, as it became full with domestic problems. Pan-germanists considered that the revolution was kindled by hostile forces aiming the destruction of Germany. Lot of versions and hypotheses have been expressed about this topic during the last century. The fact that revolution changed a lot in the international policy of Germany according to the dramatic change of its position in the war is commonly considered. The events of Autumn 1918 played a fatal role in German-Georgian relations as well.

During its visit in Berlin Georgian delegation was attempting to accelerate the process of forming German-Georgian agreement officially. However, in July 1918 they were not hurrying as much as before, while they already had the opinion, that Germany was not about to win the war. Finally the project of this agreement was ready by 3 October 1918 but it was already late. The chancellor and state secretary of the German foreign office were not on their positions any longer and the project remained unsigned. This agreement between the countries never came into force, as the international policies went through the different ways both in Germany and, accordingly, in Georgia.

All of a sudden, Georgia faced the completely new reality: Germany – the initiator and guarantor of Georgian democracy had its own problems to mind and was no longer able to care about its Caucasus policy, including the protectorate of Georgia. The delegation of independent Georgia, suddenly stayed without protectorate in the middle of war-time Europe in revolutionary Berlin, had to act immediately and rationally. The principle of

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72 გამსახურდია გვ.246.
73 Lutz p.6.
rationality led them to contact with the enemies of Germany – the Entente powers. “By that time the reasonable action meant to approach the capitals of the winners of that time as quickly as possible. The objective of our trip was to arrange the contract with the governments of England and France, which had become the main rulers of Europe since then.”

As we see, the strategy of Zurab Avalishvili is completely in accordance with the principles of rationality under the paradigm of the political realism. We will discuss the theoretical explanations of this action later on. The situation was so dramatic and the need for rapid reaction was so high that Avalishvili refers with the action (or, better to say, inaction) of his colleague Chkhenkeli with the irony: “by that time – only that time – Chkhenkeli made up his mind that his visit in Berlin.. drawled a bit. He needed to wait until the full defeat of Germany and revolution for thinking that way. He waited until the bullet fractured the window in his room in the hotel during the revolution.” Such kind of scenes in the revolutionary Berlin made the Georgian delegation sure that they no longer had to hope for the assistance from Germany, which was already full of its own problematic. They had to look for the guaranties and protections in completely another side. In the time being for the disappointed Georgian delegation Entente countries had been the place.

The relations between Georgia and Germany discussed above ends at this point. From now on both of these countries continue their own ways of development. Actually, these new ways had been similarly unlucky for both of these countries comparing to the previous period of intense relations. The German revolution of 1918 gave birth to Weimar Republic and the crisis of post-war Germany continued with the raise of Nazism. On the other hand, Georgia had started its long and winding road of looking for the supporters and protectors among the winner allies of the First World War, before being occupied by Soviet Russia in February 1921 and the history of imperialism started over again.

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74 ავალიშვილი გვ. 197.
75 See Chapter V Part 1.
76 Akaki Chkhenkeli, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1918.
77 ავალიშვილი გვ. 197.
Georgian diplomats evaluated the situation rationally and said farewell to their former supporters. The support of Germany had been appreciated, but it already belonged to the past. German part took this fact with the full comprehension, as it also had to mind its own troubles. For the future strategy of Georgian foreign policy the time spent in Berlin during the visit of Georgian delegation in Germany in 1918 was considered even as an obstacle, while the winner allies of Entente met Georgian diplomats arrived from Berlin with mistrust. The following developments in Georgian foreign policy belong to completely another subject and strategy of Georgian diplomacy. Same can be said about Germany, giving up with its Caucasian policy. Both of the parts acted rationally according to the situation in the world of political realism, the theoretical explanation of which we will provide in the third part of our research. The interesting and successful period of Georgian-German relations had been over.

The relations between Germany and Georgia during the First World War had the variety of impacts in the policies of these countries. For Germany these relations were the part of German policy in Caucasus, which was not completed and did not succeed because of the changing situation in autumn 1918 all of a sudden. From Georgian perspective these relations were more beneficial, as it survived the country from Turkish invasion and led to the declaration of independence after the period of lost statehood lasting for more than a century. Significant tendency of these relations was the fact that the countries started to cooperate as soon as it was required from their national interests (initiative belongs to the Georgian part) and gave up immediately after this cooperation no longer complied with their national interests. The relations discussed above had to end at this point.

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78 Chapter V.
IV The Restoration of Independence

The following chapter discusses the second important point in the history of Georgia in the twentieth century – the restoration of independence. In particular, this part examines the Georgian-German relations of this period. However, there is not much to narrate about the cooperation between two countries during this period. Therefore we will discuss the developments going on in these countries separately from each other, the way they actually went. We will start with examining the preparatory period for independence from the rise of Georgian national liberation movement in 1989, continue with the actual circumstances of declaring the restoration of independence in 9 April 1991 and continue till the next year 1992, when this certain period had been finished. In the following part we will discuss the German reunification going on during nearly the same time as Georgian independence movement.

In the final part we will summarize our discussion about the developments going on simultaneously in both of the countries, but separated from each other. We will also examine the reasons which prevented the relations between the parts from developing. As the restoration of independence continued the path of Georgian statehood stopped in February 1921, we have to draw some parallels with the previous chapter. The similarities and differences between the declaration of independence in 1918 and restoration of it in 1991 is the topic worth of interest in itself. However, we will compare these periods in the framework of German-Georgian relations and underline the significant differences existing between them.

1 Way towards the Restoration of Independence

In the second half of 80s of the previous century it became clear even for the Soviet leaders there was the strong need of change and the old stagnated way of ruling would not be successful at all. In order to avoid further complications Soviet leaders made up their minds to turn on the way of ‘Perestroika’\textsuperscript{79}. The chronology of perestroika differs

\textsuperscript{79} перестройка – restructure (Rus)
according to the variety of sources. Commonly the date Gorbachev came into power in March 1985 is considered to be the start of restructuring\textsuperscript{80}. The several stages of restructuring had also been separated from the very beginning of it till the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Georgia the Soviet ruling also had to shift into slightly more ‘liberal’ style in the late 80s and Georgian national liberation movement came on the stage.

It is hard to find the exact date, when actually the Georgian national liberation movement had started, while since the very beginning of the Soviet occupation the protest movement was going on. The first obvious expression of the protest towards Soviet invaders was the August uprising in 1924\textsuperscript{81}. During the period of the Second World War an attempt of protest was eventually suppressed.. In March 1956 the protest demonstration in Tbilisi took place, which was shot by the Soviet troops\textsuperscript{82}. The same year dissident organization “Gorgasliani” was founded by the teenager schoolboys – Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava\textsuperscript{83}. Several decades later these two became the leaders of Georgian national liberation movement.

Right from the beginning Georgian national liberation movement had been based on the patriotic enthusiasm of the Georgian people, which was the only source of its support till the end. However, the popularity of this movement was rising gradually, which had several grounds. While the Soviet censorship and control had weakened it became possible to spread the literature which was strictly forbidden shortly before. With the variety of sources people were informed about the independence of Georgia in 1918-21, Soviet occupation, uprising in 1924, suppression in 1937, situation in the Soviet concentration camps and several other subjects being under the strict taboo during the Soviet period and in the Soviet historiography. On the other hand, there was the national liberation movement with the dissident leaders involved in the movement since childhood and suffered under Soviet repression system. The Soviet leaders were gradually becoming more and more unpopular, while the liberation movement gained tremendous popularity.

\textsuperscript{80} http://www.hrono.ru/1984ru.php
\textsuperscript{81} Suny p.223.
\textsuperscript{82} http://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/08/20/memories_2/
\textsuperscript{83} http://archive.security.gov.ge/gorgasliani.php
9 April 1989 became the turning point for the future developments in Georgia. By the beginning of April thousands of people demonstrated their protest against the Soviet government and claimed for the independence of Georgia. Soviet soldiers sent by Moscow committed a massacre in the midnight of 9 April, as a result of which 20 participants of the demonstration were killed (most of them were teenage girls and young women) 17 participants were killed immediately and 3 of them died in the hospital\footnote{Собчак, ч.4.}. After this tragic event the hatred towards Soviet system had grown, while, on the other hand, the popularity of national liberation movement reached its peak. It is worth mentioning, that the date when the restoration of independence had been declared 2 years later was chosen according to the tragedy of 9 April 1989.

After 9 April the protest movements and demonstrations against the Soviet government went into massive character. The national liberation movement took the course of changing the government through the way of elections. In order to realize this plan, the arrangement of the multi-party elections was needful, which was reached through the several demonstrations by the liberation movement. Accordingly, the first multi-party elections of the Supreme Council took place in 28 October 1990 after the 70 years long history of one-party ruling. According to the results of these elections the movement won the 81 places in the Council against the 44 chairs of the Communist party, which was the significant victory. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected as the head of the Supreme Council\footnote{http://ghan.ge/news-25653.html}.\footnote{http://urakparaki.com/?m=4&ID=47284}

The Supreme Council took the course towards secession from the Soviet Union and the restoration of independence. In order to achieve this, Supreme Council hold the national referendum in 31 March 1991, where the only question was asked: "do you agree to restore the independence of Georgia based on the Act of Independence of 26 May 1918" and 88 % of the voters (which, in itself, contained 90% of the population in the Republic of Georgia) gave the positive answer to this question.\footnote{http://urakparaki.com/?m=4&ID=47284} Based on the results of referendum the restoration of independence was declared in 9 April 1991. “Declaring the restoration of independence has symbolic meaning, while this was the day when the fate of Georgia had been decided – stated Zviad Gamsakhurdia – the will of the 9 April
martyrs is realized. Long live to the independent Georgia! God bless it!" However, the following events did not develop that positively. In the beginning of January 1992 the government of Georgia was expelled from the country and this certain era of Georgian history had been finished.

The act of restoration of the independence stated the following: “the abolished statehood of Georgia had been restored by the declaration of independence in 26 May 1918. The Supreme Council of Georgia… declares the restoration of the independence of Georgia based on the act of 26 May 1918.” This statement clarifies, that the legal foundation for the restoration of independence was the act of 26 May 1918 discussed in the previous chapter. There are lot of similarities between these two acts and periods they have been declared as well as the significant differences discussed below.

The main character of Georgian national liberation movement of this period was the fact that it had very high level of legitimacy among the population of Georgia. As mentioned above, the patriotic enthusiasm of Georgian people was the basic source this movement depended on. The loyalty and support towards the principles this movement was following was expressed in the elections and referendum held in 1990 and 1991. Therefore we can conclude that the movement expressed the will of Georgian population, which gave the movement legitimacy inside the country.

However, the inside legitimacy was the basic source this movement could rely on. Georgian aspiration towards independence did not find the proper evaluation from the international society before the Soviet Union collapsed. Georgia was not the only one where such kind of national liberation movement was going on. The Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia struggled for independence with the powerful national liberation movements and, additionally, these three countries expressed very high level of solidarity towards each other. The Baltic Assembly also expressed solidarity towards Georgia after the 9 April events which was not the common case from other countries.

There was the variety of reasons for such kind of attitude, among which the lack of information was not insignificant. Although Georgian national liberation movement was very powerful inside for the certain period of time, it did not have the powerful

88 The Act of Restoring the Independence of Georgia.
representation outside able to express its basic ideas. Therefore the misinformation about this movement could be spread easily and this possibility was widely used.

The difference between German attitudes towards Georgian independence movements in the beginning and in the end of the previous century is the good example for the importance of the interest group outside the country. In the first case the Georgian Independence Committee, the existence of which was unknown for the majority of Georgian population\(^90\) was able to deserve the interest and significant support. In the second case Georgian national liberation movement, enjoying very high level of popularity and legitimacy inside the country, was unable to find supporters in the international society. The domination of national interests underlined by the theory of political realism is one of the very proper explanation for this interesting situation. The situation inside Germany, which could be the basic for being neutral towards the events going on in Georgia, will be discussed in the following part.

2 Reunification of Germany

The period from 1989 till 1991 was also very busy for Germany and full of dramatic events having the significant importance on the whole following history of Germany. This period happened to be turning point for Germany, as well as it was in Georgia. Accordingly, Germany was too busy for its domestic affairs and had neither time nor other resources to carry about the Soviet Union countries aspiring towards independence. In the late 80s the “wind of change” had blown straight already and the continent-wide change caused the significant developments in the history of Germany.

By the end of the 80s Germany remained to be divided into “two Germanies” – Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Democratic Republic of Germany (West Germany). The population of East Germany (‘Democratic’ one) although enjoying the best economic conditions among the Eastern European countries of “Communist block”, still tried to reunify with their former compatriots. Similarly to Georgian case discussed above, the wind of change blown by Perestroika had direct effect on the further developments in Germany as well. Gorbachev, as the initiator of Perestroika, was

\(^90\) ბაქრაძე გვ.283.
considered to have significant positive impact. “Thanks to Gorbachev, unification was a peaceful process – rare enough for such a tremendous shift in the balance of power”\(^91\). Accordingly, the role of Eduard Shevardnadze – the minister of external relations and acting according the Gorbachev’s guidelines, had also been appreciated. This fact also influenced the German-Georgian relations in the 90s.

The impact of Perestroika was immediately noticeable in the East Germany where the permanent demonstrations demanding the reforms had been started in the late summer of 1989. The inhabitants of ‘Democratic' Germany claimed for more democracy and democratic reforms. The demonstrations started in Leipzig spread all over the East Germany by the beginning of autumn\(^92\). The slogans like “Wir sind das Volk”\(^93\) grown afterwards to “Wir sind ein Volk”\(^94\) and calling for the unified fatherland was becoming more and more popular. These demonstrations had quite concrete and immediate result; Erich Honecker, the Chairman of GDR State Council resigned from the position on 18 October 1989. However, this was not enough and as a result of overgrown demonstrations in the eastern part of Berlin, the entire government of East Germany resigned on November 7.\(^95\) A couple of days later Berlin wall (Berliner Mauer) fell down.

On 28 November 1989 the Chancellor of West Germany Helmut Kohl presented his famous ten point plan aiming to overcome the crisis. The plan started with the sentence: “immediate measures are required as a result of the events of recent weeks... The federal government is prepared to provide immediate assistance where it is needed.”\(^96\) This plan included the statement that East Germany should start the transitional period after which it would be able to reunite the Eastern part to the Western one. Basically this reconstruction meant the gradual shift from the planned economy towards western free market. This economic difference was the basic problem shortly after the reunification of Germany and still remains even nowadays. “By 1991 many average western Germans

\(^{91}\) Geiss p.105.
\(^{92}\) http://www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/01/Feste/Tag_der_Deutschen_Einheit/History_of_reunification_seite.html
\(^{93}\) We are the people
\(^{94}\) We are one people
\(^{95}\) http://www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/01/Feste/Tag_der_Deutschen_Einheit/History_of_reunification_seite.html
were clearly frustrated at having to finance the exorbitant cost of economic recovery in the east"\textsuperscript{97}. Such kind of attitude is noticeable in Western Germany even nowadays.

The new 1990 year brought the new developments towards reunification. After the several months of preparation the Preparatory Treaty for the Monetary, Economic and Social Union between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany had been signed on 18 May 1990. According to this treaty Deutsche Mark was becoming the common currency for both of the parts since 1 July 1990 and social market economy would be the common economic system of the contracting parties. The second article also stated that “the Contracting Parties are committed to a free, democratic, federal and social basic order governed by the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{98} Several other treaties have been signed including the so-called “two plus four” treaty in 12 September 1990.

In this treaty the parties were the following: ‘The Two’ were the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic while ‘the four’ were former allies against Germany during the Second World War dividing Germany into four parts after the war; the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America\textsuperscript{99}. The “two plus four treaty” went into effect in 29 September, which made the process of German reunification to the end. Several days later the process was officially finalized and finally, on 3 October 1990 the East Germany officially reunited with the west one.

The official reactions about the reunification of Germany were not homogeneous: “In London and Paris, but also in the Hague, Rome and elsewhere the dominant preoccupation of the politicians was that debates over border changes, or even German reunification, could lead to a dangerous destabilisation of the European order, as well as hindering the democratisation process in East central Europe and undermining Gorbachev’s authority” while American reaction was different and more loyal - “by contrast, president Bush and foreign minister Baker in the USA showed that they viewed the peaceful revolution in the GDR positively”; Bush is also said to be the author of the

\textsuperscript{97} McAdams, p.208  
\textsuperscript{98} State Treaty between the FRG and the GDR Establishing a Monetary, Economic, and Social Union (May 18, 1990)  
\textsuperscript{99} Two-Plus-Four Treaty on Germany (September 12, 1990)
statement: “Let the people of Germany decide this matter”\textsuperscript{100} (Unfortunately he did not make the similar statement about Georgian case).

Two decades of reunification has been celebrated in Germany in the last October. The developments in Germany directly, as well as generally in the region indirectly, have been determined by this fact. The problem was not simply solved by the act of reunification and it took several years to make this act reality, in terms of equalizing the eastern part of Germany to the western one in economical and several other terms. The problem is not entirely solved even nowadays. Therefore it was hardly imaginable for Germany in 1989, 90 or 91 years to strain its relations with Russia and go into tensions, while the negotiations with Russia had such a high importance for the realisation of German national interests by that time. This could be one of the main reasons from German side, because of which the cooperation between reunifying Germany and independent restoring Georgia did not take place, together with another significant reasons discussed in the following part.

3 Between Independence and Reunification

In the previous two parts of this chapter we have discussed the circumstances of the restoration of Georgian independence in the first case and the reunification of Germany in the second case. These events were going simultaneously, in the same period of 1989, 90 and 91 years and the global changes in the international politics, expressed in Perestroika in the end of 80s had the significant direct impact on the both of these developments. However, they did not have any did not have any dependence or determination on each other. Accordingly, they have been discussed in the way they were going – separated from each other.

In this part we have to discuss about the relations between the two countries. Were there any relations between Germany and Georgia by the indicated time period?\textsuperscript{101} The examination of the official governmental sources gives negative answer to this question. From this we can conclude that Germany did not consider Georgia as an independent

\textsuperscript{100} Weber p.222.

\textsuperscript{101} 1989-1991 years.
country even de facto and, therefore, avoided to have any relations with it before the official breakdown of the Soviet Union. However, according to the non-official sources\(^\text{102}\) there were minimal relations expressed in only the collecting of information about what was actually going on, and that was all. The explanation for such kind of attitude can be the fact that Soviet Union still existing by that time, the breaking down of which had not been completed yet. Therefore the states of the European Community, including Germany, were observing the process going inside the still existing USSR and carefully trying to avoid even the minor tensions with it caused by establishing de facto relations with the Soviet Republics. Such kind of strategy is in a full compliance with the paradigm of political realism.

According to some sources, the attitude from Germany was even unfriendly due to the certain reasons. More concretely, according to this source, Eduard Shevardnadze undertook some obligations vis-à-vis German part the realisation of which was disturbed by the Georgian government of that time led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia\(^\text{103}\). Unfortunately there is no possibility to double-check this information, or find more concrete source describing the same fact into more details. However, information is interesting, as it provides even debatable fact that could be the concrete reason for the unfriendly relations from German side to the national liberation movement and its leader.

Relying on the version of unfriendly relation or not, the following fact is clear: Germany did not conduct any official relations with the government of Georgia in 1990 and 1991. They preferred to remain neutral (at least) towards this government. However, after the arrival of Eduard Shevardnadze into Georgia in 1992 Germany started its diplomatic relations with Shevardnadze’s government and even provided certain support. Furthermore, Germany is said to be the first state to recognize Georgian independence in 1992 and conducting diplomatic relations by opening its embassy. On the web-site of the German Embassy in Tbilisi/Georgia, under the heading of “Bilateral relations between Georgia and Germany” comes the following text: “Germany was the first country which recognized the independence of Georgia in 1992 and opened its embassy in Tbilisi. Close and trustful relations between Germany and Georgia have the tradition of nearly 200 years. The share made by president Shevardnadze in the peaceful and

\(^{102}\) Interview with the prominent figures in Georgian government of 1990-1991.

\(^{103}\) Gugushvili, Just as in former Yugoslavia.
free reunification of Germany remains unforgettable.\textsuperscript{104} (There is a mistake in Georgian translation of this text on the web-site, as it states 1991 as the year of recognition, while German version states that the recognition took place in 1992)

As we see, the official diplomatic relations had started in 1992, when Eduard Shevardnadze was in power already. However, this period is out of the area of our research, which focuses on the exact points of the declaration and restoration of independence. What makes the abovementioned information interesting for us is the fact that German side preferred to have the relations with Sevardnadze and his regime rather than Gamsakuruida and the government led by him. This fact can have different explanations, included the personal relations of Shevardnadze with prominent German politicians including Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Helmut Kohl. In our opinion the basic reason for such kind of attitude was the substantial difference between Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze as the types of politicians. We will discuss this difference from the perspective of political realism in the next chapter. Here we just mention that German side would prefer to have relations with Shevardnadze and his regime, while in this case it was easier to realize the national interests of Germany.

The Georgian government led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia had such kind of problem with not only Germany, but also with the majority of western countries. In the beginning these countries were considered as the supporters of Georgia, as it struggled against the Soviet Union. However, the government did not manage to make these countries supportive and sometimes even the opposite was the case. This fact had some subjective as well as objective reasons. It is hard to say, weather the following reason is completely subjective, but this government did not succeed in the information warfare, which was very important by that time. Relying on the legitimacy and popularity inside the country the issue of international information warfare somehow stayed aside. Because of such inaction (or inability of action) on the international informational front, several sources of information made the image of Adolf-Hitler-like dictator out of Gamsakhurdia and Nazi-like movement from the Georgian national liberation movement\textsuperscript{105}. Objective reason was the situation in the international politics by that time, according to which the states of European Community could not damage their relations

\textsuperscript{104} \url{http://www.tiflis.diplo.de/Vertretung.tiflis/de/02/BilateraleBeziehungen.html}
\textsuperscript{105} Nodhia, 2.Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
with the still existing Soviet Union just in order to support Georgian independence, on behalf of democracy, self-determination and so on. This was the case in terms of German-Georgian relations as well.

If we compare the situation of restoring independence in 1990-1991 with the similar case of declaring independence in 1918, we would also be able to see the significant difference between these periods, in terms of Georgian-German relations. The similarity is that both of them were declaring independence – the decisive factor of Georgian statehood in that century. However, there is an important difference as well. In case of the first period of Georgian-German relations the national interests of these countries coincided with each other as early as in 1914. The relations were going on during the four years, as far as the national interests remained coincided, and a lot of important things had been done due to this cooperation. As long as these interests did not comply with each other due to the sudden changes in the front, the relations had been finished. In the second period discussed in this chapter the national interests of the countries did not coincide with each other, according to the existing international political reality and circumstances. Because of this non-coincidence between the interests the cooperation between the parts did not take place.

However one-sided it might seem, the concept of the national interests provides the best possible theoretical background for explaining the facts discussed above. This concept of national interests, referred by us very often during our discussion, had been provided by the theory of political realism in itself. Therefore we consider the paradigm of political realism as the most helpful one in terms of explaining the abovementioned events. However, it does not mean that the theory of political realism is able to explain every single event discussed by us, or it can explain the following developments taken place in German-Georgian relations (including current developments). The theoretical issues and explanations of the abovementioned facts will be provided in the following chapter.
V Theoretical Explanations

As the research follows the inductive way of reasoning\textsuperscript{106} we have already developed the variety of tentative theoretical explanations of the cases while discussing these cases in the previous parts. The abovementioned periods of our cases were full of historical facts. However, the decisive factor for providing and analyzing the fact was its relevance for the theoretical explanation, instead of its historical importance. Therefore the factual data were provided according to their importance and relevance for theoretical explanation. The data provided by case-studies need to be summarized. Accordingly, the following chapter is dedicated to the explanation of both of the cases through the proper theoretical framework.

The basic theoretical explanations are made under the framework of the theory of political realism. Choosing this theory as an explanatory one was conditioned by the character of the cases provided above and not by any subjective preferences. The substances of the facts provided above had shown that the theory of political realism should provide the best possible explanation for the abovementioned cases. Therefore the first part of this chapter provides the explanation of the cases through the viewpoint of the political realism theory. However, the cases provided contain certain aspects the explanation of which can not be made through the theory of political realism. The second part identifies these aspects and attempts to find proper explanation for them. The third chapter summarizes the basic theoretical explanations made in the previous parts.

1 Political Realism is the Answer

During our discussion we have examined two basic cases (or sub-cases) the first of which has been the declaration of independence in 1918 and the restoration of independence in 1991 as the second one. According to the basic aspects and characters of the facts provided through these cases the theory of political realism happened to have the best possible explanatory power among the theories of international relations. However, the political realism is no panacea and there can be the

\textsuperscript{106} See p.5.
certain aspects in our cases which cannot be explained even by this theory. Nor do we claim that political realism can be used as the explanation of all aspects in the two centuries period of Georgian-German relations, including the current development. The theory of political realism has been provided as the explanation of the majority of aspects in the two concrete cases provided in our research.

The theory of political realism contains wide range of concepts and variety of directions. In this regard we have not chosen any certain direction in this theory and given primary importance to it while rejecting the others. Instead, we have chosen the concepts developed by the different directions of this theory. Namely, the concept of national interests developed by the realism theory\textsuperscript{107} has the primary importance for us, as it provides the foundation for the explanation of the both sub-cases. The concept of national interest, shared by all of the directions in political realism, should be understood as changeable in accordance with the time and situation. Another common realist principle widely used by us is the concept that politics is not based on morality\textsuperscript{108}. The concept that “political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe”\textsuperscript{109} is also important for us. Finally, the presumption of the rationality of actors (which is, however, not always the case)\textsuperscript{110} is significant for our research as well. Using the abovementioned concept, we generally refer with the classical (Machiavelli) and neoclassical (Morgenthau) realism, as well as Neorealism (Mearsheimer).

In the first case of declaration of independence in 1918 the following realistic explanations are applicable: first of all, the national interests of the two countries had been coincided occasionally since 1914 according to the changing reality created through the First World War\textsuperscript{111}. These interests coincided with each other during the whole period till the autumn of 1918. The successful developments in these relations, the most significant expression of which was the 26 May declaration of independence, had been conditioned by the national interests coincided between Germany and Georgia. Once these interests did not coincide with each other in autumn 1918, the

\textsuperscript{107} აკობია გვ.17.
\textsuperscript{108} Machiavelli Ch. 11.
\textsuperscript{109} Morgenthau, Principle 5.
\textsuperscript{110} აკობია გვ.22.
\textsuperscript{111} ბაქრაძე გვ.283.
relations had been stopped. The concept of the rationality of actors also applies in these case, while as long as the interests had differentiated, Georgian delegation turned their orientation towards the Entente forces immediately\textsuperscript{112}. This action is in the full compliance with the realist concept that “the alliances between states are considered as the temporary events and the ally of today can become foe on tomorrow. Accordingly, the realists conclude that states have to be egocentric and care on their own national interests”\textsuperscript{113}

The second case of the restoration of independence also underlines the importance of the national interests. Namely the attitude of Germany towards the issue of Georgian independence had changed and the relations between the countries did not take place because it was not in compliance of the national interests of Germany. The changeable character of national interests also applies here, as the national interest of Germany has been changed over time. The example provided above does not undermine the importance of the commonly shared values such as independence and self-determination. However, when the national interest contradicts with the principle or idea, the former overrides the latter. Relevant theoretical concept also belongs to the neoclassical realism, according to which “political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.”\textsuperscript{114}

According to the explanations provided above several concepts can be formed. First of all, the relations between Germany and Georgia had been driven by the national interests in both of the cases. In the first case the relations started and went successfully during the four years as long as the national interests coincided and stopped immediately after the interests had been changed. In the second case the relations did not take place as they contradicted with the national interests of Germany. Accordingly, when the establishment of relations is not in the national interest of one country, it does not take place even in case when it contains the interest of another one. Additionally,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[112] ავალიშვილი გვ. 197.
\item[113] აკობია გვ. 23.
\item[114] Morgenthau Principle 2.
\end{footnotes} 41
when the national interest contradicts with the commonly shared ideals or principles, the former overrides the latter.

2 Political Realism is not always the Answer

The concept of rational actors is one of the basic principles in the theory of political realism and derives from the concept of national interests. According to this principle, politicians have to act rationally, in order to defend the interests of their country, as they have positive responsibility to their nation. According to the Neorealist statement of John Mearsheimer, “states are basically rational, although they can not always predetermine their actions, as they act in the world of incomplete information”\(^{115}\). Therefore, states (and, accordingly, politicians which represent them) have to act rationally, or, at least, do their best to act rationally, in order to protect their national interests.

In the case provided by us\(^{116}\) there is a certain aspect which substantially contradicts with the abovementioned concept. Namely, this is the policy of Georgian Social-Democrat Party in 1917 and even in the beginning of 1918. This party was considered to “play the decisive role in all of the important political issues”\(^{117}\) in Georgia and it officially became the ruling party in the independent Georgia since 1918. Accordingly, it had to express the national interest of that country. However, Georgian Social-Democrat party followed the policy of ‘loyalty’ towards the Russian Social-Democrat Party and therefore contradicted the idea of Georgian independence, in order to maintain ‘centralism’\(^{118}\). The strange policy of ‘faithfulness towards Russian democracy’ by Georgian Social-Democratic Party had been expressed in several actions\(^{119}\) and was going on even in 1918 when such kind of policy lacked the elementary rationality.

The case provided above fundamentally contradicts with the basic concept of the political realism theory. According to this theory the protection of national interest is the

\(^{115}\) See p.17.

\(^{116}\) Chapter III, Part 2.

\(^{117}\) აკობია გვ.22.

\(^{118}\) ალათონის გვ.89.

\(^{119}\) ალათონის გვ. 24.
basic motive in the international relations, while in case of Georgian Social-Democratic party the opposite was true. Furthermore, the theory of political realism suggests that when the national interests contradict with the commonly shared principles and ideas, the former had to override the latter. In our case the independence of Georgia was the national interest while the ideas of socialism and democracy were the commonly shared principle at least between the Social-Democrats. Strangely enough, what happened in this case was that quite ambiguous principle of ‘loyalty towards Russian democracy’ overrode the national interests of the country. Finally, such kind of decision lacked the elementary amount of rationality which is also required by the theory of political realism. How can this curious situation be explained?

In our opinion the following considerations can serve as the possible explanations of this case. First of all, the rationality of politicians is the requirement but is not a must. It might take place (in very rare cases) that politicians act irrationally. The irrationality of action can be determined by the devoted loyalty towards the idea, which was most probably the case in the abovementioned policy. The irrationality of action can be determined by the ambiguity of the political situation as well. This might also be the proper explanation in our case, while the political situation in Georgia in 1917 was pretty much ambiguous. Finally, such kind of policy did not last longer, as the Georgian Social-Democratic made sure that being the leading party in Georgia they had to protect the national interests of this country. The explanations provided above might not be in the full compliance with the theory of political realism. However, they explain the motivations of such case most relevantly. To sum up, the fact discussed above was the minor exception aspect of the general case the major characters of which are in the general compliance with the theory of political realism.

3 General Theoretical Explanations

According to the reasoning provided above, the theory of political realism can be considered as the most relevant explanatory framework for the cases provided by the research. In particular, the notions and concepts of the political realism theory happened to be mostly applicable, relevant and helpful during the explanation of the case-studies.
Particularly the concept of the national interests, understood as the certain interest of the state or country expressed by its government or interest groups, had been the basic concept explaining the main aspects of the provided cases. Particularly the changeable character of the national interest was helpful to explain the abovementioned aspects. The priority of national interests over the commonly shared principle was explanatory in the majority of aspects (not everywhere). The concept of rationality, in order to protect the national interest, had been relevant as well.

The particular case the explanation of which was possible according to the theory of political realism included two sub-cases. The first one has been the relations between Georgia and Germany during the declaration of independence by Georgia on 26 May 1918. The explanation referred to this case was based on the dominance of the national interests. Particularly, German-Georgian relations and the successful results of these relations were determined by the coincidence between Georgian and German interests. Once these interests did not coincide with each other any longer the relations had been terminated. The changeable character of the national interest had been demonstrated through the second case, which referred to the period of the restoration of Georgian independence in 1991. Particularly this case had shown that national interests change over time and the fact that German attitude towards the issue of Georgian independence had changed was determined by the shift of German national interests.

However, the theory of political realism has not always been relevant to all of the aspects in the provided cases. Particularly, the policy of Georgian Social-Democrat party in 1917 was found to be in contradiction with the basic concepts suggested by the theory of political realism. Several explanations have been delivered, in order to clarify the motivation of this policy, which happened to be unusual case. This fact has demonstrated that the political realism theory may also be irrelevant while explaining the certain aspect of the case-study. Accordingly, the significance of the political realism theory can be determined as not the universal one explaining every single aspect of the provided case, but as the theory the concepts of which are mostly helpful to explain the majority of aspects of the abovementioned case.

The theory of political realism also gives the possibility to make general comparison between the actors and policies conducted by them in the provided cases. To start from
the recent case of the German-Georgian relations concerning the restoration of independence in 1991 the basic directions of the policies conducted by the governments led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia with one regard and Eduard Shevardnadze with the other can be compared. The former followed the concept of political realism with regards to the protection of the national interests while did not follow the principle of ignoring the issues of morality. The latter followed the concepts of egocentrism and rationality overriding the moral principles while gave the less credit to the national interests. This difference played the decisive role in terms of the attitude of Germany towards these governments. In the first case the ‘loyalty policy’ of Georgian Social-Democratic party fully contradicts with the theory of political realism as discussed above. However, the policy of Georgian delegation in Berlin in 1918 turning immediately their orientation towards Entente while it appeared to be the future winner of the war complies with the political realism in both of the aspects: protecting national interests on one hand and being rational and egocentric on the other. We also have to mention that the policy conducted by Germany had been in a full compliance with the doctrine of political realism in both of the cases provided by us.
VI Conclusions

The relations between Germany and Georgia is an interesting topic to study in itself, as it provides quite original example of relations between the prominent European state on one hand and the country struggling for independence on the other. This topic is also quite original, as the studies and researches in this direction have not been the common case. Although the relations between these countries have been going during nearly two centuries, the history of political relations between them started later with the initiative of Georgian Independence Committee in Berlin in 1914. The declaration of independence on 26 May 1918 and restoration of independence on 9 April 1991 had been the basic points of Georgian history in the previous century. These two points happened to be crucial in the history of Georgian-German relations as well, while the relations between the countries had been determined by these facts in both of the cases. Therefore we have chosen them as the two basic points in the relations.

The research has provided the case-study of both of the basic points in the beginning clarifying the main aspects of the relations followed by the theoretical explanations of these cases and clarified basic aspects, according to the inductive reasoning. The theory of political realism and the basic concepts of this theory have been used during the explanation of the abovementioned cases. The application of political realism theory to the cases of Georgian-German relations led to the interesting theoretical explanations. In particular, the concept of national interests, which is the basic concept of the political realism theory, and its changeable character, together with its priority over the commonly shared principles and values, as well as the concept of rationality, have been most helpful during the theoretical explanations of the abovementioned cases.

The relations between Georgia and Germany is the currently ongoing process with its progressive developments during the last couple of decades. Accordingly, the examination of the basic points in the relations should be worth of interest, in order to get familiar with the basic aspects, characters and developments of these relations. The experiences earned during the past developments have their significance for the actual relations as well. Therefore the clarification and relevant theoretical explanation of the abovementioned aspects, developments and characters should be interesting from nowadays perspective and helpful for the future as well.
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