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Master Thesis on the topic

**Explaining Polish Eurosceptic Backlash –
Interrelation of National and European Level**

Thesis submitted to obtain the Master's Degree in European Studies

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Abstract

The respective Master's thesis tries to analyze the main reasons of the government shift in Poland immediately after the 2004 accession in the European Union. The Euroenthusiast government coalition which successfully completed the main objective of the last decade to accede the Union was replaced by the Eurosceptic coalition led by the Law and Justice party in 2005. The key findings of the research derive from the examination of the political environment created in periods of time characterized by the democratic backsliding and political instabilities: the last phase of accession negotiations with the EU and the immediately after the accession took place and also, their linkage with the general outcomes of the post-1989 state development. Author overviews the political vacuum created after the disintegration of the mainstream political parties, enhancing the Polish public anger after the failure of de-communisation and the low salience of European issues and consequently, the double perceptions of Polish public about the European Union as key factors contributing to the important changes after the accession. She applies the theoretical assumptions of academics in order to explain the causality found during the case-study.

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Abbreviations

AWS	Electoral Action Solidarity
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CBOS	Polish Public Opinion Research Center
EU	European Union
PiS	Law and Justice Party
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance
LPR	League of Polish Families
UW	Freedom Union

1. Introduction

The main objective of the respective thesis is to examine the underlying causes of a widespread phenomenon to Central and Eastern European region –a rise of the Eurosceptic non-mainstream parties.

An increasing electoral support as well as significant strength of the Eurosceptic/Eurorealist forces in the Western Europe is already well-vowed and well-researched topic in the academic sphere. The aim of the author is to reach the roots of the Eurosceptic ‘backlash’ in the newly acceded countries of the CEE region which quite recently underwent the process of Europeanization and were debated to be ready for the EU membership.

General outcome of the Europeanization was a progressive post-communist development – the process which logically (for the accession candidate states) lead to the eastern European enlargement of 2004. Having already fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, the newly acceded countries were meant to comply with the democratic style of government endemic to their fellow western European states. The Criteria loosely refers to the stability of democratic institutions that guarantee rule of law, human rights and the protection of minority rights without specifying the mechanisms and institutional framework through which the tasks must be accomplished and without defining the way they need to be fulfilled. The *pre and near-to-accession-date* positive performance was consolidated by the most anticipated part of the whole accession negotiations in 2004- by the actual membership of the candidate states.

The underlying feature of the accession period was marked by the common consensus between the political actors and public that the EU membership was a primary goal for

the national governments to achieve. It was also predictable that the negotiating process would be conducted by the Euroenthusiast forces in government who strived to ensure the status of a member state. However, after the successful completion of the objective, the Euroenthusiast government coalitions were replaced by their Eurosceptic counterparts regardless the fact that the level of Euroscepticism in public was low (in most of the member states) and the trust in the European project was high. The case study is focused on the case of Poland aftermath the national legislative elections held in 2005.

Before getting involved in a comprehensive analysis it is relevant to ask: '*Why did the 2005 Polish legislative elections resulted in a shift from Euroenthusiast government coalition of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) to the Eurosceptic government coalition led by the 'Law and Justice' party (PiS) if the level of Euroscepticism in polish public was so low and the trust in the European Project was so high?*'

(Table I here)

The Methodology applied in order to propose main findings is based on the case-study of the Polish political system and the voting behaviour of the Poles, the immediate political environment both during the final years of accession negotiations and the immediate period after the enlargement occurred. Author uses the method of generating the hypothesis and applying the theoretical framework in order to explain causality between the dependent and independent variables. Author explores the primary and secondary sources such as books, articles, the newspapers related to the topic of research. The study also used data analysis, the speeches, the manifestos of the twin Kaczynski's party, several surveys designed study opinion polls with special focus on variables alike: perceptions about EU membership, trust in European project,

attitudes towards the EU and the national government institutions and etc. were employed in order to find empirical evidence. Applying these techniques Author tried to find a linkage between the public opinion and the ideological stance of the PiS, also the interrelation between the development of post-1989 and post-accession periods.

In the end of the research, Author of this paperwork came up to the following hypothesis: *'The shift from the Euroenthusiast governing coalition of SLD to the Eurosceptic PiS party-led government coalition occurred because of*

- 1) political vacuum created after the discreditation of the mainstream parties, the SLD and the AWS, created a favorable conditions for the newcomers such as PiS;*
- 2) public anger and its protest vote against the existing political establishment failed to deal with the Communist legacy was used as an asset by the PiS;*
- 3) and also because double perceptions amongst the Poles regarding the essence of the European Union persisted.*

As the Polish case study shows, accession did not mean the “end of history”. The successive events and tendencies revealed the facade smoothness and fake robustness of state system. The core Visegrad states ‘displayed a worrying tendency to plunge back into populism, nationalism, Europhobia, and reform-aversion, which, according to the EU “script” was supposed to be firmly a thing of the past’(Sobell, 2006: 2) The worrying tendencies of the post-enlargement development of issues shows a real discrepancy between the initial goal and the would-be result of the designer of the Europeanization and the ‘Back to Europe’ process and the evidence shown examined below in the literature review of the relevant academic work.

1.1 Field of Study

The topic of this thesis is related to the Enlargement and Post Enlargement studies, interrelations between the EU and National level of Governance, Post-Communist studies of the Central and Eastern Europe also can be included. More precisely, to concretize the sub-fields, it falls under the study of National Political and Party system.

The linkage of this research with the Enlargement and Post-Enlargement studies should not by any means demonstrate the author's aim to prove that the EU accession directly and inevitably caused a collapse of pro-European governing coalitions in Poland but to examine indirect effects of the Europeanization process on the government and political party behavior, their strategies resulting in a *win game* for some of them and a loss for the others. While the impact of the EU enlargement on the macro-level is quite well researched, its influence on the national political systems except what is meant under the broad and vague term of democratization, is not yet explored.

Also, the overlap between the EU and National level of Governance is a relevant context for this research as the independent variables determined during the case study are in touch with the EU-national level interplay, how it shapes and impacts the society and its preferences.

1.2 The importance of the Study

Writing about the reasons of rising the Eurosceptic vision among the societies of the members states can not be considered as a eureka. So called democratic deficit arguing that the decision-making lacks public participation and non-elective and therefore, non-accountable EU bodies play the main role in the policy-making bypassing the desires and aspirations of EU/National citizens and this is considered as one of the significant reasons of increasing the support of Eurosceptic approach.

Other contributors to rising of anti-EU sentiments have to do with the supranational essence of the Union and experience the feeling of being unprotected in front of “losing their peculiar identity” due to the European-wide dimension of the EU policies. The fear of deepening and at the same time the fear of the widening process keeps the Western Europeans alarmed.

After all, what is special and interesting in Euroscepticism born at Central and Eastern European scene on the Eve of “returning to Europe”? Does the fall of initial pro-EU attitude in Central and Eastern Europe have the similar roots as the Western European phenomenon already discussed? Answer is no. What makes the difference is the image of the EU itself. For the most of Western European member states and the societies who stand on the negative stance towards the EU integration, the Union is not associated with an asset of restoration of “historical fairness” and is merely an instrument of receiving additional benefits of being a member of an economic (firstly) and political union.

What is another paradox here is that as the support for nationalist and populist messages strengthens, the levels of life satisfaction, the percentage of those people who

consider the EU membership positive and beneficial for their respective countries increase.

While examining the Euroscepticism in Eastern countries, one has to keep in mind the continuous efforts of reforming the existing order scrutinized under the authority of the Commission. The tangible outcomes of joining the Union as a force and a guarantee of stability have not been so much expected in any rounds of any past enlargements. However, the events occurred on the Eve of and after the accession (the corruption scandals, government crisis, and street demonstrations) mostly repeated the early period of post-communist 90ies. Conditionality is dealt with, accession is achieved, now has come a turn of Scepticism? Some commentators of the European studies argue that Eurosceptic vision is somehow a necessary ingredient of EU integration but in case of the Eastern and Central European states the mushrooming of Eurosceptic, populist or anti-establishment parties indeed had a negative effect on the further stabilization and consolidation of democracy because of the immaturity and extremely fractured and fluctuated feature of their new-born political systems.

Thus, the importance of the research topic lies in the analysis of an unfinished business of Europeanization in newly democratized countries of Central and Eastern Europe based on a case study of Poland. It tries to explain the reasons of losing the public support for the mainstream parties which conducted the accession negotiations and fulfilled this important task and rise of hitherto marginalized nationalist parties which came into power soon after joining the UE. Thesis highlights the issues such as a phenomenon of democratic backsliding noticed by the commentators of the European Studies, the stagnation of democratic consolidation and the speed of reforms, the paradoxically decreased public support for liberal democratic type of governance.

Despite the fact that the case study is focused on the pro-European government collapse and emergence of the EU-reluctant and nationalist parties (Law and Justice party in Poland) in the second half of 2000ies, the importance and relevance of this study lies in assessing the common feature for the whole region which has been left in a past and lost its relevance to the current events shaping the contemporary politics in respective states. If we take into consideration continuing negative developments of region-wide events in a political environment and the increased likelihood of unpredictable outcomes the similar questions as this thesis tries to focus and answer will emerge again. The region of Central and Eastern Europe seems an interesting laboratory as countries like Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary remain a wide *field* for *new entrants* because of still being fragmentized.

This Master's thesis can be useful for students interested in the contemporary historical developments of Eastern Europe, the implications of the Europeanization and the principle of conditionality applied vis-à-vis this region, researchers focused on the patterns of Eastern European politics and party systems, main characteristics and the explanations of the political instability (turbulences) and frequent government reshuffles.

1.3 Case Selection

The growth of the Euroscepticism is not characteristic only to Poland, as already mentioned, but what is specific in this case is that the significant portion of *elite and party based Euroscepticism* is not in compliance with public opinion regarding the importance of the EU accession and the further integration processes. In Poland Eurosceptic parties held the office immediately after the accession took place in 2004 and a significant rise of nationalist-populist rhetoric from the government side was observed. Main criticism was directed to the European level of governance and the pace and character of its integration process. Case of Poland was selected according to the following criteria:

- a) Poland is one of the first representors of Central and Eastern European region who officially expressed its wish (1994) to join the European Union as one of the first priority among them. Very soon after the dissolution of the Socialist system, country applied for the EU membership and during the pre-accession and accession negotiations was committed to the long-lasting process of Europeanization and harmonization of its system of governance to the Western European model, and to the restructuring of its economy – the process which took more than a decade accompanied by the certain troubleshoots and limitations, the enlargement fatigue from the EU side and reform fatigue from the CEE countries' side.
- b) Among the candidates which joined the EU in 2004, Poland is the most influential one and possesses substantial leverage (the level of economic development, size of population which automatically means the significant

number of Members of the European Parliament, one of the most homogeneous state regarding the ethnic composition, the geo-political importance) both on regional and the EU level.

- c) According to the surveys of the European Commission (conducted by Eurobarometer) from 2004 till 2007, the life satisfaction, the percentage of population who perceives the EU membership as a positive development is high and progressively increases towards the 2007.
- d) Meanwhile, Poland's party system is relatively fragmented and fragile, vulnerable to the political destabilization and opportunism.
- d) The reason why Hungary was not selected as a case is that it has a predominantly majoritarian and not a proportional electoral system. Being less proportional than that of Poland, Hungary's electoral system represents a "mixed model with three interlinking majoritarian and proportional tiers which offer a complex mix of incentives and choices to both large and small parties seeking to formulate alliance building and campaigning strategies" (Birch and others, 2002: 63-6)
- e) The idea about comparing the states from the different accession rounds, the most relevant to the Mediterranean enlargement would also be irrelevant because the Central and Eastern European Countries unlike the candidate states Greece, Spain and Portugal were undertaking the double course of Europeanization both in political and economic terms, while the Mediterranean

countries already were based on capitalist system and only had to re-establish the democratic rule of governance.

The time period used for research after the accession up until the recent global economic crisis 2008 does not exclude the fact that the radical right wing parties have existed before the accession period actually began, the relative freedom of expression as the result of collapse of the socialist bloc and uncertainty have created a fertile ground for the nationalistic, radical parties to emerge. But what is interesting in the time period focused is that although the academic truth that the radical parties gain the support of electorate in times of economic turmoil, crisis and backlash into the society.

2. Literature Review

Literature consulted during the research includes the following academic sources related to the topic of this thesis: while arguing about the development of the party politics in the CEE region, Paul G. Lewis in his article “Europeanization and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe” says that the phenomenon of significant rise of radical wing has nothing to do with the “European” but resembles merely to less civilized eastern practices or traditional authoritarian style of government.

He underlines the vagueness of the principles set by the Union to comply in order to be eligible for the accession negotiations. “The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ that determined the conditions that new states had to meet for membership do not mention parties at all, so there is no party model to apply in the way that specific policies have to be implemented in particular areas” (Lewis, undated: 11).

Other authors which mention the destructive role played by the EU during the process of Europeanization are Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden. ‘As part of growing prominence of governance over established patterns of coordination and political rule in general, indeed, European integration is widely understood to be responsible for a loss of responsiveness on the part of traditional intermediary institutions and organizations – particularly of political parties’ (van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004: 159)

Meanwhile Simon Hix and Goetz disapprove the possibility of the EU’s direct influence on the party politics and rather than argue about a more indirect effect of the EU on party systems and in general, on the political landscape of the candidate countries, “indirect effect of EU governance outcomes on domestic political institutions and input processes in domestic political systems (Hix and Goetz, 2000: 10)

Apart from observing the EU impact on the party politics, some authors underline the importance of the country system peculiarity in order to explain the different levels of organization and fluidity of the political parties in the states of the CEE region. In a comparison of the Czech Republic and Poland, Saxonberg argues that the presence of a well-institutionalized party on the Czech centre-right derived, in part, from an indirectly elected presidency and concomitant absence of incentives for charismatic leaders to pursue alternatives to party formation (Saxonberg 2003: 2-36) Accordingly, in order to achieve the office of head of state, (Poland’s case) one has to insure the electorate’s support because of the direct election of the President which is not the case in Czech Republic where President is elected by the main representative body; that’s why the strong and reliable party support is vital in Czech Republic, while Poland mainly rests on the disorganized and fragmented political parties which time to time show an unreliable pattern of action: changing the ideological stance from right to

left or vice versa, forming the coalitions with inappropriate and irrelevant forces. The evidence of this phenomenon will be shown later during the case-study.

Authors' ideas differ according to the identification of the main cause of what is called Euroscepticism, populism and radicalism. Krzysztof Jasiewicz in his essay 'Elections and Voting Behavior' underlined the system changes causing societal divisions as a driving force for increasing support for political populism.

Another scholar who supports the systemic explanation of the specific voting behavior of the public is Frances Millard; he argues that voting results of Polish society is linked with the political disintegration and the increasing mistrust in government which made it easier for the populist parties to succeed. This proposition will be used later as the theoretical framework for the study.

Andre Gerrits claims that the current phenomenon of rising populism at the expense of decreasing trust in representative democracy is a common feature of Central and Eastern European societies but at the same time he agrees with Lang that Populism is not an equally prominent force in all post-communist countries and even in those countries where it has gained considerable political strength, the representatives of radical populism never reached beyond ten percent of the general vote (Lang, 2006) – the observation which should be definitely questioned given the example of Poland and its elections resulted in the nationalist/populist force 'Law and Justice' of Kaczynski brothers to assume the government office in 2005-2007 years in coalition with Peasants party and Self-Defense.

Williams and Tavits highlight a common trend for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to diminish their support for incumbent parties nevertheless of their

political vector or ideology after some time holding an office (Williams, 2002; Tavits, 2008). The formula that the governing parties lose the next elections is relevant to the overwhelmingly vast majority of the political parties for the entire region.

Apart from the systemic, *European* factors of change; academics also analyze the role of domestic political elites as a main driver or the main barrier to the positive Europeanization. While disputing the role of political elites in maintaining the shift from positive Europeanization towards the negative one, Gallina concludes that “while political elites cooperated readily to become part of the European Union, they now increasingly oppose further political integration and tend to nationalize and polarize political issues, thus turning to a negative Europeanization of their countries’ (Gallina, 2007: 3). Author uses the path-dependent approach in order to emphasize the role of values, beliefs and institutions of the old regime influencing current developments. Under the old regime legacy she does not only mean the period of Communist party dominance but also the authoritarian style of governance, the supremacy of state over society common also to the pre-War period.

Alongside with the generally positive impact of the Europeanization in the preparation of the candidate countries, Geoffrey Pridham in his article ‘EU Accession and Domestic Politics: Policy Consensus and Interactive Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe’ examines the pressures of the accession process and a strength of existing consensus in society to withstand these pressures. He identifies following factors:

- a) The historical imperative behind the basic policy redirection from east to west has been present from the start and it still generates grand political rhetoric, sometimes being linked to the geo-strategic and security concerns as well as the need to reinforce democratization (Pridham, 2001: 58)

- b) Factors related to Governance i.e. the adoption of *acquis communautaire*, foundation of instruments and bodies to deal with the judicial and political harmonization and govern the relations with the Union. Pridham mentions the sensitiveness of particular issues for certain candidate states such as land acquisition for the Czech Republic, environmental issues because of its costly nature, the Common Agriculture Policy and its rules importance for Poland, minority rights and Etc which can make public vulnerable .
- c) The factor of media and national political level including the steps undertaken by the political parties. ‘While, the wider political arena is not so subject to this basic constraint, so that criticisms and dissent are more likely to surface at this level as well as in the socio-economic arena (Pridham, 2001: 63)
- d) Socio-economic concerns questioning the candidate state’s readiness in economic and social terms to adopt the EU requirements in order to avoid the economic malfunctioning and decrease the competitiveness of European internal market. But according to Pridham, the fourth factor was the weakest to negatively affect the consensus about the EU membership in the societies.

Pridham also underlined the increasing gap between the political elites who drive the process and the mass the one who feels the impact of it. According to him, the “*rendez-vous manqué*” between these two groups is likely to be widened because of the unilaterally-led accession negotiations by the Brussels-side.

2.1. Operationalization of Concepts

In this section, author explains the terminology applied during the research.


Euroscepticism according to Taggart ‘expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European Integration’ (Taggart, 1998: 366) while the Euroenthusiasm is explained as the opposite of the Euroscepticism i.e. the support for both the accession process of the country and the further integration of the Union – “deepening and widening ’dilemma.

Hard and Soft Euroscepticism is also differentiated from one other. The former opposes to the way of EU functioning; its decisions and instruments and the soft Euroscepticism refers to the supremacy of national interests opposing to the very idea of the EU about the supranational governance system challenging the idea and functioning of a nation state.

Beyond the scope of Euroscepticism which mainly addresses to the scepticism emerged on the party basis, ‘negative Europeanization’ focuses on concrete domestic politics enabling populism, polarization and nationalism and consequently, on political elite behavior (Gallina, 2007: 84).

In order to conduct a research on a performance of an Eurosceptic party, a clear definition of what criteria are defined to consider a party as an Eurosceptic is needed. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003: 2-3) argue that identifying the particular party as an Eurosceptic is not ‘over-inclusive and should refer specifically to party attitudes towards European integration through the EU in principle and the EU’s current or

future trajectory. . . party-based Euroscepticism was ‘where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU or where there is a sense that national interest is currently at odds with the EU trajectory’.



Graph Taken from Kopecky and Muddle: ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism’ in European Union Politics, Vol. 3, No.3 p. 301

Research frequently refers to the concepts of Conditionality and Europeanization. Conditionality principle will also be used various times during the research. It is defined by Steunenberg and Dimitrova as an “Exchange between the EU and a candidate country in which the EU offers the candidate a (realistic) prospect of the EU membership, if the candidate implements a wide range of (EU driven) domestic reforms”(2007: 3). The rough example of how the conditionality principle works in

practice is its comparison with the ‘stick and carrots’ policy. In order to finally get the carrot, one has to make concessions in the tough and sometimes very sensitive process of the preparation.

The principle of Europeanization sometimes creates the ambiguity and misunderstanding for those who are not acquainted with the special vocabulary of the EU accession process. Europeanization is used not in a special and geographical terms i.e. meaning that Central and Eastern European Europe was not a part of the European continent before the accession process, but rather to describe the dynamics which of candidate states from the CEE to accommodating European values and harmonizing with the EU governance and decision-making structure.

Europeanization as a process linked with the Central and Eastern Europe is seen and analyzed as a top-down process rather than a bottom-up one. Under the term, the EU impact on the national systems and processes are meant. According to Ladrech (1994: 2), Europeanization is “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”. Radaelli (2000, 3-4) defines Europeanization as the “processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decision and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”.

3. An Overview of the Political Developments in the CEE Region

3.1 The Controversies of the ‘Return to Europe’

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-socialist transformation had to be implemented. The first and the foremost strategic decision made by the Central and Eastern European countries was to ‘Return to Europe’ – the long-term and complicated issue in terms of a re-introducing themselves from half a century of a planned economy and the authoritarian style of governance to the system based on a free market and the respect of the fundamental principles of rule of law, human rights, minority rights; etc.

Poland expressed its willingness to joint the EU by officially applying for membership in 1994. The accession negotiations with Poland started in March, 1998 and was concluded in 2002. After signing the Treaty on accession and holding a referendum in 2003, Poland joined the EU in May, 2004.

The evaluation of the overall process emphasized on the win-win situation created by the strengthening the trade relations, multiplying the investments between EU-15 and EU-10 as well as within EU-10.

The objective of ‘Return to Europe’ has never reversed during the accession negotiations even when the serious blow regarding the specific issues for the different states arouse: for example the freedom of movement of persons and workers, land acquisition by the foreign national the very sensitive issue for Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland. The transitional periods were demanded by the EU-15 countries in order to

protect their nationals from the burden of redundant cheap labor force, the uncontrolled movement of persons and the security concerns related to this issue, the security of the external borders was now being drifted towards the unknown East. The stereotypes persisted both from the newly acceded states about their second level country status and the subordinated position inside the EU in the decision-making and the stereotypes from the EU-15 about the difficulties of the EU transformation in order to maintain the unity and the absorption capacity of the Union not to disturb the integration process by the relatively unreliable newcomers. The impact of these issues on the public perceptions about the EU will be analyzed further during the case-study.

Another main concern of the candidate states was provoked by the forceful nature and the asymmetric interdependence between the European Commission and the *negotiators* on behalf of the acceding states. The negotiations that were intended to bring the EEC countries back to the democratic world after the long awaited period; the Promised Land was conducted in a pretty undemocratic and clandestine way behind the doors.

Euroscepticism appeared to be more spread in the candidate countries which were the frontrunners during the accession negotiations and had relatively more perspective to become a member in a near future. This tendency shows the so called “reform fatigue” in the candidate states generally, especially in those which had already performed the most part of tasks and requirements as the prerequisites for a long-awaited accession. As a result of the accession period, enlargement fatigue was not only felt in the EU-15 from the eastern enlargement, but also reached a significant level in the EEC population with a clear reform fatigue syndrome causing an anger or dissatisfaction from the EEC public towards the image of the EU and contributing to the

fertilization of ground for the rise of Eurosceptic or nationalist-populist kind movements.

The reform fatigue phenomenon has accelerated and came on a surface as the public has realized that their participation was limited in the accession process, moreover, the governing subjects kept silence about the possible negative side effects of the conditionality. To say in another terms, the accession issue was securitized by the governing elites and put under the concept on a national interest – a very vague term and vulnerable to being used as justification of certain political steps.

The demands of EU conditionality had begun to produce significant levels of discontent, and the positive commitment to EU membership was being replaced by a more grudging acceptance of its inevitability (Lewis, Mansfeldova, 2006: 2).

3.2 Breaking the European Consensus Apart

Initially, as the EU membership was perceived as a restoration of historical fairness supported by an overwhelming majority of populations, anti-EU or middle stance could not be embraced openly by the mainstream players. What is interesting is that the party elites of both right and left were agreed on the importance of EU membership from the mid-1990s, thus undermining any kind of competition around this issue. According to Peter Mair (quoted in Karcheva, undated: 8) “European integration increasingly operates to constrain the freedom of movement of national governments, and hence encourages a hollowing out of competition among those parties with a governing aspiration. As such, it promotes a degree of consensus across the mainstream and an inevitable reduction in the range of policy alternatives available to voters”. What was an added value to the pro-European government rule, was a

relatively low cost of socializing and accepting the externally introduced requirements as the general direction of Europeanization is not questioned and the processing of reformation is not speeding down. The national government can rely on the domestic electorate that the concessions made in order to pursue certain political course, would not behave in a self-constraining way fearing of the electoral ‘betrayal’ from the public. The latter in its own way was acquainted with reasonable choice of what Schimmelfennig and others refer to a ‘credible policy of conditionality, which caused a pro-Western and pro-democratic electorate to reassess the costs of having a government, which had proved to be an obstacle to the Western integration of their country’ (Schimmelfennig and others, undated: 14).

After the accession in 2004, a conditionality paradox was observed: while the newly acceded central and eastern European countries enjoyed significant economic growth and a level of the country competitiveness on internal market increased, the conditions for further development of the domestic reforms have been deteriorated. As soon as the big goal of accession has been achieved, the common agreement between the political forces on European-oriented stance has loosened and lost the affiliated parties to the Eurosceptic or nationalist way of thinking. As Rayna Karcheva (undated: 3) mentioned, “the big political goal of transition has been achieved and the economic prospects are no doubt promising but the political parties that led their nations to this successful end are rapidly losing support and legitimacy.” As Grzymala-Busse and Innes (2003: 64) note, the requirements of enlargement “have both constrained responsive and accountable party competition and … encouraged populists and demagogues”.

Thus, the expectation that the total reorganization of Central and Eastern European states through the instruments of Europeanization would mature the already marked signs of democratic consolidation started after the fall of socialist system, did

not come up with hopes and was placed under revision. At the post-accession processes a show, Central and Eastern Europe is therefore a region renewed political challenges.

The early impact of EU enlargement on CEE politics and patterns of party government also seemed to be quite negative and was often destabilizing in its effects. Leszek Miller, Poland's Prime Minister resigned from office on 2nd of May, a day after his country joined the EU. This was of course not a direct consequence of EU accession but EU-related issues had certainly played a part in weakening his position and bringing about a situation in which the country's whole party system, as it has been formed for the past 15 years, seemed to be in fundamental crisis; The core party of the Czech governing coalition, the Social Democratic Party, came fifth out of the six groups that succeeded in sending representatives tot the European Parliament and the government collapsed just two weeks later (Lewis, Mansfeldova, 2006: 2).

The sense of being betrayed by the political elites had been significantly strengthened as the accession actually took place and the credentials of the governing parties had been expired. There was nothing pivotal left in order to justify the means. The public overburdened by the accession costs had not been given a chance to be involved in the Europeanization project. If someone makes a contra-argument and adds that because of the complicated structure and organization of the EU, the society usually finds it difficult to participate in EU policy making and this is a very true also for the Western member states, one can ask whether the Parliaments of the respective old members of the EU were neglected into the accession negotiation process as it was a case in the Central and Eastern European region.

Author does not have an intention to argue that the rise of populist/radical parties is the phenomenon of the Central and Eastern Europe resulted only by the

accession process but it must not be neglected that the EU despite the fact that they themselves were now members of the this same EU is still perceived as an external force demanding to make concessions; despite the win-win outcome of the eastern enlargement, the idea about the unfair treatment is still persistent in the new member states.

In conclusion, the “Return to Europe” political objective was successfully completed by the candidate states in terms of obtaining the EU member status, but the limitations of the Europeanization process also vivid as the pre-accession relatively stable environment was immediately altered by the political turbulences and the feel of uncertainty. Mainstream accountable political parties were replaced by the new-comers tended to populism and Euroscepticism, the public anger enhanced as the result of the feeling of betrayal from the political elites, the perception of the EU has also became vague and full of contradictions. Poland is examined below as one of the examples.

4. The Case Study

The case study is about immediate changes on political landscape of Poland – a radical shift occurred in the composition of the government after the accession trying to find out the main factors contributing to this change.

As already mentioned above, the enlargement caused unpredictable consequences for the main political players who contributed the most to Poland’s accession to the EU. The Prime Minister Leszek Miller shortly before the official accession date the May, 2004 revealed about his intention to resign on the day after the Poland would officially join the Union. The resignation of Miller was not a surprise for the Polish

public because of the several malaises of the Miller's government and its surrounding political environment. But instead of the more stable situation to be resulted from the accession to the EU, as it was generally expected both from the public and the EU, the outcomes of the process were ambiguous and confusing for the public. One possible contribution of the EU to such an unpredictable situation was a sense of the public that the membership of the EU could deter further complications.

As one Polish prominent sociologist Marek Cichocki stated 'Even if the accession will not be a panacea for any of the pathologies of our democracy, it will nevertheless strengthen the stability of the state, so that if there is major crisis ... membership in the EU will reduce their consequences' (Cichocki, 2003: 58). The importance of the EU membership was seen primarily as a strategy of avoiding the reversion of the positive reformation done under the Europeanization process, some kind of deterrence mechanism against the possible turbulence as the domestic political establishment was ineffective of counter the threat on its own.

The situation was further deteriorated by the fact that according to the results provided by the Eurobarometer polls: the trust in national political institutions was extremely low (ironically in the country which experienced more than a decade advent of democracy and pluralism after the fall of Communism) in contrast to the mythical trust revealed towards the functioning of the EU institutions which appeared to be a positive sign.

(Table II here)

4.1. The legacies of Miller Government

The Miller government corruption practices, nepotism reinforced the distrust in national establishment and additionally, misused the chance to utilize the Euro enthusiasm and public trust in the EU as a capital resulted in a double loss: both to regain the trust for polish national institutions and negatively affected the attitude of the Union as a watchdog of national governments and safeguard of irreversible democratic consolidation.

The government of former Communist and self-reformed Socialist Leszek Miller was in favor of fastening the accession negotiations and adopting a new, more flexible negotiating strategy that meant making a number of concessions on two most important ‘chapters’ that appeared to be main points in order hurry up the ‘closing’ of those chapters as soon as possible not to endanger the Poland’s positions as a member of the so called Luxembourg Group intended to accede in 2004.

Firstly, the Miller government broadly accepted the EU’s proposal to allow existing member states to restrict Poles and other eastern European full access to Western labor markets by up to seven years as non-negotiable, although it pledged to persuade individual members not to take all advantage of this provision. Second, and more controversially, it also announced that it would reduce the proposed transition period on the sale of Polish land to foreigners from eighteen to twelve years. (Szczerbiak, 2012: 1860).

Another striking issue before the accession was the forthcoming Constitutional Treaty and the replacement of already agreed Nice voting system which was more beneficial for the new member states than the one proposed in the framework of the Constitutional treaty favoring the core old members such as France and Germany. As a consequence of the Nice voting quarrel, right-wing political parties in Poland (an oppositional force at that moment) discovered EU-skepticism as a support-source and have not incorporated a EU friendly stance since then (Gallina, 2007: 83). They perceived it as a mechanism of dictate on relatively non-influential new entrants.

But as already mentioned above, due to the overwhelming support for the accession issue, even called as an Euroenthusiasm (Pridham and Agh, 2001) did not leave the space for maneuvering for the non-mainstream parties at least at the initial level of accession negotiations which did not share this enthusiasm about the future possible joining of their country to the Union, the other Europe. In Poland, the parties opposing the prospect of near future were the Samooborona (Self-Defense), also the League of Polish Families (PRP).

As Miller resigned, the new interim government which was selected by Marek Belka entrusted by the President Kwaszniewski did resulted in change in terms of numbers but not with regards to the substance as the core ministers of the Miller's government still retained their posts. Only gaining 188 votes from the needed 226, the new cabinet failed to secure the parliamentary voice of confidence which created a force majeure situation in the country. President was forced to re-nominate the candidature of Belka as a counter measure of calling a new parliamentary election which was supposed to be held in autumn 2005.

The electorate was mainly focused on the domestic problem of weighting *in* against *out* from the EU but what is also worth to mention is that these critical issues were not in a causally connected with the EU itself: with the reform fatigue, with the tough negotiations and asymmetrical interdependence caused by the dominant position of the Commission or the severity of the conditionality principle ‘take it or leave it’.

4.2. Emergence of the Law and Justice Party

EU critic Law and Justice Party (PiS) run by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski came into power after the elections held in 2005. As the ruling PiS and its leaders parted from a pure nationalist view of politics – fighting for Polish identity in Europe – they focused on national issues, the eradication of communist legacies in Poland and utopia of building a IV Republic (Gallina, 2007: 85) The concentration on preserving the national traditional values was seen as a necessity in order to counter the emotionally-detached formal EU values.

Party	% of Vote	Total Seats	% of Seats
Law and Justice (PiS)	26.99%	155	33.7%
Civic Platform (PO)	24.14%	133	28.9%
Self-Defense (SO)	11.41%	56	12.2%
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)	11.31%	55	12.0%
League of Polish Families (LPR)	7.97%	34	7.4%
Polish Peasants Party	6.96%	25	5.4%
German minority	0.29%	2	0.4%
Polish Social Democracy (SdPi)	3.89%	-	-
Democratic Party (PD)	2.45%	-	-

Source: 2005 Parliamentary Elections Results for Sejm, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza.

According to the announcement made by the leaders of the two main right wing parties while campaigning before the 2005 election, Kaczynski and Tusk (Civic Platform), they would be eager to establish a coalition government in order to ‘improve the decency and transparency of public life, fight corruption, and unveil clientelistic links between the economics and political domain’ (Markowski, 2006: 819). But after some time, PiS started to distance itself from the Civic Platform as emphasizing that the latter was in favor of the rich because of its liberalist approach of economics in contrary with the rather own social appeals towards the disfranchised.

The aggressive campaign launched against the rest of the competing parties and their leaders was seen as a significant factor of attracting voter’s attention. The PiS attacked the other competitors ‘as if they had been absent from the Polish politics of the past decade and a half. They blamed everyone for the alleged failure’ (Markowski, 2006: 821). In order to expand its base, PiS looked to the radical Right for support and earned backing from LPR and religious fundamentalists under the guidance of radical Catholic Radio Maryja (Millard, 2006: 1023). Influence of a Polish Catholic Church on domestic politics is also argued by Szczerbiak ‘...given that many of the concerns about excessive Church influence on Poland around which the secular left mobilized in the early 1990s had receded, the social base for a liberal-cultural left was felt to be too narrow to sustain a major party in a socially and culturally conservative country such as Poland’ (Szczerbiak, 2008: 430). The Catholic Church was generally in favor of the accession in the EU but on the mass level, some fundamentalist priests were arguing about the Union as a threat against the moral and values of the Polish nation which would be endangered by the accession.

According to the pre-election polls, the Tusk's more moderate and pro-market oriented Civic Platform was expected to be a frontrunner and a best performer in legislative elections; this forecast had been strengthened as the PO emerged as a winner in the first European Parliament elections held in June, 2004, shortly after the accession in May. As the forthcoming national legislative elections and the European elections were interpenetrated because of the totally national character of the pre-EU parliamentarian elections campaign ran by the parties - The Parliament's elections were seen as an added value chance and a platform for the national parties contesting.

The PiS on the top of the list appeared to be an unpredictable surprise for the political commentators. National Conservative ideology in coalition with the Catholic LPR, agrarian populist Samoobrona and agrarian Peasants party was not the best result from the options.

The hitherto conservative and the EU critical position was significantly strengthened as the twin brothers 'divided' their responsibilities and shared offices of Prime Minister and President of the country. An unfinished business of Europeanization regarding the transition of European values and a sense of solidarity among the member states ended up with a revival of foreign policy concept of 'historical enemies' considering Germany and Russia under it.

A famous dissident Adam Michnik has summarized the government style of the PiS in a remark: 'the governing coalition employs a peculiar mix of the conservative rhetoric of George W. Bush and the political practice of Vladimir Putin. Attacks on the independent news media, curtailment of civil society, centralization of power and exaggeration of external and internal dangers make the political styles of today's leaders of Poland and Russia very similar... I am writing about Poland, but what I say applies as

well as to many countries of post-Yalta Europe. Everywhere, the phenomenon of populism has appeared' (Michnik, 2007).

Despite the vivid Eurosceptic stance of the party, the Law and Justice leaders were mainly focused on the domestic political issues. Very interested in to create an image of a 'pure' player on the Polish political scene, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) had developed more complex ideological narratives centering on the nature of post-communist transformation. PiS elaborated a more powerful, coherent conservative-national project of moral and political renewal based on a vision the creation of a "Fourth Republic". ... The party sees itself as fighting to break the power of a corrupt "establishment" of post-communist business and political networks and liberal elites and use the state to ensure social solidarity (Hanley and others, 2007: 29-30).

As an enough period of time had passed after the accession of Poland and after collecting the revenues from an uneasy process of Europeanization Kaczynski-led government preferred to accentuate on broadly discussed and nationally sensitive topics (issues) (abortion and Catholicism, reintroduction of death penalty) and to various social and economic issues from the everyday life of citizens. The early mentioned 'negative Europeanization' in Poland's case was reflected on polarization of preferences of masses and governing elites.

Another feature of the PiS ideological stance was the *statism* as a feature of PiS ideological stand appeared in rhetoric of favoring the Thatcherism and her style of government, the political line applied by the latter in relation with the EU and strong defense of the British position were the similar visions shared by the PiS about the place of Poland in the region and in the EU.

The nationalist school of thought was reinforced after the accession to the European Union by a propaganda stressing the necessity to protect the East European societies from ‘outside enemies and from self-alienation (= Europeanization) (Gallina, 2007: 82). The party was intended to revise the school academic curriculum and add a subject called “Patriotism” to it.

Thus, the EU accession of Central and Eastern European states in 2004 which was a formal sign (message) and belief from the EU’s side that those candidate countries showed the readiness and necessary level of democratic consolidation to be accepted as a fully fledged members, was put under the question by the events of the 2005. The membership test was passed at the expense of the pro-European rhetoric, the willingness of adopting the *acquis* formal regulations fully-functional in relations with the EU and under its authority, but when it came to monitoring the national/local level, the image of good fellow blurred. The positively assessed democratic consolidation, performance of the institutions, evolution of a party system was an asset for the heads of state and governments to benefit from the economic well-being in return and to enjoy the most anticipated and expected outcome of ‘back to Europe’ long path.

As already mentioned above, despite the permanent critic and a strictly defined negative position of the Law and Justice party towards the EU, the European issues can not be considered as the only main factor contributing to the PiS success in the 2005 legislative elections. The main aim of the author was not to limit to the role of the EU accession and the side-effects of the Europeanization process while answering the research question. Moreover, the finding of the research is put in a certain ‘hierarchy’: the peculiarity of the national system level that enabled the opportunist new-comers on the political scene to replace the mainstream parties, the characteristic of the public attitude towards the domestic politics and the interaction between these variables and

thirdly, the perceptions of the Poles about the EU –often contradictory and self-exclusive: the citizen on the European level and vice versa.

4.3. National System level: Political Opportunism as a Chance

Theoretical framework – various theoretical assumptions - for the analysis is provided by MICHAEL BAUN, JAKUB DÜRR, DAN MAREK, and PAVEL ŠARADÍN arguing that a pro-EU consensus among the major parties creates openings for non-mainstream or anti-EU parties to exploit. The reasons for this increase in political instability are difficult to fathom. It is possible that EU accession itself has changed (transformed) the political dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe. In the candidate states, the objective of EU accession was backed by a strong cross-party consensus, and it dictated much of the policy agenda. The EU's manifold demands left little room for political discussion about the 'right' course of action. All mainstream parties usually supported whatever reforms were needed to get their country ready for membership. In other words, the accession process was the glue that held together Eastern Europe's rather fractious party political systems. After accession, this glue resolved. Policy-making became more controversial and antagonistic, and the newcomers showed signs of 'reform fatigue' (Baun and others, 2006).

Also Connor O'Dwyer supports the above-mentioned argument in a more specified way underlining the possible difficulties encountered by the opportunist parties to penetrate the government level if the party system is not fragmented and vulnerable. Unpredictable coalition-making, poorly institutionalized party systems offered a good opportunity for outsider non mainstream and less responsible players to

pave the way. ‘As party systems become more institutionalized, it becomes more difficult for populist parties, where they persist, to enter government and to leverage their coalition-making potential for political benefits’ (O’Dwyer, 2008: 1187)

The similar pattern can be observed in Poland - the exhaustion of the governing elites especially as these elite consisted of the self-revised Communists in the era of strong debates about the lustration law leading to the adoption of *unfair political rules* of personally attacking opponents.

Fractious party system in Poland was often vulnerable to internal disagreements of the policy issues. The parties that emerged on the Solidarity only reunited for the election purposes in 1996 which the party won defeating the main competitors, the SLD. Solidarity Electoral Action at last ‘appeared to bring unity to the pullulating, fractious, narcissistic right-wing groupings’ (Millard, 2010:84) But as the government led by Jerzy Buzek was unpopular and defeated in 2001 elections, the internal situation of the AWS was further deteriorated and led to the disintegration of the movement into various political parties, Civic Platform and Law and Justice among them.

Founded in 2001 as a relatively new force in Polish political life unlikely the other already examined and disfavored parties, the PiS enjoyed an favorable position as a newcomer or at least, the one creating an image of a newcomer to neglect the fact that party itself was connected by its historical links to a Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) which broke apart after total discreditation in the 90ies. In its turn, a disintegration was also apparent in the SLD when Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union deputies led by Sejm Marshall Marek Borowski broke away to form a new party, Polish Social Democracy, thereby depriving Miller of his de facto parliamentary majority. The catalyst for this split was a huge slump in the Democratic Left Alliance-

Labour Union's opinion poll standing. (...) Mr. Borowski's supporters came to the conclusion that only by taking the radical step of forming a new political party could they present themselves as a 'renewed left' and thereby save themselves from electoral catastrophe (Szczerbniak, 2004: 2) The political vacuum created after the disintegration of the mainstream parties opened the way for the relatively newcomers. This particular disadvantage of the national political system became a big advantage for the PiS.

Before joining the EU in 2004, the main issue of the political debates on the national level was to juxtapose the advantages and disadvantages of the future accession. The underlying factor of domestic party competition ran through the lines of accession negotiation strategies of the incumbent governments and the dissatisfaction of opposition forces. These contradictions are visible in Buzek AWS-led government critics by the then-in-opposition SLD party for threatening the country's accession perspectives. Buzek's government was strongly criticized for embarking on a hard stance regarding the negotiations on the transitional period of the right of free movement of persons and workers for the Poles after the accession would be fulfilled. The hard line strategy adopted by Buzek government negotiators became a subject of criticism from the SLD opposition party for their ineffectiveness. The discussion revealed the vulnerability of the government coalition towards the public position for being re-elected for the second term (a very unlikely forecast for the CEE countries in general and perfectly suitable for Poland). On the other hand, the successor SLD-led coalition government was criticized for its soft stance and concessions-oriented policy during the last and decisive moment of the negotiations, for its intentions to be seen as a best pupil at class.

The two mainstream parties - the compromised Communists SLD and the destabilized Electoral Action Solidarity were perceived as anachronism and irrelevant

to the current political structure, impotent to provide the solutions to the modern demands of the electorate.

The disintegrated Polish party system was characterized also by disorientation. What is worth to mention is a paradoxical change in party values and ideology: opportunism at the expense of an electorate. The paradox lies in the euro enthusiasm of the SLD itself – a direct successor of the Communist period Polish United Worker's Party the choice of which had deprived the Solidarity of its main defining feature - the first driving force, pro-Western and pro-European movement not only in Poland but in the entire Communist sphere. The both mainstream parties were discredited: The Solidarity movement lost its supporters for its costly and insufficient efforts towards the EU which finally resulted in a euro realism stance of the party, the failure to shift from the dissidents'-led individual democratization to the institutionalized and consolidated democracy and the SLD lost the battle as the main promise given during the campaigning – the EU membership – was already fulfilled. The SLD was neglected both by the former electorate holding the socialist position and the pro-European part as the goal was already achieved. The SLD-led government failed to provide the solution to the relatively high levels of unemployment, the improvement of the destroyed social welfare system and those issues that generally was attached to the party because of its ideological stance being a socialist. But 'since 1989 we have not seen in Poland a single social democratic party that is rooted in the working class movement or allied with trade unions (Those social demands which have to be met by the left coalition government was mainly monopolized to a great extent by Law and Justice party, Father Rydzyk's (radical Catholic priest holding the radio station) media corporation and other populist factions' (Pinior, 2008: 114). Left wing parties were unable to elaborate a strategy for the next action as well as the right-wing AWS was demobilized as lost the electorate – the workers by whom the Solidarity was created

and the advocates of the demands of civic and political nature as it has been already achieved to a more or less extent during the post-1989 reformation.

The PiS endorsed on highly critical policy towards ‘the new elites who led the move away from communism thrived by consolidating democratic institutions without participation and by forming a policy consensus at the expense of politics’ (Rupnik,2007: 20). As the politics was suppressed and dominated by the unreliable coalitions replacing each other on the legislative elections, there was no place for the politics ‘for the people, from the people, to the people’. This was the very moment when the PiS entered the scene with populist messages as ‘the credibility of the populist parties’ appeal in turn is determined by assessing the visibility and persuasiveness of the populist leadership and the Populist Party’s ability to ward off an extremist image and to convincingly distance itself from the political establishment (van Kessel, 2011: 40)

The strategy of distancing itself from the whole political establishment and non-alignment was a successful step if we take into consideration the situation described above. The relevance of this political course is empirically proven as according to the CBOS poll of July 2001, the respondents who voted PiS indicated that their main motivations were the lack of ties between Law and Justice and other parties (44%), the party’s stance on the issues of crime and safety (43%) and the fact that its politicians appeared to be honest and uncorrupted (34%) (Szczerbiak, 2002: 59).

Thus, the vacuum created after the self-exhaustion, demoralization of the mainstream parties was filled by the newcomers. The main asset which the PiS possessed was its relative non experience on the domestic political scene, as far as the party have never been a part of any government coalition since its foundation unlike its main competitors (except the PO) SLD (2001-2005) and AWS (1993-1997 AWS-UW

coalition government). Thus, the defect of the national political system made the PiS to take a chance on the demoralized and fractured main political parties totally alienated from the public discourse and paved a way emphasizing on the particular policy agenda to be fulfilled which will be discussed in details below.

4.4. The Public Anger and the Protest Vote against the Political Establishment

In this section author wants to underline the importance of the public anger and its protest vote against the existed political establishment used by the Law and Justice party as an explanatory variable of the research question posed. The post-accession period was marked by the high salience of domestic issues dominating the political debates. More than a decade occupation with the European Union was undermined by the rapid disappearance of the latter in favour of the well-embedded problems of the national politics. To say a long story short, the ‘Return to Europe’ meant a return to the real politics – the unresolved issues left behind for a definite period re-emerged with a double force after the enlargement hysterical was over. One of them was a question of Communist legacy and the rhetoric of de-communisation. The theoretical framework used in order to explain the linkage between the variables is the proposition made by the Frances Millard that the protest vote against the existing political establishment and usage of the public anger serves as a valuable instrument for non-mainstream parties to succeed over the mainstream accountable parties.

4.4.1. The Question of Communist Legacy

As the accession process has been fulfilled and the nature of the ties between the EU and Poland has been finally defined by the membership, the sensitivity of communist period legacy has reappeared on the surface. The fact that basic contingent of Leszek Miller government comprised of the reformed social democrats has contributed to its further discreditation and the problem was reemerged on the political surface.

The sense that that the current political scene was still filled by the remnants of the Communist past increased the public demand for abolishment of the *Układ* which according to Millard means (2010: 147) the “putative shady network of business oligarchs, politicians, and the security services that formed the webs of corruption, cronyism, intrigue, and informal relations between ‘liberals’ and ex-communists’ that had effectively ruled Poland after 1989”. The issue of Communist period legacy appeared to be an important asset in the rhetoric of the political parties, especially for them which due to their status of a newcomer succeeded to distance themselves from the period of Polish history which held a double-faced power in itself: a destructionist against the political enemy and advantageous for the political opportunists.

The Miller government as one of the embodiment of such network became extremely unpopular in public because of the scandals related to senior members of his government or his team. Due to the increased interest of press towards the illegal affairs of his close friends and colleagues formed as a group of informal rulers, quite early was aware of the prevalence of Soviet-time nomenklatura over the independent civil administration, state control and the other kinds of Soviet legacies of Miller government.

The most sensitive inherits of the Soviet period – adoption of a lustration law, rampant corruption and nepotism rejuvenated on the political scene after the accession, especially after the scandalous ‘achievements’ of the SLD-led government. In addition to Prime Minister Miller, the Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz had served in the PZPR. The Sejm Commission on Europe was headed by Josef Oleksy, a former PZPR member and Prime Minister tainted by a scandal about spying for Russia. Two of Poland’s main EU negotiators, Jan Truszcynski and Danuta Hubner, were attacked by the right as part of their communist clique. The deputy Minister appointed in 2002 to take charge of ‘Euro propaganda’, Slawomir Wiatr, had admitted under the lustration law to working with the security bureau in the communist era (Taras, 2003: 6).

Those alleged affairs once again re-enhanced the importance of de-communisation and to deal with the inheritance of the nearest past: a sensitive issue linked with this past was the lustration law and the enduring discussion and accusation of the political adversaries of cooperating with the soviet secret services. Similarly, Pytlakowski suggested that the Treasury Minister, Sławomir Cytyński, belonged to a group called “the colleagues from Independence street” – members of the communist intelligence service, among whom numerous worked in very prominent positions as secretaries of state. Finally, questions are currently being raised about informal networks between business and politics, with sensitivity strengthened by the engagement in some of these affairs of former Soviet Intelligence officers, (*Polityka*, 25 January, 2003).

The lustration was a consisting part of the more broad process of de-communisation. While the former has more individual character –revealing the hidden involvement of the particular person in the past activities of the Communist regime and

denying further access to the particular positions in the public sector offices, the de-communisation encompasses itself a wider process of getting rid of the officials and the members of the Communist-party of the pre-democratic period exercising authoritarian style of government inconsistent with the final aims of the transition i.e. purification of the state institutions and policy-making. ‘Decommunisation was supposed to consist in the removal of ex-members of the Communist party (above a certain rank) from prominent positions in a new democratic system. Thus, it encompassed not simply the exposure of individual guilt of past collaborators with the secret police but also a more collective removal of ex-Communists as a group from influence upon political decisions in the democratic state’ (Sadurski, 2003: 4).

The necessity of passing a lustration law appeared on the Polish political scene quite later than in other Central and Eastern European countries which were in a similar situation tackling with the inheritance of past. The main reason of delay was a negotiated transition and shift of power from the communist regime to the Solidarity movement with certain reservations for the former regime members in Sejm. Due to the successful restoration of the status of the self-reformed communist party contributed to the creation of such political circumstances that the salience of the lustration issue was low and the measures adopted were less restrictive and mild in character than in other countries for example in the Czech Republic. It was ‘in May, 1992, the Parliament passed a resolution stating that the Minister of Internal Affairs must provide information as to whether any person applying for, or holding, a position in the Parliament, as a government official (with an extremely wide range of positions subject to this requirement, from local council officials upwards), or as a judge, prosecutor or barrister (advocate), was connected to the secret police under the past regime (revise) later abolished by the Constitutional Court as an unconstitutional act. Later 1997 law was addressed to ‘judges who in 1944-1989 had committed acts contrary

to judicial independence by issuing unjust sentences, or judges who has otherwise impaired a defendants' right to defense' (Sadurski, 2003: 28). But the processing of the lustration did not show a continuity because of the opposition of certain group of the society feared of emergence of new division lines and also, the changing priorities of the parties in government. The indecisive feature and permanent varieties of the lustration process contributed to the strengthening of public negative attitudes having a permanent doubt.

The rhetoric of putting an end to the unofficial power of the nomenklatura network and the purification of the state institutions was reinforced in the speeches given by the Kaczynski twins before the elections. The Kaczynski brothers framed the political conflict in Poland these days as a clash between their Fourth Republic and the Third Republic that prevailed during the years of transition (1989-2005). It should not come as a surprise that the issue of lustration has emerged as the symbol of contestation between the Liberals' Third Republic and the Kaczynkis' Fourth Republic¹ (Kralev, 2008: 69)

The salience of the Lustration law for the Kaczynskis did not slowed down even after coming into power. The lustration law hysteria resulted in a twice changed Lustration Act revealing the identity of those persons who cooperated with the Communist regime in 1944-1990 period of time without the respect of the presumption of innocence principle. "The legality of releasing these documents was highly controversial to say the least since it gave the impression that the question of who was

¹ The first republic collapse was reasoned by the fourth partition of Poland by the main European forces as the result of Vienna congress in the 19th century, the second republic started from the 1919 when according to the Treaty of Versailles and the Wilson 14 points, Poland was recognized as an independent state and lasted till the end of the Second World War as the country was forcefully integrated into the Socialist Eastern bloc, the third Republic was pronounced between the periods of 1989-2005 and the Kaczynskis were dedicated to creating the true Fourth Republic.

to be subjected to lustration was a political issue rather than a task for historians (Letki, 2002).

In addition to the judicial lapses and unreliability of the documents kept in archives, an obsession with a lustration issue increased the division among the society contributed to its further disintegration and polarization and an instrument of retroactive justice turned into the retroactive vengeance, political among others. ‘In a political climate in which former Communists were able to resurrect themselves successfully, the issue of dealing with the past became increasingly salient and was instrumentalised by the Polish rights as part of the political power struggle’ (Szczerbiak, 2002: 570) .

An instant period of democracy sparkling during the accession time consensus between the political players was followed by the issue of de-communization. The slogan of the transitional period from the applicant to the member country status ‘Return to Europe’ in case of Poland was a sign of returning to the Realpolitik – the national political scene. Such an obsession with the political and public space with enlargement-related issues naturally came to an end after the 2004 enlargement and a free room for maneuvering was emptied. As the time of accession ‘endgame’ was approaching, another problematic and sensitive question appeared on the surface – a Soviet legacy. The lustration law appeared to be a very controversial issue in domestic politics as it caused the society opinion split into opposing parts: those who were favor of the dealing with the problems of the nearest past and those, mainly comprised of former dissidents and academic circles, arguing the necessity of avoiding a new division lines among the Poles. However, such an indecisiveness and confusion was successfully manipulated by the Law and Justice party in order to gain the support of the electorate

as an actor distanced from the inherits of the Communist period, the existing political establishment while committed to the building of a Fourth Republic.

4.4.2. Unfinished Business of the Development Process – Public in Search for a Better Solution

The public anger was caused by existing political establishment which secured its position even during the accession. The negative attitudes were reinforced by the continued illegal practices such as corruption, the informal hidden forces having a real power in the country. The failure to contribute to the real change happen was also blamed on the EU as long as ‘documents with a more policy-oriented approach (EU institutions, think tanks, and EU governments) were marked by “shortermism” prospective or suggesting step by step solutions without a long term perspective this might have contributed to channel a pessimistic image of enlargement because most of the benefits for both sides were not to come immediately’ (Giusti, 2007: 5).

The very true reason why Poles were in favor of accession and supported the Union was the total distrust in their national fundamental institutions and high awareness of the malaise in domestic politics, ‘the state, having been as an alien, impenetrable, inauthentic and hostile entity, continues to be regarded with suspicion and reliance on personal connections’ (Schöpflin, 2002: 100). The post-communist legacy which plagued the fundamental institutions were associated both with the SLD because of its roots and the numerous proved accusations against the senior officials and the members of the inner circle of the government and with the Electoral Action

Solidarity because of the round table negotiations and cooperation with the Communist in the government.

Ironically, a more than a decade later after the power was shifted from the Communists to the Solidarity Movement in the name respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms, the consolidation of the democracy, the rule of law, according to the surveys of CBOS held in September, 2003, only 31% argued that the democracy is better than any other form of the governance and 40% was indifferent towards any kind of rule be it democratic or not. 19% of the respondents did not exclude the fact that undemocratic government might be sometimes more desirable than the democratic one (CBOS, 2003: 2).

Table III here

According to the Eurobarometer surveys held in 2004, the 16% of Poles were fairly satisfied with the way Democracy worked in their country while the 83 % showed the opposite position. Regarding the question of trust in the national government, only 7% of Poles argued that they trust the national institutions while an overwhelming majority 83% did not reveal the trust towards the domestic institutional structure (European Commission, 2004b).

The mythical knowledge about the EU based mainly on the Communist and Post-Communist period stereotypes that the West is a source of democracy and well-being, the low awareness about the decision-making and the modus operandi of the Union offers a background that can serve as a basis for measurement of the expectations about costs and benefits of the accession. Slovak legal scholar Radoslav Procházka observed, 'Given the lack of immediate and tangible results of deference to Brussels, it is ironic that support for EU membership has not withered away among the Central European

populations as much as it did it in relation to the overall post-1989 political development (Prochazka, 2002: 284).

4.4.3 Other Expectations of the EU Accession – Analyzing the Data

The surveys conducted show that expectations of the Polish people about the desirable outcomes of the accession were clear. These expectations were significantly raised as the domestic constituencies failed to recover from the malware of system functioning on the national level, the continuing limitations of the national institutions to transform the social system, health, educational system, an ongoing deterioration of the unemployment situation and standard of living further glued the public to the EU level as a leverage in order to implement decisive policies on behalf of the national state bodies who were unable and out of resources to initiate concrete steps. Expectations of fair economic treatment and mobility and exchanges were particularly visible.

Table IV

According to the data about the perceptions of the possible disadvantages of the EU membership, the price increase was mentioned as one of the negative effect of the future accession which indeed took place after the country's actual membership but the results of already-mentioned survey show such development of events was unanticipated before and as an immediate outcome has reinforced the negative attitudes towards the EU. Also what is worth to be mentioned here is the fear of being overrun by the overall secular and emotionally-detached image of the Union with liberal values regarding the abortion, rights of homosexuals not fitting with the moral of the country

the 98% of the population is Catholic and the significant percentage of Church attendance. Nevertheless, overwhelmingly little percentage 2% has considered the EU membership as a threat to moral-cultural values of the country. ‘On the other hand, one area that Poles felt strongly should remain exclusively a member state competency was the moral-cultural sphere. For example, a CBOS survey conducted prior to accession in March 2004 found that 65% of respondents felt that abortion law should be solely a member state competency compared to only 11% who wanted this to be determined jointly at both at the EU level and 9% who said that it should be mainly an EU competency’ (CBOS, 2004: 5)

The population was worried about the lack of real chance in improving the situation regarding the alleged affairs of the government and the close circles abusing the power. By the year of 2004, the percentage of the people who considered that the rate of corruption among the political elites and other unfair practices such as nepotism, misuse of public funds for the needs of their party activities had increased, grew by 7 %. According to the chart, the very significant part of the public suspected the high level of corruption in the domestic politics, not excepting the officials of very high ranks.

Table V here

According to the results of the survey conducted by the CBOS in October, 2003, on the question ‘Who does really rule Poland?’ the Poles admitted the existence and importance of non-formal forces of power alongside with the formal ones. ‘The first one is formal and at the same time emotionally neutral the respondents mention the highest state authorities or political parties; the second one is focused on the corruption of power, … the third one, focused on the existence of hidden forces’ (CBOS, 2003: 3).

Table IV here

The quantitative research held by the European Commission in 2001 in order to find out the general patterns and attitudes of the candidate countries towards the idea of European Integration and their contributions as future participants surprisingly showed a relatively similar trends among the public opinion between the CEE and the old member states. However, to examine more precisely, the lack of knowledge about the Union institutions and its institutional system the restrictive visions and a more economic-dimension-based knowledge are more prevalent. The Poles who aspire to a Europe with a broad scope of action, but who see it primarily as a club of rich countries looking to mutually reinforce each other among whom they are afraid of always being the poor relations, ignored or looked down on' (OPTEM S.A.R.L, 2001: 10).

The expectation of the Poles regarding the right of free movement was explicitly mentioned among the one of the most positive outcomes expected as the result of accession. A May 2003 Eurobarometer survey found that for 84% of Poles the EU represented, above all, the ability to work in other countries, 78% cited the freedom to study abroad and 71% mentioned the chance to move there permanently (European Commission, 2003: 110) A March/April 2007 CBOS survey found this was one of those areas that, in the opinion of most Poles, the EU had clearly delivered on: among the greatest perceived benefits of EU accession were the opening of borders (29%) and the ability of Poles to work in other EU states (28%). The same survey found that 93% of Poles felt that EU accession had increased opportunities to work abroad compared to only 1% who said that it had reduced it (CBOS, 2007: 14). A spring 2007 Eurobarometer survey also found that 42% of respondents cited free movement of people, goods and services within the EU as the most important benefit to flow from European integration and a further 32% cited it as the second most positive effect (European Commission, 2007: 6).

In conclusion, this paragraph was dedicated to analyzing the data derived from the opinion surveys about the multiple policy area, the issues related to the role of Poland in the enlarged EU, the possible positive and negative effects that the accession can have on the country and the Polish society, the desired influence of the EU to have on the development of issues in the country. Those data analysis contribute to the understanding of quite contradictory and self-exhaustive nature of the Polish perceptions about the role and essence of the EU. Now we will see the impact of the one of the controversial issue- imposing the restriction on the free movement of CEE country nationals in the EU-15 for a certain period a time on the Polish perception of the EU as such.

4.4.3.1 Negotiations on the Right of the Free Movement of Persons

Data of the surveys conducted shows that the most expected outcome of the Enlargement was a chance offered by the principle of 'four freedom' the free movement of persons and workers to work in another member state, the EU-15 (except Ireland, United Kingdom and Sweden) imposed a restrictions regarding the issue authorized by the clause of a transitional period of seven years authorized by the Accession Treaties.

From the EU officials' position the two essential issues for Poland, the land acquisition by a foreign country national (part of the chapter on free movement of capital) and the free movements of persons were intermingled. Accordingly, the Commission concession made regarding the introduction of seven year transitional arrangement on land acquisition right was an excuse for the identical arrangement made by the particular member states of the EU for the nationals of the future member states. Another sensitive debatable issue was related to the deterioration of the relations with non-EU candidate neighbor states because of the necessity of implementation of

the Schengen *acquis* and introduction of visa regime for example, with Ukraine. For Polish negotiators, there should be made a fair concession between the right of free movement for the Polish nationals and additional measures demanded by the EU for effective control of the common European Union borders.

The negotiations on the right of unrestricted free movements for CEE country nationals undermined the influence of the supranational level and the Commission as a usual chief negotiator body on behalf of the EU. The negotiating position proposed to the Council was truly member states-interest-based as ‘foresaw a system of flexible transitional arrangements (2+3+2) which would allow gradual introduction of free movement during a limited transition period; member-states were free to decide, through national law, for a faster opening of their labour markets after enlargement, but they could also keep national restrictions in place. In all options, the candidate had to offer full right of access to their labour markets for EU-15 workers’ (Grabbe, 2006: 137). Moreover, the Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen was criticized for defending the interest of the country of its nationality –Germany regardless of its duty of impartiality.

High salience of the issue and broad media coverage had its impact on the attitudes of Poles about the main allies of Poland among the member states. According to the polls conducted in February, 2004 Germany the previous leader was replaced by Spain (the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands –those which announced they were not in need of transitional arrangements- were also listed as one of the strongest allies) who did not support the imposition of restrictions on the CEE nationals’ movement and was involved in a hot debate with German and Austrian counterparts – those who perceived the transitional arrangements as a national interest. Moreover, the hard line strategy adopted by then-Buzek government lost on both levels: in negotiations as failed to

ensure more favorable conditions and in domestic politics enhancing negative public attitude towards the ineffectiveness of government also exhausted the patience and frustrated the Poles hoping the EU would make concessions. The misunderstanding among the Polish public and the Commission officials' approaches towards the leading role of Poland in the region and accordingly, in the enlargement process can be described in a remark of an EU official 'They don't understand that Poland is trying to join the Union, and we're not joining Poland! '.

As the well-founded critic of the incumbent government for making an unreasonable concession instead of a more hard-line and interest-based approach during the negotiations, positively correlated with the strengthening of the image of PiS as a sound political force, fresh and distanced from the vicious circle of 'sticks and carrots'.

In this paragraph, the author tried to show the public perceptions about the European Union as such both from the positive and negative side. The trust towards the European project was indeed very high in contrast with the trust shown regarding the domestic political establishment. The balance between the expected positive and negative effects of the accession, the role of the European Union in ameliorating the overall situation in the country created the double and often contradictory ideas among Poles about the Union: they did not fully receive what were expected for but at the same time, accession positively contributed to the areas where the improvement was not expected. Relying on this analysis, the impact of the Double perceptions about the EU will be explained below as one of the independent variables answering the research question.

4.5. The Polish Citizen and the European Level – Double Perceptions about the Essence of the EU

If we examine the impact of the European Level on the election outcome, the choice of Poles can be understood if taking into consideration the double image of the Union among the Polish citizenry. When the mass-level Euroscepticism is low in the country due to the ameliorated economic conditions, the standards of living, the benefits received from the EU budget and the structural funds especially for undertaking infrastructural projects and the Polish farmers becoming the net contributors of the Common Agricultural Policy (more than 26 billion euro provided shortly after the accession in 2004), the Poles did not succeed into participating in the EU-related policies neither during the accession negotiations nor after the accession was fulfilled and the citizens gained their right to have a say in a decision making.

The gap between the EU and the public sphere appeared to be widened because of the basically technocratic nature of the conditionality and the Europeanization process, favoring the more managerial than participatory approach. Not only organized public interest but also the main representative body of the country, the Parliament was excluded from the negotiating part and its competence was reduced to a role of an adopter and an asset for implementation of already negotiated and agreed rules.

Dysfunctional institutions can also contribute to the increasing the doubtful perceptions about the EU and also contribute to the explanation of the limitations of the Europeanization process on the hurrying up the democratization to come up with its logical end. EU-designed administration harmonization projects funded in the framework of the PHARE aid program – SIGMA, TAIEX, and TWINNING –

strengthened the administrative capacities and reorganized the structure of the state institutions but did little in changing the substance. ‘The CEE countries may thus have set up institutions which looked like those functioning in the EU member states, but which did not have the same impact on policy as their western counterparts’ (Grabbe, 2006: 106). Not only the conditionality principle focused on the quantitative evaluation of the achievements made while opening and closing the negotiating chapters undermined the formal structures symbolic influence

Another factor what the Polish citizens did not appeal to the role of the EU was an lack of salience of European issues discussed in public as domestic media broadcasting did not show a particular interest be focusing on identifying ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ in concrete sectors or analyze possible costs and benefits of the negotiations conducted by country leadership. As a result, the initial myth-based perception of the Union as an altruist delivering the prosperity and stability through democratization emptied itself.

Misunderstanding about the essence of the EU itself among the eastern societies had its role in advocating for those parties which were endorsed on more national level of action and were oriented on ‘keeping in touch’ with their electorate on the local level rather than bargaining with another kind of authority and rule-maker – the Commission. It can’t be said that the majority of those who voted in favour of the Law and Justice party were Eurosceptics and opposed the idea of integration. According to the data more than 80% of Law and Justice voters supported accession (Szczerbiak, 2003: 10) and did not vote in favor of the party because of its Eurosceptic stance. The low awareness of the party positions (policies) about the EU-related issues can also be seen according to the April 2005 CBOS survey found that between 47%-57% of respondents did not know the stance on the constitutional treaty taken by the eight

main parties contesting the elections. Indeed, 48% of Law and Justice party voters, 28% of Self-Defense voters and 11% of League of Polish Families voters (together, more understandably, with 76% of Civic Platform voters) actually thought that their parties' supported the treaty (CBOS, 2005: 11-13) while the actual political posture of the parties was more anti than pro-Constitutional. Dominance of the domestic issues and the less prioritized, secondary rated European issues made the voters not to judge the competing parties only according to their position regarding the European Union.

In conclusion, by analyzing the data and empirical evidence in the previous paragraph, the main aim of the author was to underline the role of the interaction between the Polish citizen and the European level as one of the explanatory variable of the research question. The study showed that the double perceptions existed among the society about the essence of the European Union as such which was caused by the low salience of the European issues on media or in public contributing to the contradictory ideas of the EU among the Polish electorate. The view about the advantages and the disadvantages of the EU accession was a blurred image as the Union did not fully met the expectations of the public but on the other hand, contributed to the general improvement of the conditions in Poland which was positively assessed by the ordinary Pole.

5. Conclusion

The accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU was made under the slogan of ‘Return to Europe’ and this strategy has never been reversed during the accession negotiations even when the serious blow regarding the specific issues for the different states arouse. But as soon as the membership of the European Union was accomplished, visibility and electoral strength of the Eurosceptic/Eurorealist forces became evident. The worrying tendencies occurred immediately after the enlargement, the development of the events show a real discrepancy between the initial goal and the would-be result of the Europeanization and the Central and Eastern European accession.

The “Return to Europe” political objective was successfully completed by the candidate states in terms of obtaining the EU member status, but the limitations of the Europeanization process was also vivid as the pre-accession relatively stable environment was immediately altered by the political turbulences and the feel of uncertainty. Mainstream accountable political parties were replaced by the new-comers tended to populism and Euroscepticism, the public anger enhanced as the result of the feeling of betrayal from the political elites, the perception of the EU has also became vague and full of contradictions.

The aim of the author was to research the roots of the Eurosceptic ‘backlash’ in the newly acceded countries of the CEE region which quite recently underwent the process of Europeanization and were debated to be ready for the EU membership.

The case-study was focused on the concrete example of Poland which has seen the shifting the voters' preferences from the Euroenthusiast towards the Eurosceptic government coalition even if the support for the European project among the population was high and the level of the Euroscepticism was low.

During the research, author sought to find the answers to the research question 'Why did the 2005 Polish legislative elections resulted in a shift from Euroenthusiast government coalition of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) to the Eurosceptic government coalition led by the 'Law and Justice' party (PiS) if the level of Euroscepticism in polish public was so low and the trust in the European Project was so high?'

As the result of the case-study Author identified the linkage between the dependent and independent variables and applied theoretical framework to explain the causality between them. The major findings of the research are the following:

Despite the permanent critic and a strictly defined negative position of the Law and Justice party towards the EU, the European issues can not be considered as the only main factor contributing to the PiS success in the 2005 legislative elections. The primary aim of Author was not to limit itself to the role of the EU accession and the side-effects of the Europeanization process while answering the research question. Moreover, the finding of the research is put in a certain 'hierarchy': the peculiarity of the national system level that enabled the opportunist new-comers on the political scene to replace the mainstream parties, the characteristic of the public attitude towards the domestic politics and the interaction between these variables and thirdly, the

perceptions of the Poles about the EU –often contradictory and self-exclusive: the citizen on the European level and vice versa.

Author concluded that the shift occurred because of the political vacuum created after the self-exhaustion and disintegration of the mainstream parties. This empty room was easily filled by the new entrants. The main asset the Law and Justice party possessed was its relative non-experience on the domestic political scene, as far as the party have never been a part of any government coalition since its foundation unlike its main competitors SLD (2001-2005) and AWS (1993-1997 AWS-UW coalition government). Thus, the defect of the national political system made the Law and Justice party to take a chance on the demoralized political parties totally alienated from the public discourse and paved a way emphasizing on the particular policy agenda to be fulfilled.

Thesis also underlined the importance of the public anger and protest vote against the existed political establishment used as an asset by the Law and Justice party. The post-accession period was marked by the high salience of domestic issues dominating the political debates. More than a decade occupation with the European Union was undermined by the rapid disappearance of the latter in favour of the well-embedded problems of the national politics. To say a long story short, the ‘Return to Europe’ meant a return to the real politics – the unresolved issues left behind for a definite period re-emerged with a double force after the enlargement hysterical was over. One of them was a question of Communist legacy and subsequent de-communisation. The impact of the EU as a new agent which had to contribute to the resolution of the problematic issues was not assessed positively by the Polish public.

While analyzing the data and empirical evidence, Author identified the role of the interaction between the Polish citizen and the European level as one of the explanatory variable of the research question. The study showed that the double perceptions persisted among the society about the essence of the European Union which was caused by the low salience of the European issues in media or in public debates contributing to the often contradictory ideas about the EU among the Polish electorate. The view of advantages and the disadvantages of the EU accession was blurred as the Union did not fully met the expectations of the public but on the other hand, contributed to the general improvement of conditions in Poland which was positively assessed by an ordinary Pole.

Thus, Author applied the interrelation between the different levels – a citizen interacting with the EU, the EU influencing the national political system and the domestic party system particularities having an impact on the citizen's voting behaviour - rather than concentrating only on the consequences of the EU enlargement as an explanation of the shift from Euroenthusiasm to the Euroscepticism.


Appendix

Table 1: Polish attitudes towards European integration, 2003-2007

	2003												2004	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	IX	X	XI	XII	I	II	I	II
For	63	60	58	59	66	67	67	69	63	63	61	60		
Against	21	25	24	24	18	18	20	23	30	29	30	31		
D/K	16	15	18	17	16	15	13	8	7	9	9	9		
	2004												2005	
	III	IV	V	VI	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	II	III	IV		
For	62	64	71	69	70	69	72	77	76	77	74	77		
Against	29	29	20	22	21	69	72	77	76	14	17	15		
D/K	9	7	9	9	9	10	8	7	8	9	9	8		
	2005				2006				2007					
	V	VI	VII	IX	I	IV	VIII	X	I	IV	V	VII		
For	76	74	78	73	80	80	83	88	87	86	89	89		
Against	14	15	14	16	12	11	10	6	7	7	5	5		
D/K	10	11	8	10	8	9	7	6	6	8	6	6		


Source: CBOS, *Pierwsze oceny skutków członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej*, CBOS: Warsaw, September 2004; and CBOS, *Sprzymierzency Polski w Unii Europejskiej*, CBOS: Warsaw, July 2004.

Table II




The Source: The Polish newspaper "Gazeta Wyborcza" 4 August 2003 in cooperation with the opinion polling institute CBOS.

Table III




Source: CBOS, September, 2003. p. 2

Table IV




Source: CBOS, June, 2003, p.3

Table V




Source: Polish Public Opinion Research Center, January, 2004. p. 4

Table VI



Source: CBOS October, 2003. p. 3

Table VII



Source: CBOS, September, 2005. p. 2

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