How Efficient is the European Union in Conflict Resolution?

Case-Studies of Cyprus and Transnistria

Master Thesis
by
Ia Kverghelidze

Instructor: Prof. Tamar Beruchashvili

Institute for European Studies

Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

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**Abbreviations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BATNA</td>
<td>Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOKA-B</td>
<td>the national organization of Cypriot fighters</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Member States</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Control Committee</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>Newly Independent States</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation of Europe</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMR</td>
<td>Pridnestrovskaya Moldovskaya Respublika or Dnestr Republic</td>
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<td>RoC</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>Stabilisation Pact</td>
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<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty)</td>
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<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>the United States (of America)</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Abstract

The paper reviews and evaluates efficiency of the European Union (EU) in conflict resolution process. Short historical discourse shows how this area of responsibility emerged on the EU agenda and introduces two conflicts through which the efficiency will be examined. Cyprus and Transnistria cases may seem distant ones, but such a link aims at showing the EU’s role from various angles and seeks to stress the EU as a regional player.

Hypothesis is formulated this way: The EU objectives and goals determined course of events during conflict resolution process. In order to test the hypothesis, the author reviews the EU instruments and policies towards the countries, assesses their efficiency and proportionality. Role of the EU factor in shaping identity of the countries is also explored. Ability of the EU to cope with different interests of the various actors is questioned. Following the EU’s ambition, interests and resources on the international arena, its relations with the other global players are referred to. Whether the EU could act on its own independently from the other international actors and whether he could be an objective third party in the conflict resolution are the matters of interest. Apart from discussions, short historical overview of the conflicts and the EU’s involvement is also cited.

The issues are analysed through Constructivism approach. Concepts of social learning, persuasion and social mobilisation lead the researcher to the final conclusion about the efficiency of the EU in conflicts resolution process.
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1. Introductory Discourse of the Thesis

The chapter reviews the main developments that made the EU deal with the conflicts. Scopes of the EU activities and its approaches to the countries are given. The main snapshots drive us to the period when the new areas of the EU responsibilities were appearing. This led more cooperation with the other international players and stressed for regional approach. Second sub-chapter provides information about aims and motives of the thesis, justifies reasons for selection of the topic through a short historical discourse. This casts light on the scope and objectives of the study, as well as on limitation.

1.1. Introduction

Focusing initially on economic integration, the European Union (EU), in response to the developments in the international arena, assumed responsibility of dealing with conflicts, among other global threats. The end of the Cold War marked as ‘deepening’ of integration in the European Community\(^1\). New enlargement rounds brought about new countries and new neighbours that, on their turn, put their conflicts onto the EU agenda. By integrating acceding states, security of Europe was increased but, at the same time, the EU was brought “closer to troubled areas”\(^2\).

“Security is a precondition of development”\(^3\), was stated in the European Security Strategy. Conflicts pose threats to regional security, by deterring economic advance, infringing democracy, human rights, sustainable political development. This hinges upon structural stability\(^4\). European Security Strategy (the so-called “Reform Treaty”) stressed the importance of having well-governed countries on the EU’s borders, stating: “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”\(^5\).

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\(^1\) Carr, Fergus, Callan, Theresa, Managing Conflict in the New Europe, the Role of International Institutions, p.101
\(^2\) A Secure Europe in a Better World, p.8
\(^3\) Ibid, p.2
\(^4\) Kronenberger, Vincent, Wouters, Jan, The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects, p.239
\(^5\) A Secure Europe in a Better World, p.8
As far as the regional security is concerned, it raises the need of coherent policies among the EU and its neighbours. These coherent policies were embodied in the instruments the EU assigned to its neighbours, as well as in its approaches towards them.

With regards to the EU policies for conflict, the Commission’s Communication on Conflict Prevention, 2001, comes at a core. As for the instruments for conflict resolution, the EU used economic instruments and civilian crisis management. “Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations”\(^6\). Conditionality was also added to these, which ensured proper follow-up of the introduced measures and, by doing so, was expected to accelerate conflict settlement process.

In particular cases EU Membership perspectives were also introduced, as additions to these instruments. “The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform”\(^7\). European integration was especially appealing and encouraging for the new neighbours. European integration is regarded to be a long-term conflict prevention and peace-building project. “It promotes an environment conducive to peace, addresses all aspects of structural (in) stability… and tackles the root causes of conflict”\(^8\). Overall, all these instruments and policies were expected to bring about peaceful change\(^9\).

Report in the Implementation of European Security Strategy held: “Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by … addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity”\(^10\). In relation with the policies, the EU’s policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, Balkans and Turkey was developing in the framework of potential membership\(^11\). Since 2004 the EU developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for its eastern neighbours. Furthermore, conflicts needed to be dealt with coherent policies regionally. “Problems are

\(^6\) A Secure Europe in a Better World, p.7
\(^7\) Ibid, p.8
\(^8\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.217
\(^11\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.255
rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support.” This assumption was based on the EU’s experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Gradually, the EU expanded from mere soft power player to a regional player with hard power at its disposal. The post-Cold War period marked as the challenge to the EU’s civilian power and pressured the EU “to exert itself purposefully to achieve foreign policy objectives.” Therefore, the EU had to take up tasks that were initially beyond its focus. Logically, before the EU took action, there were already some international actors with the main task of conflict resolution, namely the UN, OSCE and others. Having noticed the EU’s interest and potential involvement in conflict settlement process, they invited the EU to be a mediator, guarantor and a catalyser of the conflicts. The EU, on its part, has provided a response.

“As the general political and economic significance of the EU has grown it has sought means to focus its influence in external relations.”

The EU took up ambition to shape events for building “a secure Europe in a better world.” This ambition to pursue strategic objectives was strengthened by an array of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention (including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities). The ability to shape events was obviously related to active policies and good coordination with the other global players, as well as with the countries concerned.

The European Security Strategy stressed for “multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.” This would better tackle the common threats to the EU and its closest partners.

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12 A Secure Europe in a Better World, p.13
13 Ibid, p.13
14 Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, pp.15-16
15 Ibid, pp.15-16
16 Carr, Fergus, Callan, Theresa, Managing Conflict in the New Europe, the Role of International Institutions, p.101
18 A Secure Europe in a Better World, p.11
19 Ibid, p.13
1.2. Aim and Motives, Objectives and Scope of the Study, Limitation

Aim of the thesis: The thesis is to review and to assess the EU’s policy, outlook, scope of involvement and efficiency of the EU instruments in two conflicts, Cyprus and Transnistria. The first conflict is directly related to an EU Member State (EU MS), the second one – to an ENP partner country. Both conflicts were brought to the EU’s attention due to the enlargement process.

Motives, objectives and scope of the study: Motives for the selection of the particular topic are academic: the thesis seeks to find answers to the efficiency and relevance of the EU’s increased role and its newly-acquired responsibilities towards world peace. By doing so, the thesis is expected to contribute to the conflicts resolution theme from the EU’s perspective. Choice of the particular topic was conditioned by the researcher’s extensive works about the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), its emergence and legal framework, possibility of the European Army and the EU’s new role in the conflicts’ resolution through the ESDP. Cyprus was selected as one of the most disputed and, at the same time, broadly-discussed case in this regard. This case mattered to the EU at great extent. Transnistria was chosen because of its proximity to the EU borders. The conflict was also important to the EU, although it showed various rates of involvement in the issues.

Reason behind the link between Cyprus and Transnistria is to show off the EU as a regional player, dealing with conflicts that exist in its southern, as well as in eastern proximity. This comparison of the EU involvement will assess directions in the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the conflicts in one case in relation with its member state, in the other – with its ENP partner.

Moreover, one cannot blatantly say that the abovementioned conflicts are related to one EUMS and one ENP partner country. Generally each conflict has two or more opposing sides. The two abovementioned conflicts are quite complicated ones, where EU MSs, an accession country, ENP- and strategic partners are interconnected. Comparative analysis of the two distant cases will outline the EU’s stance towards conflicts more distinctly.
The overview will encompass the time-frame of 2004-2009. The choice of this period was conditioned by the fact that in Cyprus’ case, in 2004 the last hopes for the unification came to an end, international perceptions were changed about the Cyprus issue\textsuperscript{20} and the island of Cyprus officially became an EU MS, regardless its division; in Transnistria’s case, it was since 2004 that Moldova was high on the international agenda. The end-date of 2009 will assess the events up to the present year. The paper analyses the key events in the theme. Thus, it is not expected to cover all the developments and neither can be it present in the form of the account of news. As far as the main focus is made on the 2004-2009 period, some parallels are drawn to the earlier period as well, upon relevance. In the Literature Review chapter one can easily see that the EU direction in the 1990s and 2000s is often referred to \textit{vis-à-vis} the conflicts. The RoC’s accession process and the EU’s attention to Transnistria in the 2000s are worth noting. Drawing parallels to this period is important for explaining trends and strengthening the author’s argument towards the final conclusion about the EU’s efficiency in conflict resolution. Events can be encountered endlessly. The paper gathers the main snapshots that, according to the author’s assumptions, look at the EU’s role at different angles and show off this role vividly.

\textit{Limitation}: Obviously the short time-frame given to the author, as a master student, did not give much scope for developing something radically different from what had already been said about the EU’s involvement in the conflict resolution process. Therefore, it should be mentioned for the further clarification that the hypothesis developed does not solely belong to the author. Nor the adjusted theory is the first precedent when the EU’s policies and instruments (especially foreign policy and Europeanisation process) are discussed through the Constructivism approach. A book by Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan is one of those where the EU foreign policy is linked to the Constructivism approach. Nathali Tocci in her book also discusses EU policies through Constructivism.

Limitation applied to the material is worth considering. There were many books and articles found about the Cyprus case, while the Transnistria case suffered from the scarcity of materials. The researcher tries to balance this disproportionality.

\textsuperscript{20} Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.38
2. Research Questions, Hypothesis, Concepts and Theory

The study examines how was the EU tailored towards conflict resolution? The current study, therefore, attempts to fill this gap by exploring these issues under the context of EU efficiency in resolving the problems of the newcomers and its objectivity towards the EU MS and ENP partner (as well as to the other actors involved in the conflicts). It also aims at its ability to act on its own independently from the other international players.

Hypothesis and research questions make the subject of the study more concrete. The concepts enlisted are generalised in the Literature Review chapter. Theory examines the framework in which the theme is discussed.

2.1. Research Questions

Main research question of the thesis is: how was the EU tailored while conflict resolution? It consists of some sub-questions. More precisely, the following points will be explored: EU efficiency in resolving the problems of the newcomers, its objectivity towards the EU MS and ENP partner (as well as to the other actors involved in the conflicts), its ability to act on its own independently from the other international players.

The EU efficiency has to be measured by its instruments and policies towards the theme. The extent of EU involvement in conflicts is measured by the instruments that are connotative to the EU interest. Furthermore, the EU has applied not only to conflict resolution, but also crisis management tools. While reviewing short- and long-term goals, Stephan Keukeleire says that “long-term conflict prevention efforts can fail because they are not sufficiently supported by diplomatic and / or military security efforts”\(^\text{21}\). Assessing the EU involvement and tools used for conflict prevention, we can argue that the EU had short-term goals. Instruments for short-term conflict prevention and crisis management are incentives, humanitarian aid whose advantage lies in the fact that they have significant means at their disposal. At the same time, they have limited flexibility\(^\text{22}\).

\(^{21}\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.219
\(^{22}\) Ibid, p.220
While enriching its circle, the EU was promoting European values. The new countries were to align to these standards. The EU was itself involved in this process, getting to know problems of the newcomers.

The first sub-question can be formulated this way: was the EU properly responsive to the problems of the newcomers (new countries and neighbours)? The EU was tackling conflicts through the existing instruments, insisting that “European Integration was and is a project for conflict prevention in the region”\(^\text{23}\). Apart from conflict prevention, conflict resolution and settlement was a priority in the new challenging world.

The point of how the EU coped with its different partners and at what length will be examined. “The EU failed to use accession to solve one of the major problems in EU-Turkey relations: the conflict over Cyprus, an island divided into Greek and Turkish parts”\(^\text{24}\). When the EU let Southern part without endorsing in April-2004 plan, “the EU lost its leverage to tackle the conflict”\(^\text{25}\). As a result, the Cyprus conflict paralysed not only the EU-Turkey relations, but also various EU policies\(^\text{26}\).

The next sub-questions will come to the reasons that prompted the countries for the closer relations with the EU. How objective the EU was while dealing with the various parties and how the variety of interests reflected on the EU policies will also be explored and assessed.

When the EU was to deal with the conflicts, it meant that it went beyond its initial focus (economic integration) and did it at the request of other global actors. Consequently, a perception arises that the EU itself is not an initiator of conflict resolution, but acts in response with the other international actors. Next sub-question concerns the EU’s ability to act on its own independently from other international players. The EU’s relations with them will also be reviewed.

\(^{23}\) Carr, Fergus, Massey, Andrew, Public Policy and the New European Agendas, p.140
\(^{24}\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.268
\(^{25}\) Ibid, p.268
\(^{26}\) Ibid, p.268
When examining the EU’s objectivity towards a conflict where two EU MSs and an EU accession country is involved, nature of the EU foreign policy comes onto the agenda. This is resulted from the evidence that both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) have a say in shaping the EU foreign policy. Therefore, when mentioning the EU foreign policy one should say it “only includes national foreign policies in so far as they are developed at least to some extent through interaction with the EU mechanism”\(^{27}\). How this was into action will be further assessed. In Transnistria’s case, the EU had to face its ENP- and strategic partners. Taking the conflicting parties into account leads us to the last sub-question: could the EU be an objective third party? What matters here are the various kinds of relations between the EU and the conflicting sides.

A number of sub-questions are to let us dive in the depth of the issue and draw an opinion on the EU’s efficiency in the conflicts’ resolution process.

### 2.2. Hypothesis

Based on the introduction text and the abovementioned research questions, hypothesis can be formulated as follows: The EU objectives and goals determined course of events during conflict resolution process.

In Cyprus case the conflict resolution was sacrificed to the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria and its objective to break Ottoman legacy (While accepting the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, the EU was breaking Soviet legacy. By allowing Cyprus, the EU would be able to break Ottoman legacy as well.), as the several scholars argue.

In the Cyprus case the EU was guided with the same principle as in the case of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): to counter the break-up of the Soviet legacy (by allowing FSU countries) with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. The EU’s decision to let the partitioned island to the communities leaves the evidence to think that the EU focused on Cyprus’ accession itself. Furthermore, if the country abided with the Copenhagen criteria, it could not have been declined of the privilege of entering the EU so easily.

\(^{27}\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.29
In Transnistria’s case, the EU was focusing on economic reasons rather than on merely conflict resolution process. “The increased EU focus on Transnsitria has been accompanied, and indeed caused, by a growing awareness of the linkages between the unresolved conflict and Moldova’s difficult economic and political situation”\(^\text{28}\). Thus, the EU involvement was conditioned by the fact that Moldova’s economic advance was deterred by the Transnistria issue. Here the conflict resolution was guided by economic reasons, in particular by economic advance of Moldova and its control over customs territory. Moreover, when the EU was directly involved in respect with the EUBAM, it stressed the importance of controlling customs territory on the border of Moldova and Ukraine. This avoided the EU from being in awkward situation with Russia for Moldova’s sake.

2.3. Concepts

There are some specific concepts in the thesis that need to be defined for clarification. This passage enlists these concepts and provides context and framework in which they are mentioned in the paper.

*Conflict* is generally discussed in different ways and through various aspects. The conflicts given in the thesis are defined as “the clashing of interests (positional differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases”\(^\text{29}\).

*Conflict resolution* “point out strategies that could be employed to find an exit from the conflict’s destroying dynamic and that aim toward achieving satisfying solution for all parties involved”\(^\text{30}\). How the EU was tailored in the conflict resolution process and whether it could find acceptable solutions will be reviewed.

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\(^\text{28}\) Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.20
\(^\text{29}\) Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK 2005: 2) quoted in Axt, Heinz-Ürgen, Milososki, Antonio, Schwarz, Oliver, Conflict – A Literature Review, p.5
\(^\text{30}\) Axt, Heinz-Ürgen, Milososki, Antonio, Schwarz, Oliver, Conflict – A Literature Review, p.16
Conditionality was developed during the eastern enlargement for transforming governance, economy and civil society of the candidate countries. “Conditionality can be defined as a strategy whereby a reward is granted or withheld depending on the fulfilment of an attached condition”. Upon the thesis’ context, it may take political and economic forms and can be positive and negative, ex ante and ex post.

Constructivism is the approach that explains “theoretically both the content of actor identities/preferences and the modes of social interaction – so evident in everyday life – where something else aside from strategic exchange is taking place”. The researcher chose this approach for analysing the EU’s efficiency in the given context. The concepts below are related to the theory.

“Social learning involves a process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts (norms or discursive structures), acquire new interests and preferences – in the absence of obvious material incentives. Put differently, agent interests and identities are shaped through interaction.” Social learning leads to social mobilisation when, after perceptions, the parties abide to the principles by their actions.

“Persuasion is a cognitive process that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion; put differently, it is a mechanism through which social learning may occur, thus leading to interest redefinition and identity change.” Persuasion results into social learning that, as discussed above, prompts social mobilisation in the best cases.

2.4. Theory

In order to follow the track outlined by the hypothesis, Constructivism by Jeffrey Checkel has been chosen. Focusing on strategic exchange and self-interested behaviour,

31 Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.10
32 Ibid, p.10
33 Ibid, p.10
34 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.409
35 Ibid, p.410
36 Ibid, p.411
Constructivism holds ‘middle ground’ between agent-centred rational choice and structure-centred approach\textsuperscript{37}. Therefore, Constructivism proved to be useful when analysing situation involving various parties. How the concepts of the theory were adjusted to the topic will be discussed below.

Social learning and socialisation vividly explains the process where the EU was promoting its standards and norms with the new partners. It was due to such an approach that the partners acknowledged necessity for closer relations with the EU and resulted into normative diffusion in their national arenas.

Obviously, process of getting the partners agree on the EU standards and norms was not so smooth. The EU used persuasion: through its carrots and stick approach the countries were persuaded to align to the EU principles. The development follows the track of Constructivism. After persuasion from the EU side, the agents in the countries motivated decision-makers to change state policy\textsuperscript{38} and, thus, social mobilisation occurred. Elite decision-makers, on their part, became internalised with the newly-emerged norms and prescribed to them\textsuperscript{39}. Constructivism marks this step as social learning. Choice of Constructivism for the given analysis will be further justified in the Literature Review chapter step by step.

\textsuperscript{37} Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.407
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p.411
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, p.413
3. Methodology

When talking about Research Design, the following aspects will be enlisted in this section: Research strategies, Types, Forms and Collection of Data, Role of the Researcher⁴⁰.

Research Strategy is Deductive, as the discussion process is directed from general view to more specific one. The researcher initially got interested in the efficiency of the EU’s involvement of the conflict resolution process and, for more precise investigation, comes down to the concrete cases of Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts.

The author uses all the three Types of Data: Primary when talking about historical overview of the conflicts and the involvement of the European Union in the fourth chapter; Secondary and Tertiary data in the Literature Review chapter.

From the specificities of the theme, Qualitative Data Forms are used on the paper. Data Collection Technique is Observation, providing systemic recording of the EU's activities for the given conflicts’ resolution. However, some parallels are drawn to the other relevant periods.

Methodology part encloses Data Collection as well. The issue will be analysed through Cross-sectional Studies, taking one period (2004-2009), capturing a still picture.

While doing the research, role of the researcher clearly matter. In the paper the researcher is a Detached Observer, an uninvolved spectator who is supposed to provide a reliable knowledge and draw up objective conclusion.

⁴⁰ Methodology was tailored by the book of Blaikie, Norman, Designing Social Research
4. Roots of the Conflicts and Attempted Solutions by International Mediators

Roots of the Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts shed light upon the main involved actors and root causes of the contradictions. History of both Cyprus and Transnistria were dominated by different powers, and the entities have been used as bargaining chips among them. However, when the independence was granted to Cyprus and Moldova, self-determination of the minorities was tangible. In both cases this resulted into a partition, but to different extent. In Cyprus the minorities created a self-declared state Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), while in Moldova the minorities are governed by a self-declared government in Tiraspol, Transnistria.

This fourth chapter is divided into two parts. First one is a historical overview of the root causes of the conflicts and attempted solutions. It reviews involvement of the international actors in the conflicts’ resolution process. The parts are divided into two sub-chapters, dealing with Cyprus and Transnistria issues respectively.

4.1.1. Roots of the Cyprus Issue and Attempted Solutions

Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was founded in 1959 on the basis of Zurich and London Agreements, which were concluded among the United Kingdom (UK), Greece and Turkey. On August 16, 1960 independence of the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed.

The Greek and Turkish Cypriots had difficulties in working together. Ethnic clashes since the 1950s resulted in the collapse of the republic in 1963. On December 21, 1963, on the so-called “Bloody Christmas”, Turkish Cypriots were pressed to agree on the 13 amendments had been proposed by Archbishop Makarios to his vice-president Fazil Kučuk. The amendments were aimed at the facilitation of the state apparatus. Following the “Bloody Christmas”, the Turkish Cypriots left the parliament and the administration.

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41 Çarkoğlu, Ali, Rubin, Barry, Turkey and the European Union, p.72
42 Ibid, p.72
43 Ibid, p.72
44 Ibid, p.72
Since the end of 1963, the southern part of the island (what is known as the RoC today) has been under the control of Greek Cypriot administration and is recognised internationally\textsuperscript{45}. Since the same period, Turkish Cypriot community have been living under the control of a separate Turkish Cypriot administration\textsuperscript{46}.

The conflict attracted the United Nations’ (UN) attention. On March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) adopted the Resolution 186 (1964), according to which the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed in the territory “for maintaining peace and putting an end to violence in Cyprus”\textsuperscript{47}.

The peacekeeping force did not solve the problem. On July 15, 1975, the Greek military junta organized \textit{Coup d’état} against President Makarios\textsuperscript{48}. The Turkish side responded by intervention on July 20, 1974. They tried to avoid \textit{enosis} (union with Greece). On August 16, 1974, the Turkish Army launched second offensive and occupied 37 percent of the northern part of the island\textsuperscript{49}.

Importance of inter-communal talks was acknowledged by the both sides. The 1977 and 1979 agreements between President Rauf Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios served this aim\textsuperscript{50}.

Since the partition, the Turkish Cypriots tried to preserve their communal existence and established several governing structures, such as The Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration (in 1967), The Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration (in 1974) and The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (in 1975)\textsuperscript{51}. On November 15, 1983, they proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) that is only recognized by Turkey\textsuperscript{52}.

\textsuperscript{45} Sözen, Ahmet, A Model of Power-Sharing in Cyprus: From the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements to the Annan Plan, p.3
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, p.3
\textsuperscript{47} Çarkoğlu, Ali, Rubin, Barry, Turkey and the European Union, p.72
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p.73
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, p.73
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p.73
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, p.73
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, p.73
Three days after the TRNC was proclaimed, on November 18, 1983, the UNSC demanded annulment of the declaration by its Resolution 541 (1983) and called for the countries “to recognize no other state than the Republic of Cyprus”\(^{53}\).

The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities of the island were operating under the patronage of Greece and Turkey respectively. Series of cooperation was started by the “Joint Defense Dogma” concluded between the Greek Cypriots and Greece in December 1993\(^{54}\). This posed a threat to the balance of powers on the region. Furthermore, in January 1997 the RoC decided to buy Russian S-300 missiles with a range of 150km\(^{55}\).

In response to this step, on January 20, 1997, Turkey and the TRNC signed a common declaration setting out the concept of common defence. On August 6, 1997, they established Association Council whose first meeting was intentionally coincided with the start of EU accession negotiations with the RoC – on March 31, 1998\(^{56}\).

The Greek Cypriots were in favour of one united state, while the Turkish Cypriot side insisted on two sovereign states. A Cypriot federation was officially proposed by Rauf Denktaş. It was backed up by Turkey with a common declaration on July 20, 1999\(^{57}\).

The opposing sides of Turkish and Greek Cypriots agreed to start face-to-face talks on December 4, 2001. Consequently, January 21, 2002, marked as the beginning of intensive negotiations\(^{58}\).

Apart from the attempts of the two communities, the mediating UN was working hard on the issue. On November 11, 2002, the “\textit{Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem}” was presented by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan\(^{59}\). “The Turkish government has actively encouraged the TRNC President

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\(^{53}\) Çarkoğlu, Ali, Rubin, Barry, Turkey and the European Union, p.73  
\(^{54}\) TISK (2002), p.63 quoted in Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, p.59  
\(^{55}\) Ibid, p.59  
\(^{56}\) Çarkoğlu, Ali, Rubin, Barry, Turkey and the European Union,, pp.59-60  
\(^{57}\) Ibid, p.60  
\(^{58}\) Ibid, p.75  
\(^{59}\) Ibid, p.75
Denktaş to accept the plan as a basis for further negotiations"\(^6^0\). Taking their concerns into consideration, revised proposal was presented by Annan on December 10, 2002. "If both sides signed this, then the Copenhagen Council Conclusions would have referred to the ‘United Cyprus’"\(^6^1\).

April 24, 2004, was the last chance for unification of the island through the UN Plan. In the referendum Turkish Cypriots voted in favour and Greek Cypriots voted against the plan\(^6^2\).

The 2002-2003 extensive talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots did not bear fruit, as “the two sides remained far apart on key issues”\(^6^3\). In March 2003 the negotiations broke down. Hopes for the further interaction between the opposing sides still appeared on February 24, 2008, when the Greek Cypriot president Demetris Christofias referred to the UN with this proposal\(^6^4\).

4.1.2. Roots of the Transnistria Issue and Attempted Solutions

Name “Transnistria” for the first time denoted territories beyond the Dniester River administered by Romanians in 1941\(^6^5\). The fact that different parts of the territory belonged to Ukraine, Russia and Romania at different times, revealed itself in the late 1980s when, during Perestroika, one part of the population wished reunification with Romania, while the second preferred being independent\(^6^6\).

Language laws adopted by the Moldovan parliament in August and September, 1989\(^6^7\), caused suppression of non-Moldovan-speaking communities, namely Russians, and resulted into strikes and into the partition of the left and right banks of the Dniester. Irritations

\(^{61}\) Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, 2003, p.74
\(^{62}\) Yılmaz, Bahri, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? p.21
\(^{63}\) Nugent, Neill, Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of Being Small, pp.11-12
\(^{64}\) Yılmaz, Bahri, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? p.21
\(^{65}\) Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.979
\(^{66}\) Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.5
\(^{67}\) Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.980
among the different ethnic communities were further raised in 1990-1991, when the Moldovan government began nationalisation of the schools\textsuperscript{68}.

On 23 June, 1990, state sovereignty of the Moldovan republic was declared\textsuperscript{69}. On the 27\textsuperscript{th} of August 1991, Moldova officially gained independence from the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{70}. Dnestr Moldovan Republic was proclaimed\textsuperscript{71} and the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet voted to join the Soviet Union on September 2\textsuperscript{72}. Since then, Tiraspol became de facto independent and began operating at its own disposal\textsuperscript{73}.

First military clashes between Moldovan police and the Transnistrians occurred on 2 November, 1990, in Dubasari, central Transnistria, for control over municipal bodies\textsuperscript{74}. Moscow immediately set up a conciliation commission. Moldovan side responded only on 13 December, 1991, when defending the regional government building in Dubasari\textsuperscript{75}.

From spring, 1992, Cossacks arrived in Tiraspol from various parts of the former Soviet Union to support Tiraspol regime, they and other volunteers “were put in the state pay-roll”\textsuperscript{76}. In April, 1992, “Ukraine established a 50 kilometre deep security zone along its border with the PMR, primarily in order to intercept Cossack volunteers crossing Ukrainian territory”\textsuperscript{77}. In March, 1992, the state of emergency\textsuperscript{78} and martial law\textsuperscript{79} was declared on Moldova’s territory. On June 19 the Moldovan forces managed to recapture Bendery for a short time\textsuperscript{80}. Following this move, tanks of the Russian 14\textsuperscript{th} Army crossed the Dnestr\textsuperscript{81} and drove the Moldovans out of the area on 20-21 June\textsuperscript{82}.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.981
\item Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.5
\item Gheorghiu, Dr. Valeriu, Moldova on the Way to the European Union: Distance Covered and Next Steps to be Done, p.1
\item Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.6
\item Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.984
\item Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.6
\item Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.987
\item Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.6
\item Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.987
\item Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.987
\end{thebibliography}
Upon escalation of fighting, there were several mediation attempts. Agreements on the peaceful settlement and on peacekeeping force were reached at the CSCE ministerial meeting in Helsinki in March and at the CIS summit in July respectively\textsuperscript{83}. The Snegur-Yeltsin accord of 21 July, 1992, “provided for an immediate cease-fire and the creation of a demilitarized zone extending 10 km from the Nistru\textsuperscript{84} on each side of the river, including the important town of Bender on the right bank”\textsuperscript{85}. Principles for a peaceful settlement were also agreed upon and Joint Control Commission (JCC) was established for monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire agreement\textsuperscript{86}. Due to the agreement, “Moldova lifted the state of emergency and Transnistria resumed supplies of gas and electricity to the right bank”\textsuperscript{87}.

The July 1992 agreement mentioned the principle of withdrawal of the Russian forces from Moldova\textsuperscript{88}. In 1994 the forces were halved, but the withdrawal process was stalled on the whole\textsuperscript{89}. On October 1994 Chisinau and Moscow reached an agreement according to which the Russian forces were to be withdrawn in three years’ time\textsuperscript{90}. In November 1999 at the OSCE summit in Istanbul Russia agreed to remove its forces, personnel and equipment by 2001-2002\textsuperscript{91}. On 9 December, 2002, the mandate of the OSCE Mission in Moldova was expanded to monitor the removal of Russian equipment and coordination of financial and technical assistance for their withdrawal\textsuperscript{92}.

On 3 July, 1992, bilateral negotiations between Chisinau and Moscow began, PMR was allowed as an observer\textsuperscript{93}. Other rounds of talks between Moldovan authorities and Transnistrian leadership took place in early 1993\textsuperscript{94}, in February 1994\textsuperscript{95} and in February

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, p.988
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, p.987
\textsuperscript{83} Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.7
\textsuperscript{84} the Nistru or the Dnestr river (author’s remark)
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, p.7
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p.8
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, p.8
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, p.8
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, p.8
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, p.8
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, p.8
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p.12
\textsuperscript{93} Kolsto, Pal, Edemsky, Andrei, Kalashnikova, Natalya, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, p.994
\textsuperscript{94} Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.10
2003. The last time Voronin initiated establishment of a Joint Constitutional Commission (co-chaired by Chisinau and Tiraspol) that would draft a new constitution.

In 1995 Ukraine became the “third official ‘mediator’ in the Transnistrian conflict and eventual ‘guarantor’ of a settlement”. On 19 January, 1996, a Joint Declaration was signed by Russia, Ukraine and Moldova that recognised the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.

There were several proposals on the resolution of the conflict. In spring 1997 formation of a ‘common state’ was proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov, the OSCE issued a draft agreement in June 1997. On March 20, 1998, Agreement on Confidence Measures and Development of Contacts between Republic of Moldova and Transnistria was signed in Odessa. In November 1998 a new draft agreement was presented by the mediators, signed in Kyiv later on 16 July, 1999, by the two parties and the three mediators. Ukraine set up a State Commission on the Transnistrian conflict in August 2000; Moscow presented a proposal for the same commission (known as the ‘Primakov project’) in the same month. Vladimir Voronin presented “a new proposal for a final settlement” on 16 May, 2001. On 1-3 July, 2002, the three mediators presented the s-called Kyiv document, outlining “the constitutional system of a united federal Moldovan state”.

In November 2003 Russia unilaterally approved the so-called “Kozak Memorandum” that would “guarantee Russian military presence until 2020 and Transnistria’s de facto domination of the whole of Moldova”.

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96 Ibid, p.10
97 Ibid, p.14
98 Ibid, p.14
99 Ibid, p.11
100 Ibid, p.11
101 Ibid, p.11
102 Ibid, p.12
103 Ibid, p.12
104 Ibid, p.12
105 Ibid, p.13
106 Ibid, p.14
107 Ibid, p.14
108 Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.3
109 Ibid, p.3
Moldova’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), raised necessity of new customs stamps for Transnistrian exports (introduced by the Moldovan government on 1 September, 2001) and deployment of “joint customs and border control on Ukrainian territory”\textsuperscript{110}.

4.2. Involvement of the European Union in the Conflicts’ Resolution Process

During the 1990s the EU focused on building security in its peripheries. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was to maintain security in the EU’s, the eastern periphery was stabilised by the EU’s own security-building model\textsuperscript{111}.

The European Union has not been indifferent towards the Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts, although its involvement was revealed in different situations at different extent. Attention to the Cyprus conflict touched upon interests of EU MSs Greece and Cyprus and an EU candidate country Turkey. Transnistria conflict encompasses countries of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.

Involvement of the EU has certainly influenced the course of events and development of the involved countries’ outlook. A Cyprus issue has been directly reflected on the EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s accession perspectives. When looking through the EU-Turkey relations, one can see that cooperation with the EU has sometimes helped Turkey ease tensions with Greece\textsuperscript{112}. As regards with Moldova, one cannot blatantly say Moldova’s EU membership prospects were deterred only by Transnistria. Moldova’s aspirations to this membership have been revealed in the successful implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)\textsuperscript{113} and created a favourable image for Moldova among the FSU countries in 2003.

\textsuperscript{110} Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.13
\textsuperscript{111} Bilgin, Pinar, A Return to ‘Civilisational Geopolitics’ in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era, p.271
\textsuperscript{112} Dannreuther, Roland (Ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy Towards Neighbourhood Strategy, p.56
\textsuperscript{113} Dannreuther, Roland (Ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy Towards Neighbourhood Strategy, p.91
This part, like the previous one, is divided into two sub-chapters which present a collection of facts about the EU involvement in the resolution of Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts and reviews the responses this involvement has triggered among the countries involved.

4.2.1. Involvement of the European Union in the Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict

The EU, by its actions, left a trace on the development of relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The EU policies have in many cases determined course of action of the sides. This section will review the EU involvement in the Cyprus issue, its policies vis-à-vis the RoC, TRNC, Turkey and Greece.

Starting from 1959 with Turkey’s application to the emerging EEC, the EU-Turkey relations went smoothly\textsuperscript{114}. On September 12, 1960, Association Agreement (the Ankara Agreement) was signed between Turkey and the EU (then the EC), which came into force on December 1, 1964\textsuperscript{115}. The Turkish associate membership in 1963 followed the Greek one\textsuperscript{116}. On December 19, 1972, the Republic of Cyprus and the EU signed Association Agreement that came into force on June 1, 1973\textsuperscript{117}. On January 1, 1988, Customs union protocol between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU came into force\textsuperscript{118}.

Being encouraged by the positive development, Turkey applied for the EU membership on April 14, 1987\textsuperscript{119}. However, the application was rejected by the Opinion of the European Commission\textsuperscript{120} on December 18, 1989. At the same time, the Opinion “confirmed the eligibility of Turkey for membership”\textsuperscript{121} and named the Cyprus dispute as an obstacle for eventual membership\textsuperscript{122}.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{114}Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.3
\textsuperscript{115}Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, pp.72-73
\textsuperscript{116}Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.3
\textsuperscript{117}Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, p.73
\textsuperscript{118}Ibid, p.74
\textsuperscript{119}Ibid, p.74
\textsuperscript{120}Ibid, p.74
\textsuperscript{121}Ibid, p.74
\textsuperscript{122}Yilmaz, Bahri, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? p.5
\end{flushright}
On July 4, 1990, the government of the Republic of Cyprus applied for the EU membership. On June 30, 1993, European Commission was “in favour of the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus” and started accession negotiations on March 31, 1998.

On March 6, 1995, the TRNC’s “historical compromise … guaranteed Cyprus its accession negotiations would begin six months after the conclusion of the 1996 IGC. In return, Greece lifted its veto on the customs union agreement with Turkey”. On their part, on December 28, 1995, Turkey and the TRNC signed a common declaration stating that “they only approve the accession of Cyprus to the EU within the framework of a definite solution of the Cyprus problem”. EU-Turkey relations advanced at economic level on January 1, 1996, upon Customs Union between the EU and Turkey coming into force.

Turkey’s Non-inclusion in the enlargement round and invitation to the “European Conference in 1998 on certain conditions” prompted the Turkish Cypriot administration break off bi-communal contacts for more than a year. March 12, 1998, was another attempt of interaction between the two Cypriot communities. The Turkish Cypriots were invited to join the Cypriot negotiation team by the Greek Cypriot President, Glafkos Clerides. Moreover, the British Presidency of the EU invited the Turkish Cypriot leaders to take part in the European Conference in London. The invitation was refused by the TRNC.

December 10-11, 1999, European Council Helsinki summit decided that the resolution of the Cyprus problem would not be a precondition to the EU membership for the RoC. At the summit Turkey was granted a candidate status.

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123 Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, p.74
124 Ibid, p.74
125 Ibid, p.74
126 Ibid, p.74
127 Ibid, p.59
128 Ibid, p.74
129 Yilmaz, Bahri, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? p.9
130 Anastasiou, Harry, Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case if Ethnically Divided Cyprus, p.591
131 Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, 2003, p.74
132 Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1999
The EU had different stance towards the RoC’s entry. Firstly, it applied to its standardised conditionality to the RoC when on December 14-15, 2001, European Council meeting in Laeken concluded Cyprus would be ready for the EU membership if it maintained pace of reforms. The June 21-22, 2002 Seville European Council raised the issue of the divided island, confirming “that the EU’s preference continues to be for the accession of a reunited island”. Lastly, the December 12-13 2002 “European Council of Copenhagen welcomed Cyprus as a member of the EU from May 1, 2004 regardless of the resolution of the Cyprus issue.

Opening of checkpoints in April 2003 proved reunification to be a difficult process. Having linked the Cyprus issue to Turkey’s EU accession, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders supported the UN Plan in 2003-2004.

The EU seemed determined to reward the Turkish Cypriot side: in April 2003, after signing the EU Accession Treaty the Commission pledged assistance of 206 million Euros to Northern Cyprus in case of the conflict settlement. Furthermore, the EU promised an “unconditional lifting” on the Turkish Cypriots’ isolation in 2004. But the EU was unable to keep the promise.

With regard to Turkey, accession process was gradually looming. The 2002 Copenhagen summit was promising for opening accession negotiations with Turkey. The summit meeting would use the Progress Report on Turkey 2004 and recommendation from the Commission on October 6, 2004, as the basis. On October 3, 2005 membership negotiations with Turkey were finally open.

Customs Union with the EU and a wave of new EU MSs placed the Ankara Agreement on the top agenda of EU-Turkey relations. The Presidency Conclusions of the EU Summit in

133 Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, 2003, p.75
135 Turkey and the European Union, Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, 2003, p.75
136 Bryant, Rebecca, A Dangerous Trend in Cyprus, p.32
137 Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.7
138 Nugent, Neill, Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of Being Small, p.13
139 Akçakoca, Amanda, EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment? p.11
140 Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.9
141 Yilmaz, Bahri, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? p.11
17-18 December 2004 highlighted the importance of the Additional Protocol by Turkey. That would open Turkey’s ports and airports to Greek Cyprus. The European Council of December 2006 decided to freeze eight chapters of Turkey’s accession negotiations until the full implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Customs Union Agreement by Ankara. Turkey’s progress would be reviewed reassessed by the EU Three years later in December 2009. Poor rate of achievement of progress in reforms during 2006-2008 deterred Turkey from implementing the Additional Protocol. Finally on 29 July 2009 Turkey signed the Additional Protocol.

Turkish Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Greece on May 14, 2010, casts a promising light on the Turkey-Greece relations that were stagnated due to the Cyprus issue.

4.2.2. Involvement of the EU in the Resolution of the Transnistria Conflict

More than a decade after the flare-up of the Transnistria conflict, the EU has stepped in the mediation process, using CFSP instruments, issuing opinions, responding to the moves from the opposing sides. In this section the involvement of the EU in the resolution of Transnistria issue is given.

On the 28th of November, 1994, the PCA was signed between the EU and the Republic of Moldova, which entered into force on 1 July, 1998.

The EU showed active involvement in the Transnistria issue since late 2002. During the period the EU proposed to develop “an EU CFSP common strategy towards the three

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143 Kramer, Heinz, Turkey and the EU: The EU’s Perspective, p. 27
144 Theophanous, Andreas, The EU, Turkey and Cyprus: What Next? p.1
145 Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.9
146 Ibid, p.2
148 Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.1
149 Gheorghiu, Dr. Valeriu, Moldova on the Way to the European Union: Distance Covered and Next Steps to be Done, p.1
150 Ibid, p.2
western NIS – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – and to offer them a ‘special neighbours’ status after the enlargement of the EU\textsuperscript{152}. A 2002 Commission paper on EU approaches to Moldova highlighted Moldova’s stability as the matter of importance to the EU\textsuperscript{153}.

New Communist government of Moldova brought about new institutional set-up which was alike the EU accession states: there was a National Commission for European Integration established on 13 November 2002, a special Department was also created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{154}.

On 27 February, 2003, the EU and the US imposed a travel ban on 17 Transnistrian leaders. After this move, Russian troops’ withdrawal and creation of Joint Constitutional Commission speeded up\textsuperscript{155}.

In spring 2003 the EU launched the “Wider Europe” concept\textsuperscript{156} which showed the EU’s “determination to build stronger relations with Moldova”\textsuperscript{157}. In March 2003 the European Commission initiated a series of trilateral consultations between Ukraine, Moldova and the EU itself. They were held in Brussels and touched upon “the issue of joint border controls on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, including its Transnistrian segment”\textsuperscript{158}.

In September 2003 Moldova called for the EU and US involvement in the mediation process. However, during Commissioner Verheugen’s visit to Chisinau Moldova was prompted not to raise the Transnistria issue in the framework of the SAP for the Western Balkans (in which Moldova was included in June 2001)\textsuperscript{159}. The EU and US involvement was supported by Ukraine and in 2005 already by Transnistria\textsuperscript{160}.

\textsuperscript{151} Emerson, Michael, Should the Transnistrian Tail Wag the Bessarabian Dog? CEPS Commentary (Nov. 2003) quoted in Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p. 4

\textsuperscript{152} Dannreuther, Roland (Ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy Towards Neighbourhood Strategy, p.90

\textsuperscript{153} EU approach on Moldova (Unpublished, 2002), quoted in Popescu, Nicu, The EU and Transnistria, p.1

\textsuperscript{154} Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p. 7

\textsuperscript{155} Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, pp.14-15

\textsuperscript{156} Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p. 5

\textsuperscript{157} Interview with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP published by BASA Press, p.2

\textsuperscript{158} Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.5

\textsuperscript{159} Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p. 6

\textsuperscript{160} Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.5
In 2003 the EU was involved in the Joint Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution for a reunified Moldova. “The Commission ultimately failed in its task, but it marked a symbolic change in the conflict resolution mechanisms with the EU being involved for the first time in negotiations on the status of Transnistria”\textsuperscript{161}.

During 2003-2004, the EU was periodically sending diplomatic missions to Moldova, mentioning the Transnistria issue with Russia and Ukraine. It issued opinions about conflict resolution process and thus, became “an ad hoc diplomatic actor in Moldova”\textsuperscript{162}. In November 2003, when Javier Solana declared lack of EU support to the Kozak Memorandum, it led to the rejection of the plan from the Moldovan side\textsuperscript{163}.

When in summer 2004 the Transnistrian leadership attempted to close down Romanian-language schools in Transnistria, the EU extended travel ban on more Transnistrian officials\textsuperscript{164}. Robert Cooper, Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs of the EU Council, visited Transnistria in early August 2004 as a response to this attempt\textsuperscript{165}.

A new enlargement round of 1 May, 2004, got Moldova closer to the EU. During the period EU-Moldova negotiations on the ENP Action Plan started\textsuperscript{166}. The resulting Action Plan was signed in February 2005\textsuperscript{167}.

In March 2005, the EU appointed its Special Representative for Moldova, a senior Dutch-diplomat Adrian Jacobovits de Szeged. This was to contribute to an eventual conflict settlement\textsuperscript{168}.

The ENP Country Report on Moldova from May 2005 highlighted the importance of control of the customs territory for Moldova\textsuperscript{169}. The EU backed up Moldova’s proposals to create a

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, p.4
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, p.4
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid, p.4
\textsuperscript{164} ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, writes to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on deteriorating situation in Transnistria’, quoted in Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.2
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, p.2
\textsuperscript{166} Gheorghiu, Dr. Valeriu, Moldova on the Way to the European Union: Distance Covered and Next Steps to be Done, p.3
\textsuperscript{167} Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.5
\textsuperscript{168} Council Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP of 23 March 2005 appointing a Special Representative of the European Union for Moldova, quoted in Popescu, Nico, \textit{The EU and Transnistria}, p.4
joint border control on the Ukrainian territory that would ensure the control of Moldova’s external borders\textsuperscript{170}. On 7 June 2005, the European Commission pledged the assistance of 22 million Euros for strengthening border controls between Moldova and Ukraine\textsuperscript{171}.

The EU responded the Moldovan and Ukrainian invitation to monitor the border between the two countries by submitting a memorandum on the creation of an EU Border Assistance Mission in August 2005\textsuperscript{172}. This would include the control of Transnistrian sector on the border of Moldova and Ukraine\textsuperscript{173}.

Late in 2005 “the EU initiated its first and more ambitious Border Assistance (BAM) along the 800km Ukraine-Moldova border. In doing so, the EU supports Ukraine and Moldova in countering the secessionist leaders of Transnistria, which are in turn supported by Moscow”\textsuperscript{174}.

In October 2005 office of the European Commission was opened in Chisinau\textsuperscript{175}. The same month the EU was invited to join the mediation process of the Transnistrian conflict. In December 2005 the EU Border Assistance Mission began functioning on the Moldova-Ukrainian border\textsuperscript{176}.

5. Literature Review

This section reviews the opinions of the scholars and practitioners about the EU’s role and involvement in the Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts. The review will follow a pattern given in the Research Question chapter and discuss the EU’s policy towards the conflicts, efficiency of the EU’s instruments, reasons that drew the new countries to the closer ties with the EU. The EU’s objectivity towards the various actors involved in the conflicts, the

\textsuperscript{169} Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.5
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid, p.5
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, p.5
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid, p.6
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid, p.6
\textsuperscript{174} Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.273
\textsuperscript{175} Ora, Jaap, Frozen Conflicts and the EU – a Search for a Positive Agenda, p.52
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, p.52
way the actors’ interests influenced the EU’s stance will also be discussed. The section will focus on the changes induced by the EU factor in the outlooks of these countries. After outlining the EU’s ability to act on its own independently from the other international players, the chapter will end up with a passage assessing the EU as an objective third party in the conflicts’ resolution process.

As stated in the Introduction chapter, the EU took up a new sphere of responsibility. Stephan Keukeleire maintains: “Although the EU got involved in the sphere that was out of its initial focus, it succeeded in crisis-management operations during 2003-2007. These operations demonstrated that the EU was willing, as well as able, to match words with action”\(^{177}\). The Literature Review aims at evaluating how the EU was tailored during the conflict resolution process and what its capabilities were.

*Efficiency in resolving problems of the newcomers, instruments, policies:* Enriching the circle meant dealing with the new countries. They, on their part, had new conflicts and problems. The EU had to respond this with new instruments and policies. While measuring the EU efficiency, we are referring to its policy and instruments towards not only conflict resolution, but also to the concerned countries as these steps would have their implications on the conflicts. Various tools were used by the EU in accordance with the situation.

Hypothesis claims that, while dealing with the Cyprus issue, the main guiding principle for the EU was the accession process itself. It is already a well-acknowledged fact that during the accession process Copenhagen Criteria was the most important but why it was stressed in the hypothesis is that the EU focused on this process in a way that the process was determinant to the EU’s course in the Cyprus conflict resolution process. It was crucial because the Cyprus accession should have meant resolution of the conflict itself. The below passages vividly prove this direction. Logically a question arises: why was there such an expectation? The answer lays undoubtedly the socialisation and identity-shaping effects\(^{178}\) the Europeanisation process has.

\(^{177}\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.2

\(^{178}\) Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.406
One more evidence proving that Copenhagen Criteria was the main guiding principle while accession process was the post-Helsinki climate. When, after the Decision of 1999 Helsinki Summit Turkey’s perspectives to the EU membership seemed to have been sacrificed, at the same time, road to the EU membership was outlined. “Turkey would be able to start accession negotiations if it was to convince the member countries that it had adopted the Copenhagen criteria”\(^{179}\).

At Helsinki Summit in December 1999 the EU’s back-up of the UNSG in the resolution of the Cyprus problem shows that the political settlement would be “an important factor for Cyprus’ accession to the EU, however, the settlement could not be a precondition to the Cyprus’ EU Membership”\(^{180}\). This again shows that the guiding principle of the Cyprus conflict resolution was the accession process itself.

In the pre-accession period, by linking resolution of the Cyprus Problem to its entry\(^{181}\), the EU pressurised Greek Cypriots for being “more accommodating in the search for a solution to the conflict”\(^{182}\). This was one more evidence of persuasion that was to lead to the condition where, aside strategic exchange, the actors formed their preferences in accordance with the EU instruments and policies. But the EU’s pressure applied to the Greek Cypriots was faded due to Turkey and Greece\(^{183}\): Turkish Cypriots were regarded as the ones which led to the failure of intercommunal talks under UN auspices\(^{184}\) and the threat of Greece’s veto on the other accession candidates played its role here\(^{185}\). Some EU MS who were “inimical to the accession of a divided Cyprus”\(^{186}\) still prompted Greek Cypriots for being more accommodating\(^{187}\).

Nathalie Tocci assumes that the EU missed opportunity because the time gap. This time gap concerned membership perspectives of Cyprus and Turkey\(^{188}\).

\(^{179}\) Vassilou, George, The Solution of the Cyprus Problem: The Key to Turkey’s Relations with the EU, p.2
\(^{180}\) Ibid, p.2
\(^{181}\) Kyriacou, P. Andreas, A Viable Solution to The Cyprus Problem In The Context of European Union Accession, pp.4-5
\(^{182}\) Ibid, pp.4-5
\(^{183}\) Ibid, pp.4-5
\(^{184}\) Ibid, pp.4-5
\(^{185}\) Ibid, pp.4-5
\(^{186}\) Kyriacou, P. Andreas, A Viable Solution to The Cyprus Problem In The Context of European Union Accession, pp.4-5
\(^{187}\) Ibid, pp.4-5
\(^{188}\) Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.45
The EU’s policy and instruments assigned to the parties during the accession process were designed to shape identities of the RoC, the TRNC, Turkey and Greece in accordance with the EU principles and norms. As far as the EU instruments are concerned, we can now refer to the EU’s policy towards accession negotiations with Turkey. When the screening process of accession negotiations with Turkey ended on 13 October 2006, some agreement had been reached on the chapters. The statement included in the final text said that “failure by Turkey to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations”\(^{189}\).

As stated in the chapter “Involvement of the European Union in the Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict”, the EU used Additional Protocol to the Customs Union EU-Turkey as the bargaining chip while negotiating with Turkey. The EU raised this topic several times, highlighting its importance. When the resolution of the Cyprus problem was not followed, the EU turned down its commitment to aid to Turkish Cypriots. This is an embodiment of the EU conditionality. The EU’s such look was expected promising for the Cyprus conflict resolution. However, David Hannay suggests that the ratification of the Additional Protocol and the fulfilment of the EU’s commitment to the Turkish Cypriots on trade are considered to be short-term problems\(^ {190}\). According to the author, the Turks have linked these issues, “understandably but unwisely”\(^ {191}\). The author finds the link unwise because it was conditioned by legal obligation and political pledge\(^ {192}\). He finds it “even more unwise because it ignored the iron rule of Cyprus diplomacy, which, to adapt one of Newton’s laws of physics, means that any proposal by one party immediately provokes an equal and contrary reaction from the other”\(^ {193}\).

In relation with the Transnistria conflict, the EU assigned several policies to Moldova. When talking about the EU instruments towards the Transnistria Conflict, we would note that since late 2002 the EU has shown a strong commitment “to support the conflict resolution process”\(^ {194}\) in Transnistria\(^ {195}\). “An array of CFSP instruments”\(^ {196}\) used in this

\(^{189}\) Akçakoca, Amanda, EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment? p.12
\(^{190}\) Hannay, David, Cyprus, Turkey and the EU: Time for a Sense of Proportion and Compromise, p.3
\(^{191}\) Ibid, p.3
\(^{192}\) Ibid, p.3
\(^{193}\) Hannay, David, Cyprus, Turkey and the EU: Time for a Sense of Proportion and Compromise, p.3
\(^{194}\) Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.1
respect were: appointment an EU Special Representative, introduction of a travel ban against the Transnistrian leadership \(^{197}\), “common actions under its ENP Action Plans with Moldova and Ukraine on conflict resolution in Transnistria”\(^{198}\). The PCA concluded with Moldova and the country’s inclusion in the ENP and in Wider Europe initiative are worth considering. A question arises: did these instruments benefit conflict resolution process in Transnistria? While the ENP and PCA outlined cooperation in various policy areas without prospect of the EU membership, the Wider Europe initiative was distant from any possible EU involvement in the conflict\(^{199}\). The proposal was “envisaging at most post-settlement support in civilian security arrangements with a vague promise of enhanced economic assistance for reconstruction”\(^{200}\). Javier Solana declared that by proposing the Wider Europe initiative, the EU once again showed its “determination to build stronger relations with Moldova”\(^{201}\).

Furthermore, The EU tried to regulate infringements of principles by sanctions towards Transnistrian leadership. They were the first precedent of the EU sanctions assigned in response to a lack of cooperation in conflict resolution\(^{202}\). The 2003 sanctions on the Transnistrian officials seemed credible, although were not effective. Here Nathalie Tocci’s assumption arises: “Negative conditionality, such as sanctions, can lose its credibility when the recipient party finds alternative suppliers”\(^{203}\). Transnistria is regarded to have Russia as a patron and can, thus be named as an alternative supplier. But the reasons which undermined viability of the sanctions were Ukraine’s neutrality and limited scope of the sanctions (applying to a limited number of officials) with vague objective\(^{204}\).

Despite such a limitation, the EUBAM is regarded as “a major contribution of the EU”\(^{205}\) to the conflict resolution in Transnistria. However, aim of the mission of an echo to the

\(^{195}\) Ibid, p.1
\(^{196}\) Ibid, p.1
\(^{197}\) Ibid, p.1
\(^{198}\) Ibid, p.1
\(^{200}\) Ibid, p.20
\(^{201}\) Interview with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, pp.1-2
\(^{202}\) Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.11
\(^{203}\) Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.11
\(^{204}\) Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.6
\(^{205}\) Ora, Jaap, Frozen Conflicts and the EU – a Search for a Positive Agenda, pp.3-4
hypothesis that the EU was tailoring conflict settlement process according to its already formed aims. In this case the main aim was to make sure Moldova was controlling its borders on the customs territory. This was not sufficient for the conflict resolution. Promotion of the rule of law, strengthening civil society and democracy in Transnistria would have tangibly contributed to the conflict resolution. “Until now, unfortunately, there have been only limited opportunities in this regard.” Nor was the appointment of a EUSR for Moldova a precondition to the conflict resolution, although it highlighted the EU’s interest in the Transnistria problem and provided “greater EU internal coherence and external visibility.” Manoeuvrability of the EUSR was slightly limited by the fact that it was based in The Hague.

While measuring the EU efficiency, we are referring to its policy and instruments towards not only conflict resolution, but also to the concerned countries as these steps would have their implications on the conflicts. Various tools were used by the EU in accordance with the situation. The EU’s attention to Moldova was a response to the country’s economic difficulties. The EU later became a mediator of customs agreement between Ukraine and Moldova that was successfully completed in May 2003.

Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer Mac Naughtan maintain that the EU is a normative power, promoting its identity and values. For this purpose political conditionality was used by the EU. The EU, as the actor based on identity and values, was “quick to protect its narrower self-interests and geostrategic interests.” Promoting peace and well-governed countries was the EU’s interest. Obviously, conflict deterred implementation of this interest. How the EU pursued its aim will be reviewed.

The EU applies conditionality to its partners and gives rewards in accordance with the progress achieved. This is an embodiment of the EU’s soft power and EU ensures

206 Ibid, pp.3-4
207 Ibid, pp.3-4
208 Ibid, pp.3-4
209 Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.4
210 Ibid, p.4
211 Ibid, p.4
212 Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, pp.20-21
213 Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.334
214 Ibid, p.334
215 Ibid, p.334
alignment to its principles. From the perspective of Constructivism, the EU conditionality can be interpreted as Persuasion. If we combine the real picture with the Constructivism theory, we will have such a situation: the EU directs instruments and policies to the partners and the subsequent conditionality ensures their proper implementation. Discussing this condition through Constructivism will have such a look: the EU instruments and policies are expected to win over strategic exchange of the countries via social learning. Applied conditionality has the same effect as persuasion. This cognitive process serves as a mechanism for social learning, “thus leading to interest redefinition and identity change”\textsuperscript{216}. Persuasion as a cognitive process happens “in the absence of overt coercion”\textsuperscript{217} and leads to “interest redefinition and identity change”\textsuperscript{218}.

The EU adopted “a carrot and stick approach”\textsuperscript{219} to the both Cypriot communities\textsuperscript{220}. Applied carrot would guarantee “security and economic well-being of all Cypriots regardless of their ethnic origins”\textsuperscript{221}. This way Turkish Cypriots could participate in European Structural Funds and Common Agricultural Policy\textsuperscript{222}.

Applied stick to Turkish Cypriots, “by recognizing the government of the Republic of Cyprus as the only legitimate interlocutor in the accession negotiations”\textsuperscript{223}. This proved that the EU was against international recognition of TRNC\textsuperscript{224}. What concerns with the stick, the EU blamed them for failing intercommunal talks which were held under UN auspices and the main point to which the Turkish Cypriots had to adhere was to the EU principles regarding freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right of property\textsuperscript{225}. By hinting to these, the EU proved it did not support confederal solution of the Cyprus

\textsuperscript{216} Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.411
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid, p.411
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid, p.411
\textsuperscript{219} Kyriacou, P. Andreas, A Viable Solution to The Cyprus Problem In The Context of European Union Accession, p.3
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid, p.3
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid, p.3
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid, p.3
\textsuperscript{223} Kyriacou, P. Andreas, A Viable Solution to The Cyprus Problem In The Context of European Union Accession, p.18
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid, p.18
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid, p.4
Problem\textsuperscript{226}. On the other hand, one can argue that after the unsuccessful efforts the Europe might acknowledge that recognition of the Northern Cyprus is possible\textsuperscript{227}.

Stick applied to Greek Cypriots maintained a lasting settlement of the Cyprus Problem\textsuperscript{228}, as “several Member States have expressed their resistance towards the admission of divided island into the Union”\textsuperscript{229}. But, on the other hand, Cyprus’ inclusion in the enlargement round was at least slightly influenced by the Greek factor: “Greece has threatened to veto the accession of Eastern European candidates into the Union if Cyprus is not included”\textsuperscript{230}.

Conditionality towards Moldova was triggered in response with domestic frictions in Moldova\textsuperscript{231} (regarding the view towards European integration). As a result, the adjourned 15 million Euro aimed at supporting the balance of payments\textsuperscript{232}. All these facts show how the EU introduced persuasion that was to lead to social learning and social mobilisation.

It is obvious that getting closer relations with the EU required some trade-offs from the parties. They had to put aside strategic exchange and this was done by the persuasion from the EU side. Jeffery Checkel enlists the conditions where the actors are the most conducive to persuasion, one of them outlines the situation “where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure”\textsuperscript{233}. This is very true if we assess the situation in Greece and Turkey that stressed for the importance of the EU in the countries’ affairs. In both countries domestic development prompted to this trend. In Greece it became stressed after domestic institutional changes when the hopes for resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes and the Cyprus problem was

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid, p.4  
\textsuperscript{227} Interview with Dr. Oliver Wolleh (unpublished)  
\textsuperscript{228} Kyriacou, P. Andreas, A Viable Solution to The Cyprus Problem In The Context of European Union Accession, p.4  
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid, p.4  
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid, p.4  
\textsuperscript{231} Gheorghiu, Dr. Valeriu, Moldova on the Way to the European Union: Distance Covered and Next Steps to be Done, p.2  
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid, p.2  
\textsuperscript{233} Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.411
expected to be solved in the context of European integration. As for Turkey, in line with domestic developments the country’s big business and small and medium sized firms acknowledged the need for an “EU anchor” that would solve Turkey’s persistent economic problems. Due to the very economic concerns, political elites were sympathetic towards the EU, “giving positive momentum to the Turkey-EU relationship”.

Sets of events that led to social learning and through which the EU tried to reach persuasion were Helsinki European Council Meeting in the Cyprus’ case and the failed mediation process in Transnistria’s case. Although being out of the focused time-frame (2004-2009), Helsinki European Council Meeting was an important event as it provided a “turning point in the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle”. By setting the resolution of the Cyprus conflict as a precondition for Turkey’s accession, it strengthened linkage between the EU-Turkey relations and the Cyprus problem and, thus, boosted social learning process. Eralp Atıla thinks that at Helsinki “the EU committed itself to the accession of Cyprus independent of the Cyprus dispute in return for Turkey’s candidacy at the Summit”. This is another embodiment of the EU’s conditionality. At the same time, Helsinki European Council Meeting was the case when the EU’s policy towards the issue conditioned its active involvement. “As a result of these decisions the EU increasingly became an actor in the Cyprus dispute, an actor which was characterized as potentially being able to catalyze a peaceful solution on the island”. In Transnistria’s case the failed mediation process by the OSCE and the need for the EU was highlighted in 2005 when, after invitation from the OSCE, Moldova and Ukraine, Transnistrian side lifted its objection to the greater EU involvement in the conflict resolution process.

Jeffrey Checkel mentions another condition that leads to social learning: “social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and exposure”.

234 Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.5
235 Ibid, p.5
236 Ibid, p.5
237 Ibid, p.6
238 Ibid, p.6
239 Ibid, p.6
240 Atila, Eralp, EU Accession Process and Europeanisation of Turkey, quoted in Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.6
241 Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.3
242 Mette Ellstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.411
Linking Additional Protocol to Turkey’s accession and a travel ban on the Transnistrian leadership are clearly present in the form of direct political pressure from the EU side. This pressure could be persuasion that would result into social mobilisation through social learning.

Apart from being a process upon which many hopes for resolution of the Cyprus conflict were rested, European integration was vitally important for the EU’s development and future. Eralp Atila considers European integration as “one of the most successful policies of the EU”\textsuperscript{243}. Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer Mac Naughtan agree that redefining the identity of the Central and Eastern European countries was primary success of the EU foreign policy to date\textsuperscript{244}. The European integration process triggers institutional problems, is related to economic issues and requires a sense of solidarity from the member states\textsuperscript{245}. Failure in any these themes make the EU less attractive on the international arena\textsuperscript{246}. Therefore, Eralp Atila suggests that “the EU needs a success story”\textsuperscript{247} that would balance strains caused by the European integration process. “The settlement of the Cyprus problem could provide the EU with such success story and help to revitalize the process of European integration in one of the turbulent regions of the world, that is, the Eastern Mediterranean”\textsuperscript{248}. Acknowledging the importance of European integration, some member states of the EU realised that a divided Cyprus would harm the process of European integration\textsuperscript{249}.

We touched upon the case when the process of European integration raises institutional problems. But we can now look at this issue from another angle: institutional problems of the EU in 2005 had its effect on process of European integration. In particular, when in 2005 Turkey was finally ready for the start of accession negotiations, this spirit and readiness were sacrificed to the EU’s institutional problems\textsuperscript{250} (in 2005 France and the Netherlands did not ratify the Constitutional Treaty\textsuperscript{251}). Understandably, “this deeply

\textsuperscript{243} Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.7
\textsuperscript{244} Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.334
\textsuperscript{245} Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.11
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{250} Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.7
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid, p.7
affected the process of enlargement” and slowed down the pace of negotiations between the EU and Turkey.

After reviewing how the EU tailored its instruments towards the parties, now let us look at the EU instruments from the perspective of the involving sides. What prompted the RoC and Moldova (as the main parties) to strive for the EU membership, why did Greece back up and Russia opposed, why was Turkey willing to put some of its policies at stake? Such a look will once again test the credibility of the EU instruments.

The EU integration was generally considered to be useful for the conflict resolution. Apart from economic and political reasons, security reasons also prompted the applicant states for the EU membership, Neill Nugent suggests. “The EU does not, of course, provide hard security in the manner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but it is seen by some acceding states as offering useful soft security protection and comfort.”

Greek Cypriots were interested in the EU membership because of security reasons. Firstly, EU membership, by offering soft security protection, was expected to balance military threat coming from Turkey. If they became EU member states, Greek Cypriots assumed “Turkey would not dare to take military action against an EU member state.” Secondly, they also hoped the EU membership to be a catalyst for a resolution of the Cyprus Problem. The fact that the EU related resolution of the Cyprus Problem to the success in the EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s eventual membership, make Greek Cypriots think that Turkey could encourage the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, as it (Turkey) was aspiring to EU membership. Thus, despite being a soft power, the EU, with its instruments and policies, was regarded as a desirable partner that, having leverage, would guarantee that the interests of the countries were defended and implemented.

Why was Moldova aspiring for closer links with the EU? Such relations were promising to be beneficial for Moldova both for the resolution of the Transnistria conflict and for

\[\text{252} \text{ Ibid, p.7} \]
\[\text{253} \text{ Ibid, p.7} \]
\[\text{254} \text{ Nugent, Neill, Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of Being Small, p.5} \]
\[\text{255} \text{ Ibid, p.11} \]
\[\text{256} \text{ Ibid, p.11} \]
\[\text{257} \text{ Ibid, p.11} \]
\[\text{258} \text{ Nugent, Neill, Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of Being Small, p.11} \]
economic advance of the country itself. Economic benefits became obvious in 1998 upon entering the PCA between the EU and Moldova into force\textsuperscript{259}. Subsequent advantage was TACIS Assistance Programme\textsuperscript{260}. Inclusion in the SAP (in 2001) did not lead to the resolution of the Transnistria conflict\textsuperscript{261}. That time the conflict seemed less urgent to the EU and the European politicians\textsuperscript{262}. Moldova’s will for close relations with the EU was so strong that, despite having difficult conditions both domestically and internationally, the country decided to stick to European integration\textsuperscript{263}.

EU instruments promised economic regeneration to TRNC if they, together with the RoC, became EU MS\textsuperscript{264}. Explicit commitments by the EU institutions (European Council, Council of Ministers and European Commission) “that a non resolution of the Cyprus Problem is not in itself a barrier for EU membership either as a single state or as part of Turkey”\textsuperscript{265}; EU promise for financial aid to the TRNC in case of the resolution of the Cyprus Problem\textsuperscript{266} (“even after the Republic signed the EU Accession Treaty in April 2003 the Commission promised that if a settlement could be reached quickly then (EUR) 206 million would be channelled to northern Cyprus in the 2004-06 period\textsuperscript{267}”) have highlighted this context for the TRNC since 1994\textsuperscript{268}.

Moldova has encountered some domestic obstacles and difficulties in its way to Europeanisation, but Jaap Ora sees Moldova’s European orientation as the pre-condition that the country stays on the reform track and secures its future\textsuperscript{269}. The author suggests that “in this effort, Moldova needs consistent support and attention from the EU”\textsuperscript{270}.

EU’s impartiality and proportionality: The EU had to cope with the interests of various involved parties. Variety of countries risked impartiality and proportionality of the EU. We

\textsuperscript{259} Gheorghiu, Dr. Valeriu, Moldova on the Way to the European Union: Distance Covered and Next Steps to be Done, p.2
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid, p.2
\textsuperscript{261} Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p.6
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid, p.6
\textsuperscript{263} Gheorghiu, Dr. Valeriu, Moldova on the Way to the European Union: Distance Covered and Next Steps to be Done, p.2
\textsuperscript{264} Nugent, Neill, Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of Being Small, p.11
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid, p.11
\textsuperscript{269} Ora, Jaap, Frozen Conflicts and the EU – a Search for a Positive Agenda, p.3-4
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid, p.3-4
may notice this trend while looking back to the rate of conditionality applied to the sides in the Cyprus case. In order to be effective, the EU conditionality should be exerted on all conflict parties at the same time\textsuperscript{271}. The EU process influenced political changes in Turkey and Northern Cyprus, but, as Eralp Atila suggests, the Greek Cypriots were the least influenced\textsuperscript{272}. Here, logically, a question arises: why? The answer is that the rate of conditionality applied to the sides (Turkey, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) was imbalanced. While Turkish accession was linked to the resolution of the Cyprus issue, “the same linkage did not exist for the Greek Cypriots, since the resolution of the conflict was no longer a precondition for their accession”\textsuperscript{273}.

The variety of interests affected the EU’s conditionality when Greece used its leverage. In 1995 and 1999 Greece agreed to deepen relations with Turkey if conditionality were to be lifted on the Greek Cypriots\textsuperscript{274}. This shows how an EU MS can influence the common EU policy.

One of the criteria for measuring the EU’s role in the conflicts’ resolution is its stance to the involving parties. The fact that the sides concerned are the EU MSs, an ENP partner and an accession country, risks the EU’s impartiality and determined the rate of involvement in the conflicts.

Amanda Akçakoca maintains that Cyprus’ EU membership “limits the Union’s room for manoeuvre and makes it virtually impossible for it to play the role of ‘honest broker’ on issues related to the island”\textsuperscript{275}. This impact can be seen when looking back to the EU-Turkey relations. Since 1981 when Greece acquired EU membership, “Cyprus became an important internal matter for EC/EU members”\textsuperscript{276}. The issue began to affect negatively EU-Turkey relations in 1980s and 1990s\textsuperscript{277}. This is what Amanda Akçakoca says about the Cyprus issue in EU-Turkey relations: “this decades-old problem will continue to cast a long shadow over Ankara’s relations with the EU”\textsuperscript{278}. As a result, “Turkey found itself

\textsuperscript{271} Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.165
\textsuperscript{272} Eralp, Atıla, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.6
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid, p.6
\textsuperscript{274} Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.52
\textsuperscript{275} Akçakoca, Amanda, EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment? p.15
\textsuperscript{276} Eralp, Atıla, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.5
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid, p.5
\textsuperscript{278} Akçakoca, Amanda, EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment? p.26
increasingly distanced from Europe which was engaged in redefining its identity and boundaries. Turkey’s accession process was important for the fate of the Cyprus Problem. The process itself “is highly political and requires strong and sustained political will on all sides if it is to continue and eventually succeed”. Progress of EU-Turkey accession talks was very important for the fate of Cyprus in general. In 2006 Amanda Akçakoca said: “…many fear that if the membership negotiations are halted now, Cyprus may remain divided forever.”

Scholars rest many hopes to the EU’s leverage in the resolution of the Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts using its instruments. Amanda Akçakoca maintains that the EU should “send clear messages to Turkey and … speak with one voice”. That can be exerted through the EU instruments and generally its policy towards Turkey during negotiation process. By directing instruments and policy to the parties, the EU has obvious influence on the parties for pressing solutions.

_EU factor:_ After assessing the EU’s impartiality and proportionality towards the various involved sides of the conflicts, view at the EU factor, its place and influence on the abovementioned parties will help us form an answer to the main research question (how efficient is the EU in conflicts’ resolution?). What part has the EU factor played in the politics of the parties, has it influenced their policies and at what extent? The passage will follow this direction.

Looking at the Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts, we see neither the EU accession process nor closer ties with the EU served as catalysts of the conflicts respectively. Nathalie Tocci argues that the RoC’s and Moldova’s aspirations to the EU demonstrated a case when “the metropolitan state may abandon the search for a complex federal solution and focus its attention on unilateral EU membership instead”.

Discussing the issue through Constructivism will rest on ideas and identities. Precondition to the success of the EU’s policy is “to change their identity and to alter the norms and

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279 Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.5
280 Akçakoca, Amanda, EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment? p.6
281 Ibid, p.13
282 Ibid, p.15
283 Tocci, Nathalie, The EU and Conflict Resolution, Promoting Peace in the Backyard, p.22
values”284 of the new partner countries and, by doing so, promote its values and standards. What changes the EU factor has brought about are enlisted below.

There were various positions with regard to the EU. The differences in outlook have contributed to the division of the population inside the countries concerned. In 2000, the PCRM party turned down the option of joining a platform for European integration285. The EU issue seemed to have divided the public into two parts. Same was said with regard to Cyprus, that the EU has divided the island as discussed in the Historical Overview chapter.

The EU factor affected the relations of the involved sides. It is visible from a range of events. When political stance on Cyprus was concerned, “the increasingly important EU factor both in Cyprus and in Turkey has complicated TRNC-Turkey relations”286.

Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer Mac Naughtan stress the importance of ideas and values in Turkey's aspirations. “Arguably, the debate about Turkey’s future membership of the EU is first and foremost centred on issues of identity, ideas and values. Interests, power and institutional set-ups are not unimportant, but they nevertheless play second fiddle”287.

The EU factor for Moldova became acute due to the EU’s enlargement process288 in particular Romania’s proximity to Moldova played a vital role. But the EU factor affected Moldova in other way as well: the country was aspiring to the EU membership. Although the ENP does not envisage perspectives for membership, concept of European integration had an important influence on Moldova's policy289.

The EU factor accelerated the search for a solution of the Cyprus Problem and its formulation. It was the post-Helsinki climate that set the urgency of resolving the Cyprus problem prior to the accession of Cyprus290. Due to the situation, the UNSG “presented his

284 Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.334
285 Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p.6
286 Atasoy, Seymen, Cyprus, Turkey, and the EU: The Need for A Gradual Approach, p.261
287 Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.334
288 Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, pp.1-3
289 Ibid, pp.1-3
290 Emerson, Michael, Tocci, Nathalie, Cyprus as Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean quoted in Eralp, Atila, Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship, p.6
successive plans creating links between the settlement of the problem and the emerging EU framework on the island”\(^{291}\).

Drawing a parallel to Constructivism will show links between the above passages and Jeffrey Checkel’s assumptions: “when the persuader is an authoritative member of the ingroup to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong”\(^{292}\), it boosts persuasion. Thus, the EU was the actor for which the countries redefined their interests.

When reading out about Europeanisation in Moldovan political discourse, we recall Europeanisation of the Cyprus. In the first case Moldova Europeanised the discourse itself while in the second the EU allowed Greece to Europeanise the Cyprus issue. Therefore, we can conclude that the word Europeanisation weights a lot. Like in Turkey, the aspiration to the EU divided public into two in Moldova and Transnistria. In both Cyprus and Transnistria cases, the EU is not endorsed by the self-proclaimed entities (TRNC and Transnistria). Furthermore, the EU has to face up two big players which are related to the conflicts: Russia (the EU’s strategic partner) and Turkey (the EU accession country).

**EU’s impartiality and various involved actors**: Involvement of the various actors in the Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts risked the impartiality and proportionality of the EU itself. Having various involving actors mean a variety of interests. While adopting policies and instruments towards the conflicts, the EU had to accommodate to some of their interests. On the other hand, some of these interests may be sacrificed to the outlook. What interests these different involving actors had, how impartial and proportional the EU was towards them and what part has the EU factor itself played will be useful for final assessment of the EU’s efficiency in conflicts’ resolution on the example of the two conflicts. The clue connecting these two conflicts in this thesis was the EU enlargement process and, obviously, EU’s impartiality and proportionality will be discussed in the context of its enlargement.

\(^{291}\) Ibid, p.6
\(^{292}\) Mette Ellstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.411
Andreas Theophanous thinks that the Cyprus issue is a European and international problem. "Whether and how it will be resolved will inevitably have repercussions beyond the territorial boundaries of this island-state." Put aside the international arena, "Cyprus will constitute a litmus test for both the EU and Turkey" in the sense that the EU, as a global political power, had to prove its capacity on one hand and Turkey, because of its European orientation, would have "to relinquish its expansionist designs against Cyprus."  

Cyprus issue was linked to the ESDP. This, on its turn, had its implications on Turkey especially when the ESDP was developing. Turkey was alarmed, assuming that "the EU's new capabilities could be used against herself in a dispute with Greece over the Aegean or Cyprus." Therefore, the EU's approach to Cyprus was directly and proportionally linked to Turkey's approach to the ESDP. Hugh Pope thinks that "Cyprus and ESDP have proved to be hardly separable, and these linkages will probably remain until the final accession of Turkey to the EU, if this ever happens."  

While analysing the Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian joint peacekeeping mission, Jaap Ora stresses for an alternative that would lead to a political solution to the conflict. The nature of the conflict and its proximity to the EU gives the author pretext to say the EU-led as the best option in cooperation with Russia. "Some observers have argued that Transnistria is a potential model case for EU-Russia cooperation in crisis management, yet the EU-Russia dialogue so far has not produced the desired results."  

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293 Theophanous, Andreas, The EU, Turkey and Cyprus: What Next? p.3  
294 Ibid, p.3  
295 Ibid, p.3  
296 Ibid, p.3  
297 Ibid, p.3  
298 Hugh Pope, ‘Turkey’s overlap with Europe’, Info@re-public, 13 November 2008 quoted in Medina-Abellán, Miguel, Turkey, The European Security And Defence Policy, And Accession Negotiations, p.7  
299 Özlem, Terzi, New Capabilities, Old Relationships: Emergent ESDP and EU-Turkish Relations, p.56  
300 Hugh Pope, ‘Turkey’s overlap with Europe’, Info@re-public, 13 November 2008 quoted in Medina-Abellán, Miguel, Turkey, The European Security And Defence Policy, And Accession Negotiations, p.7  
301 Ibid, p.7  
302 Ora, Jaap, Frozen Conflicts and the EU – a Search for a Positive Agenda, p.4  
303 Ibid, p.4  
304 Ibid, p.4
There were various parties involved in the Cyprus and Transnistria that makes us look at things form different sides and take the interests of the actors into consideration when analysing the general direction of events.

The EU had an ambition to shape events as stated in the ESS, but it could not always attain to its aim. There is one good example in the Cyprus case where the involving parties of the conflict influenced the EU policy. When recollecting the April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, Bahri Yilmaz says: “It was a major mistake by the EU to accept the Greek part of Cyprus as a full member of the EU without any definitive solution to the Cyprus issues, for the EU has become prisoner of its own politics”\textsuperscript{305}.

Like in the Cyprus case, the opposing sides of Transnistria conflict were “unable to agree on any of the proposals tabled by the international mediators, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE”\textsuperscript{306}. This demonstrates inefficient involvement and a gap in interest of the conflicting sides.

While analysing the involving sides of the Cyprus conflict, David Hannay says there was “a negotiating vacuum”\textsuperscript{307}. He assesses interests of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and Greece\textsuperscript{308}. According to the author, the better-off party was the Greek Cyprus, with nothing to lose even if they did not support the reunification process. The Turkish Cypriots, on the contrary, were at the risk of absorption into Turkey; Turkey was in the most difficult situation as it would have to concede the Northern Cyprus for securing accession to the EU; for Greece the problems were less immediate and acute.

Realising linkage between the resolution of the Cyprus Problem and Turkey’s EU membership, as well as favourable conditions looming for Turkish Cypriots if they became EU MS, they (Turkish Cypriots) supported the UN Plan in 2003 and 2004\textsuperscript{309}. This support was a result of strong conditionality applied to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Consequently, lack of conditionality for the Greek side led to a rejection of the UN Plan by Greek

\textsuperscript{305} Yilmaz, Bahri, \textit{The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever?} p.21
\textsuperscript{306} Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.1
\textsuperscript{307} Hannay, David, Cyprus, Turkey and the EU: Time for a Sense of Proportion and Compromise, p.2
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid, p.2
Cypriots. “They could become members of the EU without the settlement of the problem. As one close analyst clearly put, they had an attractive best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)”. Rebecca Bryant things that by rejecting the UN plan Greek Cypriots hoped “European Union membership would give them a stronger position from which to negotiate a better deal”. It was due to this very linkage that Turkey, as one of the side involved in the Cyprus conflict, has taken certain actions to solve the situation. Its suggestion of a “Conference of Five”, bringing together Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the guarantor powers, was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leadership in 2003 “as an unacceptable departure from the UN process”.

Although there was a threat of the Greek Cypriot veto while Turkey’s accession process, general position of the RoC and Greece was in favour of Turkey’s EU membership. Reason behind this position lies in the fact that the “both countries have some serious political conflicts with Turkey which in their opinion can better be solved to their advantage through Turkish EU accession”.

When Turkey acknowledged necessity of its cooperation for the resolution of the Cyprus problem and invited Cypriot leaders to negotiate, Papadopoulos threatened “to erect barriers for Turkey at every step of its EU accession process”. In such “legal gamesmanship”, Rebecca Bryant suggested that the only possible result could be “either the Republic’s own further isolation from other EU countries or Turkey’s withdrawal from the EU process”. The author maintains that neither of the result would be beneficial for the RoC.

When thinking about the EU-Turkey relations, we remember that Greece and the RoC are the EU MS and, therefore, can lobby the EU policies some way. The EU membership means aligning to the EU foreign policy objectives and sacrifice sovereignty. However,
interests of Greece and the RoC may be different from those of the EU. Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer Mac Naughtan say: “Despite a strengthened shared normative framework, foreign policy interventions and even some successes, differences in power and in interests remain crucial variables to explaining member states’ foreign policy and whether a common EU foreign policy is achievable”\textsuperscript{319}. Obviously the Cyprus issue plays an important part in Greece’s national policy.

Turkey’s presence affected EU-NATO relations, especially while formation of the ESDP. Solution was provided by “the joint UK-US-Turkish document, known as the Ankara Document, which made sure that a potential ESDP force would never be deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean”\textsuperscript{320}. By providing a reverse clause, the document seemed “to assuage Ankara’s concerns regarding the EU force’s operations in areas vital to Turkish interests”\textsuperscript{321}. The new agreement left Cyprus “outside the area of responsibility of ESDP, while Turkey lifted its veto on the EU’s assured access to NATO assets”\textsuperscript{322}.

From the abovementioned facts we can conclude that Turkish factor was so important while formation and further success of the ESDP, but the ESDP was not necessarily linked to its accession process\textsuperscript{323}. Only Cyprus, Greece and France were the countries that conceived “Turkey’s accession process through the security and defence lenses”\textsuperscript{324}.

Overview of actors related to the country of Moldova enlightens us about quite a difficult nature of the Transnistria conflict. Wim van Meurs sees Moldova as independent but, at the same time, having quadruple dependencies\textsuperscript{325}, depending “on energy resources and political goodwill from Moscow, tense relations with Bucharest, conditional credits and

\textsuperscript{319} Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.334
\textsuperscript{322} Antonio Missiroli, ‘EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Security Dialogue, 23, 2003, pp.9-26, quoted in Medina-Abellan, Miguel, Turkey, The European Security And Defence Policy, And Accession Negotiations, p.4
\textsuperscript{323} Medina-Abellan, Miguel, Turkey, The European Security And Defence Policy, And Accession Negotiations, p.9
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid, p.9
\textsuperscript{325} Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p.1
assistance from the West and deadlocked negotiations with the separatist regime in Tiraspol”\textsuperscript{326}.

When, as a result for the OSCE’s invitation, the EU decided on the peace-support operation in Transnistria, Russia, as an involved actor, showed its reluctance towards the proposal\textsuperscript{327}. As a response, Javier Solana said the EU wanted “to cooperate positively with Russia in Moldova on a broad range of issues”\textsuperscript{328}. Russia’s reluctance led to the situation when the EU could not act. Nicu Popescu stressed for the more robust involvement of the EU in Transnistria conflict so that “to catch up with thought”\textsuperscript{329}. The Transnistria conflict was important in the EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations\textsuperscript{330}.

Russia factor was important for the settlement of the Transnistria conflict. Its support of the Transnistria leadership has caused concerns in the EU\textsuperscript{331}. This again triggered for the greater and more robust EU involvement in the conflict resolution process. Jaap Ora recommends a “sustained international diplomacy … to motivate Russia to utilise its influence over the Transnistrian leaders in the interests of a resolution”\textsuperscript{332}. Such outlook, together with a continued dialogue would lead to the fulfilment of the Istanbul commitments from the Russian side\textsuperscript{333}.

Determination and political stance of the conflicting sides was important and mostly determined the EU’s involvement. In the Transnistria case, Moldova’s stress on the EU and Europeanization in Moldovan political discourse resulted in the EU engagement in the Transnistria conflict in the 2000s\textsuperscript{334}. This engagement made up for the negligible role the EU played in the first decade of the Transnistria conflict\textsuperscript{335}. The fact that Moldova’s stressed on the EU “independently of the settlement of the conflict”\textsuperscript{336} is worth mentioning.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{326} Ibid, p.1
  \item \textsuperscript{327} Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.7
  \item \textsuperscript{328} Interview with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, p.3
  \item \textsuperscript{329} Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.7
  \item \textsuperscript{330} Ibid, pp.7-8
  \item \textsuperscript{331} Ora, Jaap, Frozen Conflicts and the EU – a Search for a Positive Agenda, p.4
  \item \textsuperscript{332} Ibid, p.4
  \item \textsuperscript{333} Ibid, p.4
  \item \textsuperscript{334} Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.1
  \item \textsuperscript{335} Ibid, p.1
  \item \textsuperscript{336} Ibid, p.1
\end{itemize}
This engagement of the EU was met with uneven reactions from the other sides of the conflicts. Transnistrians responded by resentment. The EU engagement has led to a growing resentment towards the EU in Transnistrian political discourse. Differences among the major external actors have become more pronounced, with Russia disapproving of the ‘interference’ of the West and the growing engagement of the EU.

Moldova’s European orientation may not have been met with enthusiasm from the involved sides, but it was regarded as the second best when talking about the country’s success. Some suggested that Chisinau should concentrate on European integration rather than solution to the Transnistria conflict.

Javier Solana recommends that Moldova has to “resolve its domestic conflict once and for all and to start developing its full potential as a European country. And the international community, including the EU, is ready to assist Moldova on this path.” Consequently, the three Ds (Democratisation, Decriminalisation and Demilitarisation of Transnistria under European supervision) that was required by the opposition in Moldova could be achieved after normalisation of domestic situation in the country. In his interview Dr. Oliver Wolleh stresses importance of internal stability: “Only if you create peace in the inside you can become a member of the EU.”

The EU used not only conditionality for social learning and social mobilisation, but also tried to get the conflicting sides interact. According to Jeffrey Checkel, “social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants.” Proposed frequent meetings between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, also between the Transnistria and Moldova side should have led to social learning that undoubtedly benefited the conflicts’ resolution process.

337 Ibid, p.1
338 Ibid, p.1
339 Vasile Nedelciuc, Anno domini 2007 in the Republic of Moldova, Independence, Federalization or Union?, and the interview with Moldova’s ambassador to the Council of Europe in Moldpress, 17 December 2003, where Cyprus is invoked as a possible model for Moldova’s European integration efforts quoted in Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.18
340 Interview with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, p.2
341 Ibid, p.3
342 Interview with Dr. Oliver Wolleh (unpublished)
343 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, Social Construction and Integration by Jeffrey Checkel, p.411
EU’s ambition, interests and resources: Having drawn close to the turbulent regions, the EU had to take the responsibility of dealing with them and seeking ways of possible resolution. As stated in the introduction, the EU’s ambition, interest and resources were seen by the international actors.

The EU was regarded as a possible guarantor power for Cyprus regarding security interests, territory and refugees. The issue was raised in direction of negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. During this process security guarantees and peacekeeping functions were also touched upon. Michael Emerson suggests “the three original guarantor states (Greece, Turkey and the UK) as well as some combination of roles of the UN or possibly NATO or the EU” as the ones involved in this direction.

Upon revision of the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, Michael Emerson and Natalie Tocci assume the EU to be a guarantor power together with Greece and Turkey. They together “would guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the new state”. Duty of the new guarantor powers would be to “safeguard the principles of the European Union throughout the island”. Guarantorship from the EU side would have non-military character and principles of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the EU institutions (particularly the Council) would ensure that the new treaty was adhered to. Inclusion of the EU as a guarantor power would ensure credibility of the new treaty. This highlights the importance and viability of the EU principles for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. Obviously, this non-military guarantee would not be sufficient and the treaty would have mechanisms to balance the situation.

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344 Emerson, Michael, Tocci, Natalie, Cyprus as a Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean, Shaping EU Accession and Re-unification Together, p.60
345 Ibid, p.60
346 Ibid, p.64
347 Ibid, p.64
348 Emerson, Michael, Tocci, Natalie, Cyprus as a Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean, Shaping EU Accession and Re-unification Together, pp.64-65
349 Ibid, pp.64-65
350 Ibid, pp.64-65
What talking about the involvement of the EU in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, Ahmet Sözen suggests that “the EU can play an instrumental role in resolving the Cyprus conflict in line with the Annan Plan through linkage politics”\textsuperscript{351}.

By supporting the resolution of the Cyprus problem in accordance with relevant UN resolutions the EU once again proved supremacy of the UN in this respect (in fact the EU principles adhere to the generally-acknowledged UN resolutions)\textsuperscript{352}.

Michael Emerson and Natalie Tocci also discuss possibilities for peacekeeping forces in Cyprus\textsuperscript{353} and the EU’s inclusion in it. They argue that “a continued UN role would have the advantage of continuity”\textsuperscript{354}. According to the authors, the peacekeeping forces would provide an opportunity for constructive collaboration between the EU and NATO\textsuperscript{355}.

Like in the Cyprus case, the EU ambition, interest and resources were seen by the other international actors, in particular by OSCE which, in 2003 “launched the idea of an EU peace-keeping mission to Moldova”\textsuperscript{356}. The OSCE’s opinion was shared by the EU think tank which proposed a robust EU strategy for the Dnestr conflict in cooperation with Russia\textsuperscript{357}.

Apart from the invitation from an international actor (the OSCE), the EU was asked to get involved by the conflicting parties themselves. The will was so big that the plan, supported by Moldova and Ukraine, was endorsed by Transnistria in 2005\textsuperscript{358}.

Necessity of the involvement of the third party was highlighted. David Hannay recommends the European Commission as the player outside the inner circle. In the author’s opinion, in 2006 should have helped the parties disentangle the issues.

\textsuperscript{351} Sözen, Ahmet, A Model of Power-Sharing in Cyprus: From the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements to the Annan Plan, p.75
\textsuperscript{352} Kyriacou, P. Andreas, A Viable Solution to The Cyprus Problem In The Context of European Union Accession, p.4
\textsuperscript{353} Emerson, Michael, Tocci, Natalie, Cyprus as a Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean, Shaping EU Accession and Re-unification Together, p.66
\textsuperscript{354} Ibid, p.66
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid, p.66
\textsuperscript{356} Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p.5
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid, p.5
\textsuperscript{358} Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.3
Acceptable solutions should be found to the both parties, “but separately”\(^3\). In doing this, it may be necessary to look a little further than the immediate subject matter\(^4\). This stresses importance of a long-term approach to the conflict from the EU side. As stated in the Research Questions chapter, the EU’s instruments proved to have short-term goals as they were not sustained by sufficient diplomatic and military support\(^5\).

\textit{The EU as an actor}: While reviewing the EU as an actor in the conflicts, we will first see what the EU’s stance towards the conflicts was. This is what Nicu Popescu says about EU thinking towards Transnistria issue: “Moldovan conflict remains far from the most salient problem the EU faces, but since 2003 there has been a lot of thinking about the conflict in Transnistria”\(^6\).

What factors have determined the EU involvement in the Transnistria conflict and generally to the East? First and foremost reason is the enlargement process, second – somewhat stabilised situation in the Balkans (owing to the ESDP)\(^7\).

Another factor which determined the EU involvement was Russian’s policy and its unilateral diplomacy expressed in the so-called particularly ‘Kozak memorandum’ and in its reluctance and non-adherence towards the OSCE efforts and commitments\(^8\). Furthermore, the road maps adopted in 2005 and in particular the launch of a road map for a space of common external security in May 2005 paved the way for more cooperation between the EU and Russia\(^9\). Orange revolution in Ukraine provided another boost for cooperation between the EU and Ukraine\(^10\).

All these abovementioned factors and plus soft security threats from Moldova and the PMR\(^11\) made the EU, together with its MS, decide to change the status quo\(^12\).

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\(^3\) Hannay, David, Cyprus, Turkey and the EU: Time for a Sense of Proportion and Compromise, p.3  
\(^4\) Ibid, p.3  
\(^5\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.220  
\(^6\) Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.3  
\(^7\) Ibid, pp.1-3  
\(^8\) Interview with EU official, Brussels, April 2005 quoted in Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, p.3  
\(^9\) Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, pp.1-3  
\(^10\) Ibid, pp.1-3  
\(^11\) Meurs, Wim van, Moldova ante portas: the EU Agendas of Conflict Management and ‘Wider Europe’, p.1  
\(^12\) Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, pp.1-3
Accompanying events in the international arena determined the EU’s involvement in the Transnistria conflict: “With the OSCE in crisis, NATO looking beyond Europe towards global responsibilities, the United States deeply involved in the Middle East, the obvious candidate to drive the conflict resolution process is the EU”\(^\text{369}\).

As for diplomatic actions \textit{vis-a-vis} the Transnistria conflict, the EU’s moves were quite quick\(^\text{370}\). Being an ad hoc diplomatic actor in Moldova, the EU periodically sent diplomatic missions to Moldova during 2003-2004\(^\text{371}\). Furthermore, during the same period the EU was “raising the Transnistria problem with Russia and Ukraine and expressing opinions on the conflict resolution process”\(^\text{372}\). The EU as an actor strongly influenced Moldova’s stance in 2003, when the country followed the EU’s steps and did not endorse the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’\(^\text{373}\).

Settlement of the Transnistria conflict would ensure not only safe neighbourhood around the EU, but also it “would attenuate the soft security challenges the EU faces on its Eastern border”\(^\text{374}\). Such a result obviously required robust and viable involvement from the EU side. Nicu Popescu suggests that “the focus of EU policy should be to alter the context in which the conflict is situated and sustained, rather than hoping for an early agreement on the status of Transnistria. The primary objective should be to increase Moldova’s ‘attractiveness’ while decreasing the benefits of maintaining the current status quo”\(^\text{375}\).

For achieving effective results in the Transnistria’s conflict settlement process, Nicu Popescu thinks the EU should set Transnistria as a benchmark and apply an Action Plan to it\(^\text{376}\).

\(^{369}\) Ibid, pp.1-3
\(^{370}\) Ibid, p.4
\(^{371}\) Ibid, p.4
\(^{372}\) Ibid, p.4
\(^{373}\) Ibid, p.4
\(^{374}\) Ibid, pp.7-8
\(^{375}\) Popescu, Nico, The EU and Transnistria, pp.7-8
\(^{376}\) Ibid, pp.7-8
The EU interest in the Transnistria conflict was expressed in the “adoption of the ENP AP, the appointment of the EUSR, the opening of the office of the Commission in Chisinau in October 2005 and the decision to open visa facilitation negotiations”\(^{377}\).

It is obvious that, upon expanding, stability of the new neighbours mattered to the EU. Therefore, Transnistria would have a bad effect on the smuggling and transnational crime of the EU\(^{378}\). But what the EU led to an increased focus on Transnistria was “a growing awareness of the linkages between the unresolved conflict and Moldova’s difficult economic and political situation”\(^{379}\).

Discussion of the EU peacemaking force for Transnistria by the EU Political and Security Committee\(^{380}\) proved that the EU was determined “to build a stronger cooperation with Moldova and to play a meaningful and appropriate role in the process of reaching a resolution to the situation in Transnistria”\(^{381}\). More engagement in the Transnistria was welcomed by a broad consensus in the EU\(^{382}\).

*Could the EU act on its own, independently from the other international players?* While assessing the EU factor and its ability to act independently, we touch upon the EU identity. As Stephen Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan say, the EU identity hinges on a shared understanding among the member states\(^{383}\). The EU identity highlights the importance of promoting its norms first internally and then externally\(^{384}\). Therefore, cooperation with the other international players is of crucial importance for the EU identity.

As Stephan Keukeleire says, “Many of the EU’s actions are explicitly adopted alongside or in support of the initiatives of the other international organisations”\(^{385}\). The same author insists that “the EU plays an important role in sustaining the UN”\(^{386}\), both politically and financially. “The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to

\(^{377}\) Ora, Jaap, Frozen Conflicts and the EU – a Search for a Positive Agenda, p.3-4
\(^{378}\) Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.20
\(^{379}\) Ibid, p.20
\(^{380}\) Interview with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, p.1
\(^{381}\) Ibid, p.1
\(^{382}\) Ibid, pp.1-2
\(^{383}\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.333
\(^{384}\) Keukeleire, Stephan, Mac Naughtan, Jennifer, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.334
\(^{385}\) Ibid, p.302
\(^{386}\) Ibid, p.305
international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.\(^3\)

Could the EU act independently on its own in the resolution of the Cyprus problem? The conflict already had a serious mediator, the UN. Naomi Rosenbaum thinks that by its involvement in the Cyprus conflict, “the United Nations makes a characteristic contribution to world stability.”\(^3\) But the UN’s efforts did not bear fruit. At the same time, more involvement from the various international actors was obviously needed. Amanda Akçakoca insists that the international community should “put more emphasis and effort into finding a long-term solution to the Cyprus problem, rather than just ‘supporting the good offices’ of the UN.”\(^3\)

In 2005 invitation of the EU to join the mediation process of the Transnistrian conflict outlined perspectives for 5+2 negotiating mechanism and more EU support to the OSCE efforts.\(^3\) Upon the invitation the EU was becoming an observer.\(^3\) The Transnistria conflict is considered as “the only frozen conflict where the EU is part of the settlement mechanism.”\(^3\)

The EU’s inclusion as an observer in the Joint Constitutional Commission in 2003 seemed to be promising. But the fact that “the EU has not sought to be included as one of the principal mediators and eventual guarantors of a settlement, as proposed by President Voronin in September 2003”\(^3\) excluded more robust involvement on the EU’s part. However, this was a direct involvement of the EU in the conflict resolution process.

In response to the OSCE’s suggestion about the EU peacemaking force in Transnistria, Javier Solana declared “the EU has already declared its full readiness to assist in

\(^{3}\) A Secure Europe in a Better World, p.11
\(^{3}\) Akçakoca, Amanda, EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment? p.26
\(^{3}\) Ora, Jaap, Frozen Conflicts and the EU – a Search for a Positive Agenda, pp.3-4
\(^{3}\) Ibid, pp.3-4
\(^{3}\) Ibid, pp.3-4
\(^{3}\) Vahl, Marius, Emerson, Michael, Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict, p.21
implementing any peace agreement, which includes considerations also in the field of possible military and civilian contributions. The EU was ambitious to step towards the eventual peace consolidation force under the aegis of the OSCE.

Assessing the relations among the EU and other international mediators involved in the conflicts resolution process helps us to form a general idea about the extent of the EU’s involvement in the conflicts.

George Vassilou claims that the EU rested all the hope for Cyprus’ reunification on the UN, being determined “not to be engaged in the efforts to find a formula for a federation”. The same situation happened with Moldova when it was urged not to mention the Transnistria conflict in the framework of Stability Pact for the Balkans, discussed in the EU Involvement chapter.

After many fruitless attempts by the UN towards the resolution of the Cyprus problem, in 2000 Andreas Kyriacou questions whether the EU could provide a “democratic channel” that would trigger positive change in the Cyprus issue.

But could the EU be an objective third party in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict? Bahri Yilmaz thinks: “As long as the Greek part of Cyprus represents Cyprus as a whole, the European Union is unlikely to be able to make any contributions to resolving the issue along lines similar to those of the Annan Plan – which was after all accepted by Turkish Cypriots”. On Moldova’s side, the EU-Russia’s strategic partnership would be a burden.

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394 Interview with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, p.1
395 Ibid, p.1
396 Vassilou, George, The Solution of the Cyprus Problem: The Key to Turkey’s Relations with the EU, p.3
397 Kyriacou, P. Andreas, A Viable Solution to The Cyprus Problem In The Context of European Union Accession, pp.7-8
398 Yilmaz, Bahri, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? p.21
6. Conclusion

The EU assigned instruments and policies to the conflicting countries. These instruments and policies were aimed at the conflict resolution and at the improvement of security and well-being of the countries. They did not reach all their aims. The main guiding principle (Copenhagen Criteria) in the Cyprus case deviated the EU from the conflict settlement process. Same trend was applied to Transnistria: the EU’s focus on Moldova’s customs territory let the EU look at the conflict from Ukraine-Moldova perspective and not have direct links with Russia.
Conditionality, the very tool for implementation of the EU’s principles, failed to be objective. As there were various involving parties, this led to a various rate of conditionality. As a result, impartiality and proportionality of the EU’s instruments and policies came at risk. Conditionality might have faded in some cases, but it played its part and prompted the actors for social learning. Conditionality was one of the main EU tools for persuasion. Having acknowledged importance of the closer links with the EU, the countries looked beyond mere strategic exchange. The various involved actors triggered impartiality of not only the EU’s instruments and policies, but also of the EU itself.

One more condition that accelerated social learning of the countries was security interests and economic benefits of the EU partnership. This detail, together with conditionality, were instruments of persuasion, leading to social learning.

The EU had a great leverage on the conflict resolution process. This is proven by the scholars’ assumptions that, if it had sent clearer messages to Turkey, this step would have resulted in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. In Transnistria’s case deficiencies of the instruments and policies undermined successful end of the conflict resolution.

The EU factor played an important role in the political stance of the countries. It led to various changes and proved credibility of the instruments and policies assigned to them. This is one more embodiment of persuasion and social learning that came about by the EU instruments and policies.

Logically a variety of the involved actors means a variety of interests. The conflicting sides were unable to agree on the conflict resolution possibilities that were proposed by the international mediators. They had different stances towards the EU, some of them endorsed its involvement, while the others objected. Two main factors influenced their outlooks: the UN and OSCE invited the EU to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus and Transnistria conflicts respectively, the European think-tanks proposed the same; Transnistria and the TRNC saw benefits of the closer ties with the EU for fulfilment of their interests. Furthermore, the other sides (particularly the RoC, Greece and Moldova) were highlighting necessity of third party involvement. Such an involvement would mean new
instruments and policies for the conflict resolution. For assessing the EU’s capability and efficiency, a new concept arises: the EU as an actor. Questions related to the theme concern the ability of the EU to act on its own independently from the other international players and its relations with them. The EU is for the cooperation with the UN and the OSCE and sustains their operations. The EU’s Soft- and the newly-adopted military power could ensure successful ends of the conflict resolution, according to the scholars. But the EU revealed its reluctance to get robustly involved in the two conflicts in its full depth. It did not set the unification of Cyprus as a precondition of the country’s accession and, secondly, it did not take up responsibility of direct involvement in the Transnistria conflict while being a member of the Joint Constitutional Committee. Neither its approaches to the concerned countries outlined its robust involvement in their conflicts.

The last point that is to assess efficiency of the EU is whether it could have been an objective third party in the conflicts’ resolution process. As seen from the abovementioned, the various conflicting sides, to some extent, undermined the EU’s impartiality and proportionality while assigning policies to them. The scholars assume that the RoC’s EU membership and Russia’s strategic partnership would have deterred the EU’s ability to manoeuvre.

In the end, conclusion would admit the EU’s potential to contribute to the conflicts’ resolution process. Its resources, ambition and interest, together with the soft- and hard power mechanisms can redefine interests of the conflicting sides and drive them to a better end. Thesis served the aim to review this potential and the real steps taken in this regard. It was done from the various perspectives that introduced importance of the outside conditions (interests of the various conflicting sides, the EU’s relations with them and other international players). Having influenced the conflict resolution process, these factors slowed down the pace. The world is changing constantly, therefore, developments of these events are left to be observed and followed up. What can be admitted so far is the EU’s ability to shape the countries’ interests through persuasion (conditionality) and lead to social learning. This helps spread the EU’s norms and values in the new countries and direct things to the course that is endorsed by the EU. Although the EU tailored its involvement in the two conflicts according to its interests, this involvement undoubtedly led to the rapprochement of the conflicting sides.
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Appendices:

Appendix I. Map of the Cyprus Island
Map 1 The partition of Cyprus.
Appendix II. Map of Transnistria